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ART. XIII.—THE APOSTLES' CREED.

II.—Its Inward Constitution and Form.

To estimate properly the merits and claims of the *apostolical symbol*, it is not enough to be acquainted with the facts of its history outwardly considered. We need still more to understand its interior history ; its rise and progress under an inward view ; the idea which is developed in its constitution, and the manner in which the development is to be regarded as taking place.

In the first place, the Creed is no work of mere outward *authority*, imposed on the Church by Christ or his Apostles. It would help its credit greatly in the eyes of some, no doubt, if it could be made to appear under this view. Their idea of christianity is such as involves prevailingly, the notion of a given or fixed scheme of things to be believed and done, propounded for the use of men, on the authority of heaven, in a purely mechanical and outward way. If there were evidence that some several of the Apostles together, or even the Apostle Paul, or the Apostle John alone, had formed the Creed as it now stands, and handed it over in this shape as something finished and complete, to the keeping of the Church, it would be looked upon, of course, as at once a

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divine tradition, the sacredness of which it would be no better than infidelity to doubt or call in question. It is plain, however, from the history already presented, that no such origin as this can be asserted in its favor. It is not in this sense it has claimed to be apostolical from the beginning. Its relation to the faith of the Church, is not that of an outward dead *traditum* or deposit, in any way. On the contrary, the idea of such a relation in the case, contradicts its whole nature. In no such form could it be the glorious christian *creed*, which we now find it to be in fact.

In the next place, it is no product of *reflection*, exercised on the contents of christianity, as an object of thought and study. This it might be conceived to have been, in two ways. We can suppose some gifted individual, well versed in the great truths of the gospel, to have addressed himself to the work of reducing them to the form of such a brief system or compend, in a merely private character; or we may imagine a body of competent persons met together for this purpose, as a council or synod, and furnishing the formulary as the result of their joint deliberation and discussion. This last view, especially, would suit the taste of many; more particularly if it could be made to appear that the Bible had been taken as the source and rule of all evidence in the case, and that the formulary was exhibited throughout as an extract simply, and summary, of what is to be found in its inspired pages. It would assist the respect of such persons greatly for the Apostles' Creed, if in the acknowledged default of a strictly apostolical *imprimatur*, it were possible still to refer to some ecclesiastical convention of this sort, in which with all due formality and deliberation it was brought out for the use of the Church, at the very beginning of its history; if that famous synod at Jerusalem, for instance, or some other solemnly convened for the purpose after the destruction of Jerusalem, were known to have taken the matter in hand, (after the fashion of the great *world convention* in London,) and to have produced finally, what they conceived to be, in this shape, a truly *scriptural* platform of christian doctrine. But it must be admitted that the ancient Creed comes down to us in no such form as this. We ask in vain for the private study or private theological brain to which it owes its birth; and we are equally disappointed when

we think of tracing its origin to any more public theological or ecclesiastical source. In this respect, its rise is more obscure seemingly, than that of all modern confessions. It comes with far less "observation," than the Heidelberg Catechism, or that of Westminster. No trumpet tongue proclaims its "articles of agreement," for the whole world to hear, as in the case of the late "Evangelical Alliance." There is no evidence whatever, of plan, or calculation, or forethought, of any sort, in its production; not even to the extent of what is implied in the fabrication of a modern church "covenant," for the use of a single congregation. There is nothing in the case to match even the independent private manufacture of that new creed lately originated for the use of the Protestant Armenian Church, in Constantinople. We can see and understand easily how *that* was made; the missionary goes into his upper room, takes the Bible into his hands, forgets as far as possible all creeds besides, and so through the medium of his own head, with such theological shape as it has already at hand, contrives and puts together a scheme or plan of necessary christian truths; which in such form is presented, at the end of a few hours, all done and complete, and at once ready for use. All this however, we miss in the Creed which bears the name of the Apostles. No one can tell exactly whence or how it comes. Its beginning is vague and uncertain. It seems to spring up at different points, and its appearance is not at once well settled and defined. Plainly there has been no method or plan, no process of intellectual reckoning, no comparison of views and observations, no outlay of theological thought and reflection, in the production of the Apostles' Creed. The authorship of it, be it such as it may, does not hold at all in the form of any such relation to its contents as would be implied in this supposition. It is not the work of any mind, or set of minds, placing themselves over against the contents of christianity in the way of consideration, holding them off as it were objectively for the notice of thought, and so reducing them to logical statement for the understanding. We hear of no such process; and we read no trace of it in the formulary itself. That is not in any view its constitution and form. The Creed, it deserves to be well understood and well borne in mind, is not a confession

in the common modern sense. It is not like a catechism. It is no summary of christian doctrine, no theory of divinity in miniature form. To be appreciated properly, it must be apprehended under a wholly different character.

We would not be understood, in what is here said, as undervaluing or disparaging at all, schemes of christian doctrine; as though the vital power of religion must be supposed to suffer, from any attempt to make it the subject of intellectual contemplation. There is a certain way, indeed, of using the understanding here, which is not to be approved; when its notions and abstractions, namely, are made to pass for the matter or substance of religion itself, as though this stood primarily in such mere acts of thought. To make reflection or intelligence, in this way, the principle of christianity, is to fall at once fully over into the arms of rationalism. But allowing the christian substance or reality to be already at hand, under a different form, there is no reason why it should not be made the object of thought, like any other material with which the mind is called to work. On the contrary, it lies in the very conception of christianity, that it should thus take possession of the thinking of men, as well as of their outward activity. It seeks continually to become objective, in the way of reflection and knowledge. Where there is no religious thought, no doctrinal scheme for the understanding, no theological science, it is in vain to expect that the life of religion can be truly prosperous in any other view. We undervalue not systematic divinity. We speak not a word against modern catechisms and confessions. They are all good and highly necessary in their place. Only we must not think of the Apostles' Creed, as belonging to the same order of ecclesiastical productions. It is no work of religious reflection, no product of the understanding, no digest in the form of thought. It holds altogether in a different element, and carries in itself quite another constitution.

What then is the true distinctive character of the Creed? How has it come to pass, and in what form does it now challenge our homage and respect?

We have the answer in its name. It is the *Creed*; that is, the substance of christianity in the form of faith. Here we reach

at once its last ground and inmost constitution. It holds immediately and entirely in the element of *faith*, and it can be rightly appreciated only as it is apprehended under this view.

Are not, however, our ordinary confessions and catechisms, in this respect, of the same nature? Is it not precisely as compends or summaries of the christian faith, the things which christianity requires us to believe, that they are prized and counted sacred?

They are indeed, we reply, summaries of what is regarded as the christian faith, and it is only as the contents of this faith are truly represented by them, that they can deserve respect; but still they do not hold immediately and directly in the life of faith itself, as the very element and inward form of their representation. They give us the contents of faith, as projected in the first place from the mind which has them, and made the object of thought or reflection. This reflection is not itself faith, but something different from it altogether; which only in this case employs its force on what faith has caused to be at hand for its use. So apprehended, truth is before the mind not immediately, but mediately. The mind separates itself, as it were, from its own contents under the first form, and then turns round to gaze upon them, for the purpose of coming if possible to some clear knowledge of their sense. The process is indirect, circuitous, reflex; whereas in the first case, the apprehension is immediate, and without any intervening mental operation. The difference between such mediate and immediate apprehension, is very great, and is not confined of course to the sphere of religion. All knowledge starts in the second form, and from this passes forward into the first. So we have said already, the substance of christianity carries in itself the same necessary tendency. It requires to be translated into both thought and action. In this mediated form, however, it is no longer the same thing precisely which it was before. Thus it is, that our summaries of faith, in the form which they carry as the product of theological reflection, are always materially different from the Apostles' Creed. They represent christianity under a reflex view; whereas in the Creed we have it in its primitive form, as the direct immediate utterance of the christian faith itself.

The full import of this distinction requires, however, that we

should now direct our attention more closely to the nature of faith. If our conception of this be defective and false, it must involve the whole subject for us necessarily in more or less confusion.

Faith, it is said, Heb. xi. 1, is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. With this agrees well the definition given of it in the Heidelberg Catechism: "True faith is not only a certain knowledge, whereby I hold for truth all that God has revealed to us in his word, but also an assured confidence, which the Holy Ghost works by the gospel in my heart, that not only to others, but to me also, remission of sin, everlasting righteousness and salvation, are freely given by God, merely of grace, only for the sake of Christ's merits." It is fully distinguished here from all mere fancy or opinion. It can hold only in regard to what is true; it can never be sundered from the actual substance of that which it is called to embrace. The idea of faith in a falsehood, and the idea of faith in no actual union with its object, are alike contradictions, which come in the end to the same thing. Faith carries in its very nature its own warrant and guaranty. It is the "substance and evidence" of the realities it brings into view. Thus related to its object, it is no blind assent of course to mere outward authority. Just as little, however, can it be regarded, as the product of ratiocination. Certain knowledge, as the Catechism has it, even if such a thing could have place on other grounds, engaging us to give full credit to the declarations of the Bible, as we believe the Copernican system, or the facts of common history, would not come up at all to the conception. Our knowledge or conviction, in such view, springing from no apprehension of the things themselves, but based on something out of them and beyond them altogether, would be in fact no knowledge whatever, but a system only of unsubstantial notions and abstractions pretending to the name. It is just as impossible for ratiocination to do what is wanted here, as it is for mere outward authority and blind tradition. It is not by thinking of invisible realities, that they are made to be really present for the soul. This real presence is accomplished by faith, and by faith alone; whose very nature it is to bridge over the chasm which divides the two worlds, and to

bring them into actual substantial union, as the "hypostasis of things hoped for and the demonstration of things not seen;" and which for this very reason must ever go before, and not follow after, all true intelligence in the sphere of religion, according to the deep sense of our motto borrowed from St. Anselm, and through him we may say from St. Augustine: "*Neque enim quero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.*"

Faith stands thus in the same relation to its objects, that holds in the case of sense. It brings the mind into direct communication with them, as actually present and at hand. Such is the apprehension we have of things immediately around us, in the world of nature, by means of our senses. As thus apprehended, they may be made the object of reflection and thought; but such reflection and thought are not themselves this primary apprehension. It goes before all thought, and lies at the ground of it, as that without which it could be of no force or worth whatever. In itself, it turns on no ratiocination, no intermediate bridge of any sort, between itself and the things to which it refers. It is in its own nature, the evidence of these things, the very form we may say, in which their existence is actualized and brought to demonstration. The relation of vision to light, for instance, is such as allows no room to intervene between them, no connecting link to bring them together. It is not in any sense external, but altogether inward. They are different sides only of the same fact, each being what it is wholly by the correspondence in which it stands with the other. Light asserts its character and power by means of vision; that is the form in which it comes to its revelation in the natural world. And so on the other hand, vision takes effect only through the presence of light; this constitutes the very matter or substance, by which it becomes real in the process of actual life. The light is in the eye, and not simply beyond it; the eye, or its capacity of seeing, is itself the power of what is seen, as made in this way to fill with its own immediate presence the mind that sees. It is the organ for light, which can never be exercised without it, and whose exercise then, of course, carries in itself the guaranty that its object is really at hand. In this, natural vision differs from all impressions of mere fancy, however vivid. It can have no place, without real natural light for its contents. The form here can

never be sundered from the substance, it is required to embrace. To talk or think of sight, that sees nothing, is an absurdity.

And now parallel with all this, we say, is the connection that holds between faith and the world of invisible realities, the true home of the spirit, revealed and thrown open by its means. It is the organ by which we perceive and apprehend the spiritual and eternal; the telescope, through which our vision is carried far over the confines of time and sense, into the regions of glory that lie illimitable beyond; the very eye itself rather, that enables us to "look at things unseen," and causes their presence to surround us as a part of our own life. Our nature is formed for such direct communication with the world of spirit; carries in itself an original capacity for transcending the world of sense, in the immediate apprehension of a higher order of existence; and can never be complete without its active development. Sin indeed overwhelms this capacity and prevents its proper use; natural men are said to do violence to the truth by their unrighteousness, (Rom i. 18-20) closing their inward sense as it were, to the revelation of it that surrounds them, and allowing it no room in their minds; but the corruption of our nature in this respect, is not its destruction. The great object of religion, accordingly, is, to restore it to its proper freedom and power, by infusing life into the spiritual sense of which we now speak. Thus called into exercise by the power of the Holy Ghost, faith makes way for the apprehension of divine things at once in their own light. The barrier which had place previously between them and the mind, is made of itself to fall away. They touch it, and make themselves felt by it, on the side of its original capability for such sense of the unseen; just as the things of the natural world touch it also, and are felt, on the side of its corresponding sense for what is outward and seen. As in the case of vision and light, so here also the relation between perception and object, is of the most inward and necessary character. It is the relation which holds between contents and form. Faith is the form in which divine truth comes to its proper revelation among men. As a word in the Bible, merely, or upon the tongue, or in the brain even, it is not made to be truly and fully in the world; only where it is "mixed with faith in them that hear it," only where it finds access to the living soul under this form, can it be said to

be revealed actually in its proper constitution. For truth is life; and it can hold as such only in an element answerable to its own nature. The words that I speak unto you, said our Saviour, (John vi. 63,) they are *spirit* and they are *life*; not letter for the eye only, nor sound for the ear, nor notion for the understanding, but truth whose very form is active power, and the apprehension of which accordingly is not to be imagined under any *other* form. The word lives, and is the word truly, only by faith. And so faith necessarily includes it also as its own proper substance and contents. Faith does not create truth; as little as our natural vision creates light; but without truth for its contents, it can no more be in exercise or existence, than the same natural vision can be where all light is wanting. As sense is developed by the world of sense, and subsists permanently only by union with it as its own substance; so faith is called into exercise only by the presence also of its proper objects, and can have no subsistence apart from them. Faith filled with fiction, is as great a contradiction as sight that sees nothing. It stands just in the apprehension of invisible things, in their own true and proper reality. The direct and immediate communication of our nature with this higher world, in virtue of its original capacity for such purpose, the state or activity in which this communication holds, is itself precisely what we are to understand by faith. It is the form or inward habit of a soul, in actual felt correspondence with things unseen and eternal.

The object of faith then, is always the supernatural; something that transcends nature, and is incapable of being reached in the way of mere sense and understanding. In this respect, it differs materially from common belief, such as we exercise continually in human testimony. This remains bound always to the things of this world. No amount of authority, no simply outward word, can bring into the mind under any such form, a real inward persuasion of the truth of things that belong to a higher world. Let a prophet come, doing miracles in proof of his mission, and then reporting to us invisible heavenly realities; and let us be never so well satisfied with his credentials, still the report, as such, can beget in us no actual faith. It might be fully sufficient to assure us of earthly things; but it cannot assure us in

the same way of heavenly things. These hold in a higher order of life, and can be apprehended accordingly only where the capacity is at hand for perceiving them in this form. The testimony of the prophet must be met with the power of faith on our side, as the true inward sense for the supernatural already in force, in order that it may be truly understood and received. By no possibility can faith in God, or in a divine word, be the consequence and product simply of faith in man, or faith in nature. The apprehension of divine things to be in any case real, must be in virtue of a direct and immediate communication with them, as something above nature and more than nature. This is faith; and in this sense it is, we suppose, that Abraham is made to say in the parable: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." Such an outward miracle could generate no faith, as men are apt to think it might. It would be no better for this purpose, we may say, than magic.

Faith looks at things unseen, things that transcend sense; eyes the supernatural; apprehends the divine. Its general object in this view, is the revelation of God; the being, and presence, and glory of God, as they are made manifest for the knowledge of men in his works and word. Such a revelation we have, to a certain extent, in nature itself. "The heavens declare the glory of God," we are told; "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." But all this is no part of nature itself, as it exists for mere sense. The animal sees it not; and brutish men, as the Apostle tells us, "change it into a lie." It is only by faith we are enabled to discern the supernatural in nature, looking through the sacramental symbol and embracing the divine sense, which lies beyond. "Through faith," it is said, Heb. xi. 3, "we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." Some might think mere natural understanding, reasoning from experience, quite sufficient for this. But the philosophy of the Bible is deeper, and far more sound; the empirical understanding could never bring us to any such result; we come to it, before all ratiocina-

tion, and in spite of it we may say, by faith. We understand *through* faith; not in order to it, but by its means; our creed precedes and underlies our intelligence. So in the case of history. God reveals himself here too gloriously, in the way of his providence. But the revelation is only for faith. "A brutish man knoweth not, neither doth a fool understand this." God reveals himself still more fully in the Bible. 'This is made up of many parts; but the whole may be regarded as one vast act of self-manifestation, by which he unfolds himself more and more for the view of the world, till at last the whole process comes to its consummation in the mystery of the *Word made Flesh*. Throughout, the general nature of faith remains the same. It is still the organ for the invisible and eternal, by which God and his relations to the world are apprehended, in the measure of the revelation actually at hand, at any given time, and under any particular form. It may have less or more range and horizon, but its relation to what this contains, is always the same; it remains throughout the *form*, in which the substance of what God reveals is apprehended; it is the light of the eye towards the higher world of the spirit, without which, emphatically, the whole body, the entire man, must be full of darkness.

Faith then admits of measures and degrees, from the bursting germ to the full corn in the ear. It could not be under the Old Testament, in this respect, what it is required to be under the New; and we have no right to try it in the child by the same standard, that may be applied to it in the case of the full grown man. With the same revelation, there may be very different measures of capacity (strong and weak faith) for its apprehension; and then the capacity must be conditioned objectively, by the amount of the revelation. Only a full revelation can make room for a complete faith. Thus it is, that true christian faith goes beyond all that faith could be under any other form, while at the same time it only completes the nature which belongs to faith universally. How could it be otherwise, if Christ be indeed the last and fullest revelation of God in the world, "the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person." The soul of man, brought into felt contact with the presence and truth of the world invisible under such form, must be more

completely open to the light of that world, than it could ever be possibly by any inferior revelation; which is only to say, however, in other words, that it can in no other revelation have the same perfection of faith. Christ is the absolute and ultimate sense of all God's revelations; and so we say of christian faith, that it is the end of all other faith, the only form in which finally our correspondence with the invisible world can be made complete. A fully developed faith, in our circumstances, can have place by the manifestation which God has made of himself in Christ, and in no other way. This is the end, towards which it struggles from the beginning, and without which it must remain forever incomplete. Any true *creed* must be in the end christianity.

Christianity then, is the absolute creed. Its very form primarily is that of faith, in its highest and most perfect power, as called into exercise by the revelation which God has made of himself in his Son Jesus Christ. The revelation can have place only in this way; it could not be made to the senses or to the merely natural understanding; it must hold in the element of faith. It belongs to the conception of the supernatural, as it appeared in Christ, that it should be apprehended, that it should come thus to a real and true *revelation*, by the form of existence we denominate faith, and in no other way. Aside from this form and out of it, christianity might be objectively true in other respects, but it could not have any real existence in the world, it must be for men as though it did not exist at all. To such real existence it comes only and wholly through faith, or the receptivity which makes room for it in the actual order of the world's life. Others *saw* Christ in the days of his flesh, and had their *opinions* about him more or less shrewd; but to Peter it is said: "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-jona; for *flesh and blood* hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven!" The revelation was in the person of Christ himself, not as an outward fact for sense, but as the presence of a divine life for faith.

For christianity, it deserves to be well laid to heart, is in a deep sense identical with the life of Christ itself. It is not the words he spoke, nor the works he wrought, as something sundered from his own person, but the living fountain of all these as introduced

into the world in the mystery from which his person springs. He is the word itself made flesh ; grace and truth enshrined in living *shekinah* ; the life of God disclosed, to the fullest possible extent of revelation, in the very bosom of man's life. Christianity unfolds itself into a whole world of divine realities, (doctrines, promises and deeds,) to the eyes of angels even glorious to behold ; but the inward substance of all this new creation holds continually in the mystery of the incarnation. It is no abstraction, no thing primarily of thought and notion ; but a divine supernatural reality, brought into the world, revealed, made accessible and available for men through faith, and this the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom and in whom only life and immortality are brought to light. All comes to apprehension first, and has its true reality thus, only as Christ himself is apprehended in the spirit and power of Peter's memorable confession ; in virtue of which, as the living appropriation of what it owned and saw, he is proclaimed a *rock* indeed, truly answerable to his own name. Christianity in this way is just as much a *living* reality, as Christ himself ; and being like him above nature, the revelation of God in the world, its presence can be apprehended primarily only in the living form of faith. So apprehended, it may be made the object of reflection and science ; but its whole reality stands first in this apprehension.

So it was regarded by the Church, in the beginning. Independently of all theoretical and practical use to be made of christianity, she knew herself to be in possession of its substance, as something real and constant, in a direct and immediate way. This was seen and understood to fall back on the person of Christ, as its ground. Not on this however, of course, as a mere outward historical fact ; but on the mystery of the incarnation which it involved, and the world of truth and life here opened to the gaze of faith. Christianity in this form, was felt to be immediately and at once at hand, as a divine reality, which men were bound to admit and obey whether they might be able to understand it or not ; just as the world of sense, made real to us by our senses, is to be accepted for what it is in such view, whatever may be required farther for its explanation in the way of science. This immediate substance of christianity, as it comes

to a real revelation in the first place directly for faith, forms the contents, and furnishes us with the true idea, of the ancient Creed. It was never intended to be a theory of religion ; it was not exhibited as a formulary imposed by outward authority, nor as the result of any process of reflection. It presented itself to the world simply as a firm affirmation, on the part of the Church, of what christianity was to her living consciousness in the way of direct and immediate fact. It embraces propositions, of course, for the understanding ; which, moreover, it is quite possible to accept, and repeat with the lips, in a merely notional way ; but the propositions themselves are no product of thought, comparison and deduction ; they are the utterance only of what is immediately at hand in the proper christian consciousness itself ; and they can be truly understood, only where this consciousness prevails. This is the *form* of the Creed. It has its very being in the element and sphere of faith ; and it holds there, in the character of a direct spontaneous witness, with the mouth, to the great central realities of faith as they are immediately felt in the heart.

It is as though one should stand forward, with the full free use of all his senses, in the midst of the world of mere nature, and proclaim his faith in it as a fact actually present in such immediate view : " I believe in the sun, moon and stars, and this solid earth on which I tread ; I believe in these towering mountains, and wide extended plains, and gently flowing streams ; " &c. We understand at once, without any difficulty, the nature of such a confession. It involves no reflection. It takes the realities of sense, as they are at hand, for the mind in their immediate primary form, and simply affirms their presence accordingly. So here. Faith turned towards Christ, as he stands revealed in his own life, finds itself filled with the sense of a new spiritual world, the proper consciousness of the christian Church ; and all this comes to its right expression, under such form, in the solemn language of the Creed. This is christianity, that a man should stand in Christ, in the new world which Christ creates, and say, as in the other case : "*Behold* these heavens and this earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness and everlasting salvation. I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth ;

and in Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son, our Lord ; &c." The Creed affirms all this as a glorious reality, present not to sense, but to faith. It offers no problem, no hypothesis, no argument ; but simply plants itself in the midst of the new order of things which is revealed in Christ, and proclaims its fundamental character and outline, with the force of an assurance that is felt to be identical with that of life itself. This, we say, is its constitution and form ; this is its original meaning and force ; to this it seeks to come always in the use of the Church. Its object is, not to lodge its articles as so many points of christian orthodoxy in the mind ; but so to bring this rather into the very consciousness of what they affirm, that they may be appropriated by it, and made one with it, as a part of its own life.

It would be a mistake, however, to conceive of the Creed, as springing in the form now described, at once and in full, from the faith immediately of every single christian, separately considered. It owes its origin to the faith of the Church, as a whole ; and it came to pass as we have seen, not at once, as a thing complete from the beginning, but in the way rather of free gradual progress and growth. These two points now require our consideration.

The Creed, we say, sprang in the beginning, not from the christian faith as something individual and single, but from the faith of the Church as a whole. It is the product of the early christian life, in its general and collective capacity. We shall not stop here to show how it is, that a collective life may originate and produce, in this way, without any outward consultation or reflection, forms of existence, to which no part of it can be considered fully equal when singly and separately taken. The fact itself is abundantly established, on all sides. Our single life is always borne and carried in the bosom of a broader social and public life, whose contents are not simply the arithmetical aggregate of its several parts, but a true spiritual unity rather, which as a single power pervades the whole, and as such, is always something deeper and more comprehensive than any portion of it separately viewed. So in the early life of nations, as it lies back of all history, we meet with creations continually, products of the spirit, that can be resolved into no single activity whatever

and that come by no reflection, but seem to shoot forth spontaneously, by a sort of inward organic force, from the substance of the national mind itself. Language itself is such a production. It comes by no outward gift or command; it springs from no invention or compact; the single life, as such, could never reach it; it grows out of our nature, in its collective or solid capacity. And yet what an amount of intelligence does it not involve, even under the rudest form, far beyond all that may enter into the consciousness of any who speak it, through many generations. How often it happens, that a deep philosophical idea lies hid in the very etymology of a word, which has been made to enshrine it in this way, for the undeveloped popular mind, from the earliest stage of its existence. Think too of the institutions generally, in which society starts, its customs, maxims, and laws; think of the world of wisdom embodied, no one can tell when or how, in the proverbs of a nation, its old saws, its legends, its myths. Are they the fabrication of any single mind, condensing the result of its observations into such artificial shape, and so handing it over to the community for general use? Or have they sprung, perhaps, from a number of minds working together, with common counsel and agreement? Not at all. The national life itself, as a collective power, has produced them; making use, of course, of single organs, here and there, to bring them to utterance and expression; but with a depth and wealth of sense, at the same time, which has seldom been clearly present, we may say, even to the consciousness of such individual organs themselves. In no other view, is it possible to do justice to such early creations of the human spirit. They are the spontaneous outbirth of mind itself, in its general or universal character. In some sense, this may be said of every production of true genius. Its proper ground lies back of its immediate authorship, in the power of a far broader and deeper life, (the spirit of the nation, the idea of the age,) which simply lays hold of this for the purpose of bringing itself to expression. Every true work of art is an outbirth, organically, of the general life to which it belongs.

All this may serve to explain what we mean, when we speak of the general life of christianity, in the beginning, as something more than the christian life added to itself in its simply indivi-

dual forms ; and when we say that the Creed is to be taken, not as the product of such single christianity separately considered, but as the full free outbirth rather of the christian faith as a whole.

The notorious Dr. Strauss, in his *Leben Jesu*, the most ingenious and complete of all infidel books, has endeavored to account for the whole fact of christianity itself, in this way. The life of Christ, as we have it portrayed in the four gospels, is nothing more, he tells us, than an ideal of the church, the product of its joint imagination, a magnificent myth, or rather a series of myths, (like the labors of Hercules,) made to cluster around the person of the man Jesus of Nazareth, and reduced to shape finally as they now stand, sometime during the second century. This, of course, is a most wild and extravagant hypothesis, which no amount of learning and ingenuity can ever rescue from contempt. The *idea* of Christ is itself something supernatural, and authenticates the reality of his life ; and the main use of this work of Strauss, if it can be allowed to have any, is found just in this, that it serves, for a thoughtful mind, to make the mere letter of christianity, even as it stands in the New Testament itself, something secondary to its living substance as exhibited in the actual mystery of Christ and his Church. So much of truth, however, may be allowed to it, that this mystery is actualized, or brought to pass in the world, through the medium of the general christian life as such. It comes to its *revelation*, not to its creation, as a product only of human thought, (the Hegelian dream of Strauss,) but to its revelation as the supernatural in the form of faith, by means of the Church ; and this through the activity of the Church, in its collective or universal character, the christian life as a whole. The primitive form of this revelation, is presented to us in the Creed. No man can be said to have composed it ; it is no work of bishops or synods ; it must be taken rather as the grand epos of christianity itself, the spontaneous poem of its own life, unfolded in fit word and expression from the inmost consciousness of the universal Church. It is the direct image and transcript in word, of what christianity was as a living substance, at once historical and divine, for the faith and by the faith of the early christian world. It is christianity proclaiming

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its own immediate presence, as the new creation in Christ Jesus. That presence is the power of a supernatural or heavenly life in the Church; and the primitive necessary form of this is the living christian *Creed*, whose immediate utterance we have in this most ancient and venerable among all church symbols.

It will be seen then, that we are not disturbed in the least by the difficulty some urge against the Creed, on the ground of its outward history, as showing it to be vague und uncertain in its origin. Would it help the authority of what is called the Common Law of England, as we find it handled by Blackstone, if we were able to trace it back to some single source, and could lay our hand on a particular authorship of given place and date, to explain its rise? Who does not see, that as the product of the English mind itself, collectively considered, it must be a much more faithful transcript of the very substance of the nation's life, than it could ever possibly have been under any other form? So in the case before us, that the first christian symbol, the Apostles' Creed, should *not* spring from any particular source or authorship, but come down to us rather as the free spontaneous product of the life of the Church as a whole, the self-adjusted utterance of its faith, we may say, as it was felt to have stood from time immemorial; that no one can show exactly when or how it rose, and took its present shape; that its origin, in one word, is not mathematically definite, but confused and vague, and referable to no fixed time or place; all this, to our mind, is just as it ought to be, and rightly considered invests it with the highest title it could well have to our confidence and respect. It is in this character precisely of its organic relation to the life of christianity as a whole, that its authority may be said primarily and mainly to stand.

And so, of course, we accept also, without any hesitation, the idea of a gradual expansion and enlargement of the Creed, the other point already noticed, as claiming our attention. The outward history of it shows clearly enough that it did not pass at once into the complete form in which it became finally established. It came, not suddenly and at once, but in the way of *growth*. So come all such free creations, whose laboratory is the life of the spirit under a general and not simply individual

form. It lies in a just conception of the true nature of the Creed, that it should come precisely in this way, and in no other.

There are two kinds of growth, or rather two ways in which what is called growth in this case, may be considered as taking place; by outward accretion namely, or accumulation, and by inward development. A stone grows in the first way; a plant, in the second. If the growth of the Creed had been by accumulation simply, one part added to another from time to time, without any inward reason, it might well be taken indeed, as a serious objection to its authority; for it would imply a mechanical production, the worth of which must depend, at every point, on the judgment and skill exercised in adding to it something new; and the process of its formation altogether would be felt to fall over in this way, into the sphere of common human reflection and contrivance. But we have seen already, that this is a false conception of the nature of the Creed. It represents, not a system of thought, but a system of life; and it comes into being along with this, as its direct, immediate revelation or expression in the way of word. It is the free spontaneous externalization of the christian consciousness, the substance of living christianity as a whole, in its primary form of faith. Its growth accordingly corresponds with that of the inward world it represents, the gradual amplification of the christian consciousness itself, or the determination successively of the grand facts it is found necessarily to embrace. This is no growth by mere outward addition or multiplication. It is such rather as belongs always to life, by its very nature; a growth from within; the evolution of hidden contents from a single root or ground, in which all have been comprehended from the beginning. Such growth implies no change, but is the argument rather of unity and sameness; it springs not from deficiency, but shows rather the presence of a complete whole. The Creed was not *made*; not manufactured like a watch; it *grew*, self-produced, we may say, out of the great fact of christianity itself. The early Church was not the artificer that hammered it into shape, part by part, and one article after another; but the organ, through whose life as an actual fact it brought itself to pass. Its contents thus come from within, and not from without. In larger or smaller com-

pass, it remains throughout the same. As uttered by Peter, in his rock-like confession; as it meets us in the simple baptismal formula; as "the answer of a good conscience," more or less full, in the apostolical churches; through all its variations in the second century; and in the round symmetrical beauty of its last settled form, as accepted formally by the universal Church; it is still always one and identical with itself, the same fundamental witness and monument of the new creation revealed in Jesus Christ. All its articles gather themselves up at last into a single root, and are throughout but the evolution, more or less full, of what is found involved in this potentially from the beginning. No view of the Creed can be taken as just, no interpretation as sound and complete, in which this inward unity of organization fails to make itself felt.

The very circumstances then, which go with some to invalidate the credit of the Apostles' Creed, in what regards the manner of its origin, we hold to be of special weight in its favor. That it should be so free, as to outward form, and yet so fixed and true to itself always, as to its actual inward substance; that it should rise into view gradually, now one article, now three, and now twelve, and still show itself a single growth, the development of the same faith throughout; that it should appear under so many editions and phases, all more or less different in different regions and at different times, and be recognized notwithstanding on all sides as the one invariable *regula fidei* of the whole christian world; that it should be so loose a deposit apparently in the hands of the Church, from the first century to the fourth, and after all, without negotiation or authority, by the spontaneous voice of universal christendom, assume in the end, the settled form it now carries, as its proper ultimate and constant type; could there well be, we may ask, a more convincing argument than all this, that the symbol is what it claims to be, a true tradition, not dead but living, of the primitive christian faith, the fundamental consciousness of the Church, the *Creed of the Apostles*! A very real and fixed substance, most assuredly, the "rule" of christianity must have carried in itself, in the midst of all its flowing freedom, to come at last in such free way to so fixed and solid a result; and we have no right, accordingly, to

quarrel with the early fathers, Irenæus, Tertullian and others, for appealing to it as they do, under this character, though their very appeal itself may be quoted in proof of the freedom now mentioned. They had no idea of a bound scheme of words, in the case, handed down from the Apostles; but they had a most distinct and strong sense of the actual contents of the christian faith as historically or traditionally carried forward from the apostolical age in the life of the Church; and to this they boldly and confidently appeal, and we may add triumphantly too, in opposition to all heresies, as a sure unity and firm universal fact, which no one could pretend to call in question. It is this *living* character of the ancient *regula fidei* precisely, its self-conserving and self-determining power, which clothes it with its chief title to respect. That such an apostolical rule, as to inward substance, existed and had force, as the unity of the universal christian faith, in the early Church, no one who does not choose to put out his own eyes, can for a moment doubt; and yet it is just as clear that this living rule embodied itself finally, and became permanent and fixed, in the Creed as we now have it. However it may have reached this precise form, the Creed is still, at all events, that old living tradition, nothing more or less, expressing itself in the one sense of the Universal Church. To reject it, is to reject the ancient faith; to make light account of it, is to make light account of the very substance of christianity, as it stood in the beginning. If the *regula fidei* of Irenæus and Tertullian, is to have any reality or be of any force for us whatever, we must own its presence in the Apostles' Creed. We shall have for it most certainly but a figment of our own minds, if we pretend to find it anywhere else.

The true nature and constitution of the Creed, as now explained, may assist us in understanding its material structure, the organization under which its contents are presented to our view; while the right apprehension of this, at the same time, will serve to confirm and enforce still farther the representation of its character already given. It remains then, to consider the architecture, as it may be called, of this ancient creation of the Church, for the purpose of comprehending more completely its plastic reigning spirit and idea.

J. W. N.

ART. XIV.—MINIATURE PAINTING.

I wonder what has become of my old friend Henry W——ns. I sometimes fear that his promising genius has been struck down, overturned and crushed, by the bright advancing car of modern Improvement.

Many years ago, I knew him at Braddocksfield. He and I were co-patriots and fellow-laborers on that classic ground. That there we fought, bled and were defeated, under General Braddock, I would by no means be understood to state. We date not so far back in antiquity. At that rate, if not mere shades, which would more likely be the case, but actual survivors of the carnage, my friend at present would be one hundred and twelve years of age, and myself one hundred and seventeen. We belong to a later era. We are no such Methuselahs. It is not more than fifteen years since he and I were quartered on that renowned battle ground. What a change had then come over the spirit of its dream! How unwarlike did look those quiet fields spread over the scene of its former struggle, sloping gently down from the steep woody hill above, to the broad meadows and primeval forests extended along the banks of the flavous river below! How grass-grown too and peaceful was the road, along which my friend and I often took our morning and evening walks, across the very scene of the bloody massacre! No sharp volley of musketry, no dying shriek of Briton, no exulting yell of Indian, saluted our ears. We heard only the gentle lowing of kine in the meadows below, the sweet voices of thrushes on the oaks around, or the merry laughter of maidens returning along the road in beves to the brick mansion adjoining, which was then occupied as a female boarding school.

Military men then you cannot boast to have been yourselves, some wary reader will interpose, inasmuch as you say the ground had lost all its military character. Hangers on you must have been of that ladies' seminary. Instructors, no doubt you were, in the rudiments of the fine arts or of letters; thrummers on the piano or dabblers in water colors; or, mayhap, you taught the accidence or made experiments in the gases.

We do own to something of the sort. It was our humor sometimes, to indulge in these things. Of having applied our hand, however, to music or the gases, we plead not guilty. We dealt not in things so evanescent and volatile. My friend was a connoi-

seur in paintings, an amateur artist. He amused himself often with delineations in oils. For my own part, I was more charmed with polite literature. It was our pleasure to tarry a year or two at Braddocksfield, on account of its rich historical associations and beautiful natural scenery. At the same time we did not grudge to bestow, for a proper consideration, some of our superfluous knowledge on the docile understandings of the far-gathered pupils of Edgeworth Seminary, then under the supervision of an English lady, the bland, accomplished, but now lamented Mrs. O——.

My friend had a keen eye for the picturesque. In our walks he was always on the look-out for striking lights and shades. I was better pleased with picking up a grapeshot or an Indian arrow-head. My taste led me to seat myself of an evening, on that felled oak in the field, against which, when upright and vigorous, had been leaned the fallen General Braddock. My comrade was drawn by his dilections further abroad into more retired places.

By hunters and others, he has often been descried and recognized happily before any one of them had shot him for a panther, squatted, in broad daylight, half way up some rugged cliff, beside some clinging tree, with his Bristol board and crayon, sketching off the subtended landscape. Not that he bore any resemblance whatever to that ferocious animal—meek and gentle was he as a lamb—unless, mayhap, in the keenness of his vision. The delusion on one critical occasion, was more in the ear of the deceived one than in the eye. An unpropitious circumstance it was, at any rate, to the furtherance of the fine arts, and it spoke not well for advancement in letters, that in that section of country, among the common people, the name *panther* was always mispronounced *painter*. An old hunter, therefore, stealing along through the glen, was startled by the properly expressed, but incautious exclamation of his accompanying boy:—"O! father, see the painter!" In an instant his unerring rifle was at his eye and directed towards the object pointed out, my unfortunate friend, the abstracted artist engaged in his laudable vocation. Perhaps at that very moment, unconscious of danger, he had his eye fixed on the cruel marksman, thinking to appropriate him, in his couched attitude and with his presented muzzle, as a very peculiar and striking figure with which to set off his landscape. Providentially, however, on that occasion, the humane, peaceful, blue-coated form of my talented comrade was recognized before the drawing of the trigger. By our being thrown together, I fanc,

we were both improved. From my always treating relics with that regard and affection which besuits their rust and antiquity, he began at length to see something of their worth. On my part too, I must acknowledge that, from his shrewd criticisms on nature, I received and do still retain a keener relish for what is romantic in scenery.

His favorite study, however, was heads. He was a passionate admirer of the "human face divine." Not to the mellowed likenesses of these depicted on canvas by ancient artists, did he confine his contemplations. He was better pleased with living subjects. A small man he was, compactly set, not above five feet in height, and his own classic head was thickly clustered over with richly waving auburn locks. Methinks I can see him now, in his instructing room, standing in one of his favorite contemplative attitudes, his arms folded across his breast, after the manner of a tragedian, and his dark hazel eyes fixed with feasting admiration on the fair features of some pupil engaged in drawing. As

Proserpine

Gathering flowers, herself a fairer flower,
By gloomy Dis was plucked,

so she studying heads, herself a fairer head, by abstracted W——ns was studied. Should she become aware, however, of his charmed position and fancy his gaze was perhaps too ardent, or mistake it for impertinence and therefore frown or flout at him from offended dignity, all unconscious of harm, the absorbed artist would only frown or flout at her in sympathy. Then drawing himself up for a while like Othello, he would regard her with brows dark and lowering, till suddenly a bright smile would flit over his expression from observing in her features the fine artistic effect. Nothing selfish was there in his hallucination. Passion it could hardly be called. Jealousies he had none. He never thought of courtship. How many admirers his Madonna might have, and which she preferred, he never cared. His only ambition was to make the valued head his own by transferring it, with all its life and expression, to his canvas.

Yet his portraits were never considered very striking. Some features of their originals you could discover in them, but the resemblances were far from being complete. Some parts were exquisitely touched, but as wholes they wanted keeping. Other artists and connoisseurs on looking at them would often shake their heads and tell me in confidence, that they feared my friend had mistaken his calling. Such fears they could never have entertained nor express-

ed had they seen him as I in his private walks and recreations. Deficient to some extent, I admit he was in the mechanical execution on canvas, but the whole pictorial imagery must have been vivid in his imagination. He was possessed of all the marks and eccentricities of genius. Like Sir Joshua Reynolds, he was endowed even with that gentle deafness, which was not so obtuse as to cut him off entirely from social intercourse, but it sharpened his visual perceptions, preserved him from all untoward noises, and permitted him to feast at leisure on the quiet beauties of nature, undisturbed. What led to the dilection I cannot tell, but all at once he applied the brunt of his genius to miniature painting. He bestowed his whole attention to portraying the fairy likenesses of features on oval pieces of ivory. His efforts were crowned with complete success. His genius had found its proper outlet. After only a few weeks' practice, his pictures began to excite attention. Striking, delicate creations they were! By artists, connoisseurs and all, they were soon pronounced excellent.

He presently left the fields and took rooms in Pittsburg, where he was patronized by the rich and beautiful. Afterwards he visited the eastern cities with equal success. At length I heard of his having embarked for England. This was nothing strange in his case, as he was a native of Wales. In childhood he had been conveyed thence by his parents to this our Land of Promise. He had inhaled his first inspirations from the towering cliffs of that ruinous, romantic, time-hallowed country. No wonder then that he was drawn back towards its remembered scenery. In England too, the fine arts are more highly estimated than with us. The nobility are pleased with pictures and they bestow encouragement on worthy artists. I confess I was half afraid that my friend's genius would not stand the test of their scrutiny. I was apprehensive that his fairy pencilings would not be appreciated by their too fastidious fancies. I did them wrong, however. I soon heard that his talents were immediately acknowledged; that he had depicted some of their proudest faces; that he had been received into court; that the Queen herself had been one of his gratified sitters. What further honors would have been thrown around his brow, I cannot tell, had not an unforeseen occurrence intervened. The tasteful world were suddenly thrown agog in another direction. Daguerre had discovered his wonderful art. Operators soon sprang up in all civilized countries. In every city and village, before some doors, their glittering pictures

were to be seen suspended as decoys. Likenesses by the aid of the sun were thrown off more expeditiously than dollars from the mint. Othello's occupation was gone. I have never heard of my young friend since. His profession had been stricken out of the fine arts.

The obsequies of a deceased king are soon lost sight of in the splendor of his successor's coronation. The case of miniature painting, however, was far worse. Its departure was entirely overlooked on account of the loud *eclat* on the coming in of daguerreotypes. When at the close of the silver age the divine Astræa winged her final flight from earth and became a noted constellation, mankind, we are told, lamented; poets sang her praises; but in this iron age—certainly not golden, notwithstanding all California's boasted resources, at any rate so far as taste is concerned—one of the fine arts has disappeared from our midst "unwept, without a crime!" When the seventh Pleiad, in olden times, withdrew her twinkling light from among her sisters, the inhabitants of earth were discomfited, and various were the fabled reasons assigned by poets for her bewailed departure; but for that soft Grace, in modern times, which did hang over the painter's brow, not far off and gazing coldly on him, like a star, but close at hand and sympathizing with his brightest, kindest conceptions, inspiring him to catch the living expression and impaint it on the ivory, when frightened by the din of progress she spread her tiny wings and sped aloft forever gone, no tears were shed, no plaint was uttered; unless perhaps in secret by the few, her gifted but now forlorn followers!

I would not have it supposed, however, that I am at all disaffected towards the present dynasty. I do not know indeed, but that on the whole I would prefer a daguerreotype likeness of a friend, to one in painting. These stampacts of the sun, these dark impressions of light, possess a stern reality, a sober truthfulness, which is very gratifying to an observer. Posterity will thank us for them. What a treat it would be for us in these modern times, to have the privilege of looking on a daguerreotype likeness of Shakspeare or of Homer; of Queen Elizabeth or of Helen; of any of the ancient worthies or beauties! How I would like to see one of king Solomon! From the many illustrious heads with which antiquity abounds it is somewhat difficult to select, but admitted into the cabinet, I think among the first, I would open the casket containing, on a single plate, the sweet, pastoral faces of Isaac and Rebekah. To a certain degree it would show us the true lineaments, the actual fashion of

the countenance. No interpolations of the painter would it possess; no false touches; no flattery. As the magnetic telegraph, in these progressive times, has to a great extent annihilated distance and enabled us to communicate almost instantly with our dearest friends in the remotest regions, so the daguerreotype has, with magic nearly equal, annihilated time and bestowed on our posterity, when they shall have come upon the stage, the ability of beholding us, their respectable ancestors, almost face to face.

Still it must be admitted that, with all its correctness, this art, in some respects, falls short of the pencil. It is not capable of showing off the same variety of countenance. Some bright, sprightly expressions, often the most characteristic, and therefore seized on with avidity by the painter for his ivory, it cannot catch at all on its plates. They are too evanescent to wait out its awful half minute required of patient, head-supported, stationary sitting. A dread feeling withal, is apt to creep over the subject at the time, from the solemnity of his position. He feels conscious that he is holding up his face, not before a mirror for himself to see, but before a camera obscura, to be looked upon by his absent friends, and, in aftertimes, to be scrutinized, and, he hopes, admired, by the impartial eyes of posterity. Solemn occasion! He cannot help attempting to put on his most penetrating look, his most serious suit of features. The apparatus itself too, it must be added, has a strong tendency towards presenting the awfully dismal, which it is the constant endeavor of improvers to overcome. In the way of cheerfulness, it can seldom reach, in its pictures, beyond a pensive smile. Its plates, moreover, have not yet been divested fully of their metallic glare. In certain positions, with all their improvements, they still present us with a ghastly spectre, the sombre ghost of the original. The sun too, I would speak it respectfully, is not altogether impartial in his impressions. We can almost fancy we can detect something still of the old Phœbus in his disposition. Pindar surely knew his taste when he described him as having been smitten by the violet-colored hair and dark eyes of Evadne. The Muses too, that same poet tells us, were adorned with the same dark-colored tresses. No wonder then that, in his musical capacity, the golden-haired god of day was charmed with their society, and that, at the celestial banquets, he was wont to strike his lyre in unison with their singing. Can it be possible, because in modern times he has been deprived of that instrument, and because he is no longer invoked by poets and musi-

cians as the inspirer of their lays and strains, that he has taken umbrage at their neglect, and to show that he really has a decided turn for the fine arts, he has assumed to himself the whole department of landscape and miniature sketching? Be that as it may, we know he still retains his old partiality for the same style of female heads. He prefers for his pictures the brunettes, the dark-eyed daughters of the South, his own favored clime. He may not absolutely flatter them falsely, but he takes care to show them off always in their best features. He is pleased with their pensive expressions. Towards your blonds, however, he is not so warmly drawn. Their blue eyes and light complexions he is disposed to disparage. Their freckles he blotches. He has a pique at their eyes. He cannot abide their mirth. He would not have posterity behold their dimples.

It must be borne in mind too, that this art, with all its beauties, can no longer be classed with those which are styled, *par excellence*, the Fine. All that was liberal about it has been assumed by the sun, and what is left for the operator, though requiring much taste and skill, is wholly mechanical. The man of plates feels not the same absorbing interest in your goodly looks. He does not, like the painter, by feasting on your features in fancy, make them his own and then recreate them, perhaps improved, on his ivory. For every advancement we are making in the useful arts, it seems to me, we are generally losing something in the romantic. For every actual possession we are acquiring in *Terra Firma*, we are giving up some ground in *Terra Fabulosa*. Let us not then plume ourselves too much on our present attainments. Let us still look back with reverence on the Past. Let us study its hallowed architecture, its rich poetry, its mellow paintings, its delicate miniatures. Not for the purpose of resuscitating their arts. In their pristine glory, at any rate, we can never recall them. They belong to ages that are gone. Nevertheless by feasting on their ambrosia, our humanities may be more fully developed, our imaginations may be strengthened: and hereafter, if not ourselves, our posterity at any rate may put forth improvements surpassing any that have gone before, on account of their partaking largely, not only of the physical and mechanical, but also of the æsthetical, the morally beautiful and sublime.

W. M. N.

ART. XV.—KIRWAN'S LETTERS.

Letters to the Rt. Rev. John Hughes, Roman Catholic Bishop of New York. By Kirwan. First Series 1847. Second Series 1849. New York.

THE two small tracts which go under this title, have obtained, as is generally known, a very wide circulation. They appeared originally, as a series of communications, in the *New York Observer*, and were copied from this into a great many other religious papers. Their popularity led subsequently to their being printed as pamphlets; in which form they have been still more extensively scattered over the length and breadth of the land. They have been counted worthy of translation into other languages, and their fame may be said to have gone out to the ends of the earth. Vast praise has been bestowed upon them on all sides; to such an extent, indeed, that their author must have required no inconsiderable amount of grace, not to fall into the easy snare and condemnation of thinking more highly of himself than he ought to think. The religious press has rung the most flattering changes on the theme of his merits, one organ vying with another, apparently, in some cases, to show its own theological acumen, by heaping laudations on his head. His wit and learning have been trumpeted to the skies. He has been hailed as a second Junius in letters, more worthy of admiration in many respects than the first. All sects and parties have delighted to do him honor. A new era was supposed to have broken upon the history of Protestantism, by the bold onset of the "great unknown" on the pride and strength of the Roman Church. The whole controversy was made so level to the common understanding, so squeezed into nutshell dimensions, so shut up to the off-hand alternatives of every-day sense, so bountifully sprinkled with the vivacity of the drawing room or the exchange; it seemed as though a full end of it were taken to have been made at once, and no room could be found for any farther argument in the case. The tomes of musty learning which had been given to it in other days, might have been necessary before; but all occasion for them seemed now to be fast coming to an end.

With a shepherd's sling, and a smooth small stone from the brook, Kirwan had gone forth to battle, and the philistine of Gath lay dead at his feet. To believe the puffs in the newspapers, his primers were worth, if not their own weight in gold, at least all the folios of Chemnitz and the Magdeburg Centuriators put together.

All this, of course, serves to clothe these "Letters" with importance. Their significance is not to be estimated by their size, we must look at their current reputation and credit. We feel bound also, to admit in their favor much more than a simply outward claim in this way to our notice and respect. They come, according to general uncontradicted acceptance, from a most respectable source; their author is one, whom we have long been accustomed to honor, and love, as an able and faithful minister of Christ. In the work before us, too, his general character stands in favorable contrast with much that we are doomed to meet in the current controversy with Rome, as conducted by other hands. The low bred vulgarity, the blackguard polemics, which, too, often come in our way under such form, (reminding one of the vagrant mendicancy of the Roman Church itself,) are not allowed to offend us from the pen of Kirwan. He shows throughout the air and bearing of a gentleman. As a general thing, moreover, he breathes a spirit of kindness; even when he may be unjust and harsh in fact, it is easy to see that it springs not from a directly malignant temper towards those who are wronged. He sins out of ignorance, in such cases, more than out of fanatical hate. He ceases not to be good-natured, however we may feel too often that he is neither sufficiently earnest nor fair. His frivolity carries with it a certain dignity, and sets upon him with well bred ease. It is not such as delights in the companionship of fools. His style abounds with sprightly vivacity and wit, and is well adapted to popular impression; though not exactly with an eloquence and earnestness to remind us, as his partial editor and *copy-right holder* remarks "of some of the most celebrated passages from the Irish bar." There is besides a tolerable amount of true and solid thought, embraced in the general argumentation of his Letters; which, it is to be hoped, may not fail to exert a good influence

where they are read, and from whose value and force we have no wish certainly to detract. A certain degree of glory also has been reflected upon the whole position of the writer by the palpable advantage he has had over Bishop Hughes. This gentleman managed his part of the controversy badly, displaying in it but little of the tact and skill which he is generally supposed to possess. He could never have intended seriously to follow Kirwan in the details of his attack. Still, he seems to have felt it necessary to take notice of it in some way, at least indirectly. This, however, gave him the aspect, before the public, of one who had accepted the challenge he was here called to meet; and when the demonstration ended as it did, without being carried out apparently to its own proper end, it seemed naturally enough to betoken a sense of actual confusion and defeat, in the particular controversy he was thus found to waive. Such was, of course, the construction put upon the whole proceeding, by Kirwan and his friends. Bishop Hughes, the great champion of the Pope in America, was held to have been fairly silenced, because he had nothing whatever to say. He was taken all a-back by the prodigious novelty and power of this assault, and published his own shame by going to Halifax to hide it. All this, we say, has contributed to invest these Letters of Kirwan with a halo of glory, such as few pamphlets of the same size have ever been able to win and wear. The author comes before us like a conquering chief, with laurels on his brow, and roses in his path.

Kirwan's Letters, then, may be considered a very fair and respectable representation of the whole popular style of Protestantism, in whose interest they appear; and, in this view especially, they challenge respectful criticism, while they furnish at the same time a desirable opportunity for exposing at least some of the flaws and defects, under which this popular system labors. In dealing with Kirwan, we have to do, in fact, not with a couple of twelve penny pamphlets simply, but with the reigning tone of Protestant thought as it stands at present in this country; he has the mass of opinion and feeling, in all directions, on his side; this is the great secret of his popularity and credit. And all will admit, that the reigning fashion in this respect could not

well find a more worthy spokesman, to stand forward in its name. It can have no right to complain of any criticism, which lights upon it fairly, through its knightly representative in the person of Kirwan.

We shall endeavour now to show, that the championship of Protestantism here offered to our view, is wholly inadequate and unsatisfactory. With all its brilliancy and eclat, it must be counted a failure as regards its own cause. Whether viewed as a vindication of the Protestant faith, or as a polemic assault upon the Church of Rome, it falls far short of what such high argument legitimately requires. It is unfair and unjust to both the interests, between which it pretends to mediate with chivalric lance and sword. Romanism and Protestantism are alike wronged by its intervention. As Rome was not built in a day, so neither is it likely to fall by a flourish of trumpets, and if the Church of the Reformation is destined to endure and prevail, it must be on far other ground, than the foundation laid for it in Kirwan's Letters.

A fatal presumption against them is found, at the very outset, in the air of easy overweening confidence, with which they address themselves to their work; implying, as it does, an utter miscalculation of the strength and power of the opposite cause. A sling in the hands of David may prevail over the shield and spear of Goliath; and the walls of Jericho, if God so please, may fall before a blast of ram's horns. But it will not be by imagining the giant, in the first case, into a lilliputian dwarf; nor by mistaking the walls, in the second, for a barricade of pasteboard. We lay it down as a settled axiom, that no warfare upon the Roman Church can be of any true force or weight, which begins and ends with the assumption that it is a pure fiction throughout, which must crumble into ruins, or dissolve into thin air, on the first application to it of a little common sense.

This assumption reigns, in most of our popular attacks on Popery. To hear such crusaders talk, one might suppose that all the powers of ignorance and sin had combined to work out, in the Roman system, a hellish diabolical satire on the world and its Maker, such as is to be found nowhere else in the whole range of history besides. Here is a vast huge organization, fa-

vored by accident against God's proper plan, reaching through long centuries of blank chaos, filling the universal Christian world with its power, folding the tendencies of all modern history in its bosom, which yet, if we are to believe the view now noticed, is so full of absurdity in one direction, and so diametrically opposed to the Bible and all true religion in another, so void at once of all reason and all piety, that we need the conception of something like bedlam for the holy Church catholic, to understand how it could possibly subsist for a single day.

Kirwan, we are sorry to say, with all his general courtesy, is completely carried away also with the power of this wholesale fancy. It reveals itself as a sort of fixed idea, through his whole argument. He has been praised for his great urbanity towards Bishop Hughes; and it is easy enough to see, that he wishes to treat him with respectful politeness throughout. In reality, however, his style of address, on the score now mentioned and as measured from the position of the man addressed, must be regarded as insolent in the extreme; so that we wonder not in the least at the offence created by it in the bishop's mind. It is as though some English aristocrat should stand before us, and with cavalier genteel freedom allow us to see and feel every moment, through phraseology polite, that he took all Americans to be either knaves or fools. Romanism is for Kirwan a compound of miserable delusion and deceit, manufactured from the start by the joint activity of Satan and wicked priests; without any good design; in full opposition to the Bible, and in defiance of all common sense. *How* so bald an imposture should have come to such vast power on so poor a basis, he does not pretend to show, not even probably to inquire; much less does he think it necessary to explain, *why* Christianity should have been doomed to such dreadful captivity for a thousand years. Enough that we have the fact staring us in the face. Confession, absolution, transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass, the celibacy of the clergy, &c., are all without a shadow of authority or sense in their favor. The case is taken to be so plain, that any child might see it. Everywhere Kirwan is ready to find with all ease, in this way, "a priestly device, to ensnare the conscience and to enslave men." All the peculiar doctrines and usages of the

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Roman Church are referred to cunning policy and contrivance, on the part of bad men, for the purpose, consciously, of keeping the world from the knowledge of the truth, and binding it in chains of error. The Church has been plainly a hell-born conspiracy, to hold men in ignorance, and deprive them of their native rights, from the beginning. And all this, at the same time, under a form of such blunt and forward stupidity, as may be said to expose itself, by its very weakness, to scorn and contempt, as soon as it comes to any attentive consideration. All enlightened priests, of course, *know* that their religion is a sham and a lie. Bishop Hughes, in particular, it must be courteously taken for granted all along, is quite too well informed, and has too much American life in him altogether, to be at all honest or in earnest with his priestly trade. "What an outrage upon the common sense of the world to have men, dressed up in canonicals, teaching things as true, of which the beast that Balaam rode might well be ashamed." Bishop Hughes is no ass, we may charitably trust, and must, therefore, pass for a hypocrite. "Permit me to say, my dear sir, in reference to yourself," so Kirwan *graciously* speaks, "that I have far too high a regard for your intelligence to admit for a moment, that you believe in the absurd doctrines which your Church teaches. Like the ancient priests of Egypt, you must have one class of opinions for the people, and another for yourself. Will you say that this is harsh and uncharitable? None knows better than yourself that history affirms it of popes, cardinals and bishops, that have lived before you. On no other ground can I possibly account for your remaining one hour in the Roman Catholic Church." So throughout, the bishop is respectfully begged to lay aside the priest, the acted part, and make room for his own honest convictions as a man.

All this, as we have said, is prodigiously insulting. It is not, however, in such view particularly, that we here make it the subject of notice. We refer to it, as illustrating the sense of immeasurable superiority, with which evidently the whole argument of these Letters is conducted against the Church of Rome. This, we say, constitutes a powerful presumption, from the start, against the force of the argument itself. Kirwan finds it quite too easy,

to end and settle forever this great controversy. He takes it for granted, that he can bring it within the compass of an egg-shell, and get to the bottom of it with a common tea-spoon. With the aid of the Bible, and his own common sense simply to explain it, he feels himself strong enough to storm all the entrenchments of Romanism, as so many towers of ice cream or gingerbread. They are felt, in his mind, to be creations only and wholly of ridiculous folly and shame. All this, however, only shows that he is not properly prepared for the task he has here taken into his hands. He has no right acquaintance with the history of the Roman Church; he is ignorant of its true genius and life; he has never mastered, to any extent, its interior economy and sense. No man who understands the Roman Church, and whose voice deserves to be heard in opposition to its claims, can ever think, or speak of it as a pure Satanic fiction. It is not in such view, indeed, that even the errors of heathenism itself can be rightly understood. They become intelligible, only as they are admitted to include some fragments, at least, of religious truth, and are studied in this way as comparative approximations towards religion in its perfect form, rather than as the denial in full of its power. But if the history of religion, in such universal view, be thus possessed of reason and order, how shall we dare to question their presence to a far greater extent, in the history of Christianity itself, under the form it is found to carry in the old Roman Catholic Church? To conceive of this as taking the place of the pure primitive faith, without any reason and in the way of sheer Satanic corruption, by the art and craft of cunning, wicked priests, to such an extent as to bind the whole Christian world for centuries in bonds of nonsensical impious falsehood, defeating the promise of Christ and virtually driving him from the world; to conceive of all this, we say, as the true whole sense and meaning of the Roman Catholic Church, is such an outrage on reason, and such a libel on God's Providence, as no one, who is brought to look at it rightly, can endure with a moment's patience. Away with the thought that such a system as this, so magnificent and gorgeous in its whole structure, which has nursed so many nations into maturity, which fills so large a space in the history of the world's life, which has bred such a

multitude of souls for heaven, which so many of the profoundest minds, in different ages, have bowed down to with veneration and respect—away with the thought, that such a system should be, after all, the product only of chance or blind irrational wickedness, cunningly studying its own ends. The whole imagination is monstrous, and becomes more so always, in proportion as it is weighed in the balance of serious thought. It overthrows all faith in the Church. It turns all history into chaos. If our defence of Protestantism is to be at all solid and sound, it must proceed throughout on a different view of the Roman Catholic Church. Kirwan ruins his own cause, by making thus light of the system he undertakes to oppose. Romanism is not mere nonsense, to be put down with an anecdote, or a pun. It means something; means, in truth, a great deal. Every doctrine it teaches has its bright side, as well as that which may be dark. Only one who has felt its inward life in some measure, and is prepared thus to do it justice, can ever be fully qualified to combat its pretensions and claims. This is not the case with Kirwan. True, he was raised in the Roman Church. But he never understood its proper historical life, the peculiar meaning of religion in the catholic form; and he has no understanding of all this now. If he had, he would have managed this controversy in a very different style.

We can all see, readily enough, the vanity and weakness of such sweeping prejudice, when exercised towards Protestantism on the side of zealots for the cause of Rome. Such can allow no sense or truth of any sort, in the Reformation. They will have it, that it was all a work of blind wickedness, coming, not from above, but from beneath, by the instigation of the devil and the bad passions of unholy men. Zuingli, Luther, Calvin, were all influenced, in their view, by the worst motives, and lent themselves consciously to the service of a lie. So the history of Protestantism since, is taken to be wholly a blank, or a wild horrid dream, in the world's life. It includes, in such view, no reason, carries in its bosom no truth, contributes nothing to the cause of religion and human happiness, in any way; and so, of course, is destined, in due time, to lose itself forever, like a mountain torrent dispersed on all sides over a desert of sand.

Every such easy overweening imagination on the part of Romanists, we say, is enough of itself, to cut the sinews of any argument against Protestantism with which it may be joined. The movement of the sixteenth century is too grand; the crisis involved in it for religion too clear; the epoch constituted by it, too vastly significant; the actors, by whom it was brought about, take quite too central a place in the drama of human life, and are quite too imposing in the colossal proportions of their intellectual and moral strength; the consequences of the convulsion are altogether too deep and broad, and far reaching, for the entire life of the modern world, its literature, art, science, politics, and social character; the entire course of Protestantism, in one word, shows itself too profoundly *historical*, carrying along with it evidently the grand central stream of the world's civilization, and embracing in its bosom evidently the most active and powerful elements by which this civilization is to take a still higher form hereafter: the whole fact of the Reformation and its results down to the present time, is too impressively overwhelming for any truly thoughtful mind, to be capable of being *rationaly* treated in any such summary way. We must thrust out our own eyes, and lose all faith in history as God's work, and abandon all manly trust in Christianity itself, to admit that Protestantism is without meaning and power for Christ's kingdom in the world. Romanists must learn to do justice to its actual greatness, before they can expect to be heard patiently in opposition to its claims. One champion like the learned and pious Mœhler, now with God, who knows how to admit the historical significance of the Reformation, while he still tries to show that it was unnecessary, who can speak respectfully and honorably of such men as Luther, Melancton, and Calvin, while he holds them guilty of great wrong, who takes pains to understand and represent fairly the Protestant doctrines, which he yet labors to confute; one *such* champion is worth, on that side, a full score of Auduns and Brownsons, who can see in Protestantism no worth or meaning whatever. And just so, on the Protestant side; any argument against Romanism must be comparatively powerless in the end, that refuses to do justice to its historical significance. The Roman Catholic Church is a

great fact too, which only the blindness of bigotry can fail to see and acknowledge. It is just as monstrous to stultify the history of the Church, and make it mean nothing, or worse than nothing, from the ninth century to the fifteenth, as it is to abuse in the same way the period reaching from the age of Luther to the present time. How much more power, immeasurably, in defence of Protestant faith, is exhibited by such a man as Ullmann, the admirable and accomplished author of the "Reformers before the Reformation"! One *such* writer, we say here again, is of more account for the interest on whose side he stands, than a hundred tongues and pens let loose against Rome in the usual anti-popery style.

Kirwan's polemics are made up largely of particular facts discreditable to the Church of Rome, and *ad captandum* appeals to common sense. His facts are furnished, in considerable part, from his own experience and observation in Ireland. There can be no question that disgraceful exemplifications of Romanism, in the form of ignorant priests and irreligious superstitious practices in the name of religion, may be found in that unhappy country, to almost any extent. We may find large store of such argument also in Mexico, as well as in other lands; and it is easy to gather it in almost any quantity, from the history of christianity in past ages. We admit, too, that it is not without force when properly used. The corruptions in the Roman Church, in the sixteenth century, led to the Reformation, and may still be appealed to for its vindication. The comparative tendencies of Romanism and Protestantism, as exemplified in the history and present state of the countries in which they have respectively prevailed, furnish a very fair ground of argument against the overbearing pretensions of the first, and in favor of the moral superiority of the second. It requires, however, a very profound and comprehensive survey, with due regard to all circumstances and conditions, to conduct such a comparison to anything like a scientific issue; and then its results must be taken as of relative, rather than absolutely conclusive force, in regard to the main question. Much turns here on nationality and outward relations. Admitting it to show the superior power of Protestantism, that it falls in with the genius of the more active nations, and binds them

to its service, it will not follow that the want of such spirit of action has been owing in all cases heretofore, or that is wholly attributable among any particular people now, to the want of Protestantism. No difference of this sort is sufficient to explain the difference between Mexico and New England. Institutions may be, to a certain extent, good in one age, that cease to be so altogether in another. It must ever be unsafe, in the case before us, to argue either the absolute corruption of Romanism, or the absolute perfection of Protestantism, from a comparative view of their tendencies at the present time. Especially must it be unsafe to lay such stress on isolated, fragmentary proofs and illustrations. The history of the Church abounds with abominations, we may say, from the beginning, which a writer like Gibbon can easily put forward in such style, that they shall seem to throw all her virtues into the shade. There are besides, abominations belonging to Protestantism itself, taking it in the broad sense, which agree as little with true christianity as the worst errors of Rome; and seem clearly enough to show, at all events, that however superior it may be to the other interest, it is by no means entitled still to look upon itself as exclusively in possession of all truth. It is wholly unsatisfactory to bring forward particular abuses, however gross, which are found connected with Romanism in certain quarters of the world, and at once build upon such ground a sweeping and final conclusion against the whole system to which they belong; as though this must be held responsible for every corruption wrought in its name, and as though all had been contrived and designed in its case, just to run to such bad end. The premises are much too narrow for so broad a conclusion.

We mean not then to undervalue the argument from facts here, in its proper form; for we believe it to be, in truth, of great force. Neither do we dispute the importance of Kirwan's facts, in their right place. We say only that they fall far short of establishing legitimately, what they are employed to establish in his hands. He does not use them to exemplify simply the capabilities of evil that are lodged in Romanism, its wrong tendencies as springing from its wrong constitution; but applies them, directly and immediately, as tests of universal character, as though they were, as a matter of course, the very aim and drift of the

system throughout. This is shallow. It proves nothing, except as it takes for granted all it proposes to prove from the start. It goes on the broad coarse supposition, that the whole structure of Romanism, is the senseless fabrication of wicked men and devils in league to deceive the world ; which we have already seen to be absurd.

Kirwan's use of "common sense," is much of the same order with his use of "facts." It lies all on the surface, and turns on the most bald, first-best, hap-hazard apprehension of its objects. No pains are taken to reach the interior sense of anything ; all is estimated by the way it strikes the mind, under its first, most naked and outward presentation. It is easy to make almost anything ridiculous, by sundering it from its proper connections, and placing it in a false light ; and the manifold abuses and superstitions that caricature, in every direction, the institutions of the Roman Church, may be said to lay them specially open to this mode of attack. Most easy is it in this way, to dispose of the doctrines of purgatory, penance, extreme unction, transubstantiation, and any other that is turned to bad purpose in the hands of ignorant or corrupt men ; but our theological earnestness must be small indeed, if we can feel that we have gone by any such argumentation to the bottom of the subject, in any case, or disposed of it at all according to its true intrinsic merits.

Take it altogether, this *common sense* is a very ticklish and uncertain tool to work with, in matters of theology and religion. It is not the same thing in all hands. It is more like the weathercock that goes by the wind, than the steady compass turned always towards the same point. The common sense of the Quaker, sees only mummery and folly in all religious forms ; that of the Baptist, derides the sprinkling of babies ; that of the Unitarian, finds only the wildest contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity, and the holy mystery of the incarnation. It is, indeed, where thought becomes most earnest and deep precisely, that common sense, in its ordinary acceptance, is least to be trusted as a guide. It plays sad havoc with philosophy, and we are warned against it in the Bible as the enemy of all sound religion. *Common sense*, the off-hand outside judgment of the natural mind, is no safe measure at all of spiritual christianity ; it cannot

discern the things of the Spirit of God, but is ever ready to cry out against them as foolishness. We mean not, of course, to say a word against the use of intelligence and reason, in the service of religion. God can never be pleased with the sacrifice of *fools*. We object only to the fashion of appealing, in Kirwan's style, to the first sense that comes to hand in the common mind, as conclusive on questions of religious faith and practice. No such standard is safe; no such judgment can be secure.

It needs no great depth of thought, to discover the insufficiency of this sort of argument, as actually managed in the hands of Kirwan. Where his appeals to common sense are most direct and bold, we find them, in some cases at least, most undeserving of all confidence and respect. So, for instance, in some of his interpretations of Scripture. He makes much of the Bible, as we all should. "With *me* the teachings of all your councils," he says, "weigh not a feather; give me, if you can, Bible authority.—With *me*, the authority of your popes and councils is not worth a penny. I would rather have one text of Scripture bearing upon the point, than the teachings of as many such as you could string between here and Jupiter." All very well. That sounds big and independent. But the man needs pretty heavy ballast, in the way of knowledge and sense, who thus plays off his own use of the Bible against that of the whole world besides, and holds the judgments of all councils more light than a feather as weighed against one text expounded by himself. He requires, if not downright infallibility, yet something not far from it, to justify such vast confidence; and we may well be struck with the inconsistency, if after all, his interpretations of Scripture betray no very profound insight into its sense. Kirwan, we are sorry to say, is by no means thus infallibly safe in this business of explaining the Bible. He will not allow the authority of popes and councils to be of the least value, for unlocking its meaning; but thrusts into our hands for this purpose, the key of his own common sense. To our view, however, this last pope is just as little to be trusted as any of the rest. He makes himself indeed, to be identical with the Bible, the personification of the divine text itself; but who does not know, that all other popes, and all councils too, have affected to do, more or less, the very same thing?

Kirwan finds no difficulty whatever, in getting at once in full to the bottom of the Lord's supper. The words of institution are plain, and it is only strange that the subject should ever have cost any body the least trouble. All resolves itself into the common-place thought, that the bread was to be a sign merely of Christ's body and the wine an emblem of his blood. "Just see," our cunning Daniel exclaims, "how a little common sense simplifies every thing!"—Simple of a truth, and no less *flat*.

The grand and solemn passage, Matt. xvi. 15-19, is disposed of in similarly facile style. Upon this *rock*, that is the confession of Peter that he was the Son of the living God, Christ engaged to build his Church. "How simple and common sense," cries Kirwan. Again, the kingdom of heaven means the visible church, and the *keys* are simply the power of admitting proper persons into it and excluding improper persons from it. "How simple and common sense is all this," once more cries Kirwan. To bind and loose is a figurative expression, to represent the instructions and regulations of the twelve apostles, for the use of the Church. "This, Sir, I believe,"—that is, *I*, Kirwan, who count all popes and councils as lighter than a feather over against my own dexterity in the use of Bible texts—"this *I* believe to be the common sense, the fair and just interpretation of a passage on which your Church has built up a priestly power, that has overshadowed the earth and enslaved nations. Where now, sir, is your supremacy of Peter—your power of the keys—your power of absolution? Gone, like the morning cloud before the sun. Blessed be God, you have not yet turned your keys upon the common sense of the world." Summary work of it, indeed, is made by this potent talisman, the world's common sense! It puts one in mind of the "*veni, vidi, vici*," of the old Latin general, so swift is its progress, so easy its triumph. But, alas! how it belittles all that is sublime, and turns the magnificent poetry of heaven into the tame prose of the most trivial every-day life!

Our limits, however, forbid details. It is more of account, besides, to direct our criticism towards what is general. In this view, we go on to say that the whole position of Kirwan, in these Letters, is such as to place him in a false relation to the truth. Whatever may be the justice of his cause as against the Pope

and bishop Hughes, it is so managed in his hands as to become most unjust to Christianity. His defence of Protestantism, goes forward at the cost of the ancient faith; and his war upon Rome, to a fearful extent, is a war at the same time on all that is comprehended in the idea of the Holy Catholic Church.

The most general acquaintance with church history, is sufficient at once, to show that, in many cases at least, his argumentation proves a great deal too much. Instead of stopping with the proper Roman abuse, it runs back into the very life and heart of the early Church. It seems indeed, to proceed throughout on the assumption that the system it opposes, came in violently and abruptly, one tyrannical contrivance after another, displacing and superseding a quite different order of things which had prevailed before. "Yours is not the oldest religion," Kirwan says in his address to Irish Roman Catholics: "I could here give you the time, did the limits of a letter permit, when the distinguishing doctrines of your Church were introduced. The celibacy of the clergy came into the Church in the fourth century, purgatory appeared in the seventh, &c." There is room, certainly, for arguing against the errors of the Roman Church, on the score of their comparative novelty; and the subject is so important, that it would have been well to *force* more time into the task of doing it some sort of justice; but the argument is one, which to succeed at all, requires a most careful discrimination between all such corruptions and the earlier forms of church life, of which they are to be taken as an abuse. With Kirwan, as with the school in general to which he belongs, this discrimination is wanting altogether. He just lumps the whole argument into a single easy proposition, which his readers are then asked to accept as true on his own infallible authority. Romanism is a novelty, introduced by usurpation into the seat of ancient christianity, and all its institutions here condemned, are to be regarded as the product, root and branch, of this violent diabolical revolution. Never was there, in fact, however, a more untenable hypothesis applied to the course of church history. It cannot bear a moment's examination.

Take, for instance, the celibacy of the clergy. It came in, says Kirwan, in the fourth century. That itself is pretty far

back, for a purely *popish* error. But the root of the thing lies a great deal farther back still. The idea of a peculiar merit or spiritual worth in celibacy, adopted for the more unreserved service of Christ in the Church, falls back beyond all controversy, to the very dawn of Christianity, and meets us in full force in the second century. "A bishop *must* be the husband of one wife," according to Paul in the hands of Kirwan. But the early Church took that text differently; italicising not the "must," but the "one," and seeing in it the exclusion of a second marriage; as a widow, in parallel case, (1 Tim. v. 9,) was to be the wife of one man; and, on this very ground, it was held improper for a priest to marry after taking orders, however he might be allowed to continue a marriage into which he had entered before. Kirwan, not to be outdone by the Council of Trent, hurls his anathema against the whole business, as "a doctrine of devils," forcing the "common sense exposition," as he calls it, of 1 Tim. iv. 3, into the face of Bishop Hughes, to reduce him to reason. It is not, indeed, quite clear, how a regulation, making celibacy a qualification for a certain service, which men are as free to enter, or avoid, as a military or mercantile expedition to China, is tantamount at once to a Gnostic prohibition of marriage itself, as something universally unclean. And one is bewildered still farther in the case, when it is remembered, that the very same Church, which has thus magnified the merit of celibacy, from the beginning, as voluntarily embraced by the few for the sake of the many; so far from falling in with the Gnostic condemnation now mentioned, with no less emphasis from the start has always denounced this, as contrary to the truth, and at full war with the spirit of the New Testament; carrying her zeal for the sanctity of marriage so far indeed, as finally to raise the institution into the character of a divine sacrament. With all this, however, we have here no immediate concern. Our object is simply to illustrate the way, in which the rapier of Kirwan's common sense, as plied against Romanism, runs itself too often, up to the very hilt, in the bowels of primitive Christianity. As an idea, or tendency at least, the institution of celibacy meets us from the earliest days of the Church; and some regard must be had to this fact, before we can pretend rationally to have disposed of it in a truly rational way.

In the same manner, it would be very easy to show that the opposition made by Kirwan to Roman baptism, confession, absolution, transubstantiation, &c., is so conducted as to extend, for the most part, to realities that were held to be of sacred authority in the early Church. Whatever may be the *peculiarities* in the case that deserve to be stigmatized as strictly Roman inventions, abuses that are fairly chargeable to *popery* as a system in the way of defection from the earlier faith, no proper pains at all, are taken here to sever them out for our notice; but, as a general thing, they are confounded with forms of thinking that were notoriously in force from the earliest times before, by which means these are sweepingly involved in the same uncompromising censure and reproach. The argument at last, has regard, not so much to the Roman *form* of thinking, separately taken, as to the whole primitive substance, which it is found to caricature and misrepresent. In the case of baptism, for instance, it is not simply the superstitious accompaniments that attend it in the Church of Rome, that turn it into a fiction, (although, even in such view, the fiction would amount to a nullification of the Church since the third century); the whole idea of baptismal grace, as it has reigned in the Church most clearly from the time of the Apostles, is treated with derision. So the mystery of the holy eucharist. So the conception of supernatural powers belonging to the Church, in every form and shape. All, with Kirwan, is superstition and nonsense; "which," he says, "excite my wits as I may, I cannot understand; it is addressed to my ignorance." This may be all true enough; and our business, just now, is neither to explain nor vindicate any part of the mystery. We simply hold up to view the fact, that these things all entered into the faith of the early Church, and cannot be assailed therefore as exclusively popish. The argument, or declamation rather, of Kirwan, proves a great deal too much. In almost every case, it lays the axe at the root of an old catholic idea, while pretending only to lop off a Roman superstition, so that we are forced to cry out: Woodman, spare *that* tree! Let us not, to use a German proverb, tumble out the child with the bathing tub. Or, if that be our purpose, let us, at all events, see what we are about, and not pretend to be doing the one thing only, while we are, in truth, at the same time doing also the other.

It is quite likely, indeed, that Kirwan would not be greatly intimidated, if he even knew himself in this case to be at issue, not simply with the Pope and his servant Bishop Hughes, but with the whole ancient Church. The man, for whom one text of scripture, seen in the mirror of his own mind, is of more weight, than a string of ecclesiastical decrees reaching to the planet Jupiter, need not be much disturbed by the authority of all the fathers from Barnabas to Bernard. This, however, is not the ground, on which he openly professes to stand, in these Letters. He affects rather, to make common cause with primitive Christianity, as it reaches from the first century to the fourth; assailing the institutions and practices of the Roman Church, as wholesale innovations, having no shadow of reason in the proper life of the Church as it stood before. This broad-faced assumption requires to be met with flat contradiction. However true it may be that Romanism is something widely different from the christianity of the first three centuries, it is equally certain that this finds no proper representation whatever in Kirwan's Letters. Neither Irenaeus, nor Tertullian, nor Cyprian, nor Origen, nor a single father of all that galaxy of worthies that meet us from the age of Chrysostom and Augustine, could at all take him by the hand as a true champion of the christianity for which *they* stood ready, every one of them, in their own time, to go joyfully into prison and to the stake. Most emphatically, rather, might they all be expected to exclaim: "*Non tali auxilio*; the faith of martyrs asks the *same* faith, for its vindication and defence!"

This brings us to a still more serious reflection. It would be strange indeed, if such disagreement with the early Church involved no actual defect in the system to which it belongs; for arm ourselves as we may, in the panoply of the Bible and our own common sense, it is not easy to admit the feeling that the vessel of Christianity, with Christ at the helm, missed its own true course out and out, from the very start. The whole supposition is monstrous; and the virtual consequence with which it stares out upon us from Kirwan's argument, at once enables and compels us to fix a charge of error on himself. One whole side of christianity never comes properly into his view; its sacramental, mystical side, namely; that by which it carries in itself the

character of an objective, historical union of divine and human powers, in the form of the *Church*. Here, to our mind, is a grand defect, which like a dead fly, corrupts the whole odor of these famous Letters. Kirwan, as we read him, has no faith in the Church. Let us not be misunderstood. We know and admit that he professes the contrary, and we are willing to take this profession just at its own value. What we mean, however, is this, that he has no faith in the Church after the old church sense, as we find it expressed in the Apostles' Creed, and woven into the whole texture of christian thought during the first centuries. This he takes pains himself, unwittingly, to make clear, in a whole letter devoted expressly to this subject. The *idea* of the Church as it is presented to us in the Creed, is conditioned by its relation through the Holy Ghost to the mystery of the incarnation on one side, and to the full compass of the new creation on the other: As the object of *faith*, it is the real comprehension of supernatural powers under an outward historical form: It carries its own attributes with invincible necessity in its constitution, one holy, holy, catholic, and apostolical. So the entire ancient Church believed, in her own favor; and this faith is found entering, with broad ramification, into all her institutions and ways. She held that she was founded in very truth on the rock, not of a bible doctrine only, but of Christ's living word itself, incorporated into her own constitution; that she was the pillar and ground of the truth; that she was the organ and medium, by which God's presence was brought to tabernacle among men; that a true prophetic and priestly power, as well as a true kingly power, was lodged in her hands; that her ministerial acts were divine; that her sacraments conferred grace, her baptism being for the remission of sins, and the body and blood of Christ mystically at hand on her altar serving as food unto everlasting life. All this, we say, is comprehended in the article of the *Church*, as it stands in the ancient christian Creed; it is no product of popery, however it may be found to underlie all that is most monstrous in the pretensions of this system; on the contrary, these pretensions become intelligible only when the faith now mentioned, is allowed to have been in full force before. But now of this faith, the living sense of a divine Church with su-

pernatural powers, according to the Creed, we seem to find no trace whatever, in Kirwan. The Church, as he takes it, is either an abstract word only to represent the general fact of religion under a christian form, or else an outward simply human organization, or multitude of organizations rather, which Christ has directed his people to form as a convenient apparatus for religious ends. The marks of the Church unity, catholicity, apostolicity, and infallibility, he finds to be a fiction in the case of the Roman Church; but the fiction is so exhibited and exposed, that it is virtually made to hold of the whole Church, as this has stood from the beginning; no allowance being made, as it would seem, for the difference between her actual history and her ideal inward constitution. "My Bible tells me, sir," we hear him saying, "that whosoever believeth in the Lord Jesus Christ, shall be saved. The sincere believers in the Lord Jesus Christ, whether in your church, or in other churches, or in no church, form a part of that Church which Christ will present to the Father, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing." The amount of this is, that the church is to be considered something outward and accidental altogether to the christian salvation; Christianity stands essentially in the transaction of souls privately and separately with God, through the medium of the Bible; the idea of a divine power going along with its general outward constitution, in any real way, deserves only derision. Kirwan has no conception of a true union between the visible and the invisible, in the constitution of the Church, the very form of existence under which she is made to challenge our faith, as a part of the general christian mystery, in the Creed. In this respect, he has fallen away, not only from the old catholic ground, but from the original ground also of his own denomination. He ceases to be a Presbyterian, and stands before us as a Baptist or Quaker.

There is no room, of course, for sacraments, in their true sense, where the Church is thus shorn of her proper supernatural character. The very idea of a sacrament is, the union of an outward sign and the grace represented by it, in such a way, that the second shall be felt to be bound to the first mystically as its actual body. Outward and inward enter conjointly into its constitution, with like necessity and reality. Kirwan, however, knows of no

such sacrament. His artillery played off against transubstantiation, reaches *through* that to the very substance of the old catholic mystery on which the error rests. Baptism sinks with him into the character of a mere human sign or pledge. The notion of a real mystical grace in it, he turns into ridicule, as something that lies beyond his common sense; not considering, that it would be quite as easy to turn to ridicule, in the same way, the "brazen serpent" in the wilderness, or the "tree of life" in the garden of Eden. We marvel not, that bishop Hughes should pronounce him rationalistic, irreverent and profane; though our knowledge of the man, and the allowance we are bound to make for his position, make it easy for us to exercise a more tolerant judgment. The early fathers, of course, however, from Ignatius to Augustine, would be much of one mind here with bishop Hughes; and Luther himself, the immortal father of the Reformation, could not fail, as we all know, to throw the full power of his voice, were he now living, into the same scale.

An interesting, we might say somewhat amusing, exemplification of the wrong position of Kirwan, as now noticed, in regard to the Church, has been furnished by the little controversy into which he has fallen latterly with the Baptists, as represented by Dr. Cote of the Grand Ligne Mission in Canada, and the New York Recorder. Dr. Cote, himself a convert from Romanism, and a great admirer of Kirwan, was led in the simplicity of his heart, to quote the *argument* of this last against Roman baptism, as equally valid against the "sprinkling of babies" in every shape. "The apostles administered baptism," Kirwan had said, "to those who expressed faith in Christ; and through this sacrament we obtain a place and a name in the visible church. This all men can understand; but how you, or any mortal man, by the application of water in any or all ways, can wash away the original and actual sins of the sinner, infuse into his soul the habits of grace, and give him a title to heaven, I cannot comprehend." This, of course, says Dr. Cote, excludes the baptism of infants, who can make no such confession; the thing is without Bible authority, a mere tradition of the Roman Church; and Kirwan, to his credit, virtually unchurches all who use it, as having no true baptism at all. This, however, was more than Kirwan

himself saw proper to admit; as he took pains to inform Dr. Cote, and the world, by a letter, more tart than strong, in the New York Observer. He complains of a *hocus pocus* mystification of his Letters; repudiates the unchurching dogma, in every form and shape; and welcomes to his communion table any and every friend of Christ, papist or protestant, baptist or paedobaptist. He treats the whole baptistic question as a "hobby;" a mere external; an accident of christianity at best, that should be held at arm's length from the true life of it, under its proper *unchurchly* form. The point really at issue, he leaves wholly untouched. No wonder, the Baptists should be put quite out of humor by such cavalier treatment. The Samson, that seemed so strong before, was suddenly shorn of his locks. It was plain that he was not fit to write about the Baptists at all. "For the sake of our common Protestantism," cries the New York Recorder, "we hope he understood Popery more truly when he wrote about *that*. A most unwelcome suspicion would come over us, as to that point, were not his representations corroborated by others who were born and nurtured in Romanism like himself, and who sustain his testimony by their own." This last reflection is soothing. The Recorder, in conclusion, still insists: "The passage quoted by Dr. Cote, from the Letters to Bishop Hughes, expresses precisely the faith of Baptists, and cannot be reconciled with that of the Presbyterian Church. Kirwan has adroitly passed that passage without an allusion, in his letter to the Observer." Quite recently, we have Dr. Cote himself again on the field, taking his "*dear Kirwan*" to task, more roughly still, in the same style; though with great regret, "on account of his laurels won in the controversy with Bishop Hughes." He knows not how to account for the sad change which has come upon him: *there* so strong, *here* so very weak. He seems to be Samson now, just up from the lap of Delilah—that "*perfidious tradition* of the Church of Rome," has turned the slayer of the Philistines into a common man. "When I came to read the fourth division of your letter, the paper fell several times from my hands, and as it dropped upon my desk, I said to myself: Were we to judge of the accuracy and correctness of Kirwan's assertions against the Church of Rome, by what he says so unjustly and so unfoundedly against the Baptists and their sentiments, certainly the verdict

of public opinion would be against the man, to whom Bishop Hughes found it so difficult to respond." "The mightiness of your strength was never so well exhibited, as when, in your letters to Bishop Hughes, you demonstrated to that prelate the absurdity of his creed, and the contradictions of the tenets of his Church. But next comes *your* turn to expose your weak side, Kirwan, when you try to grapple with and overthrow the scriptural doctrine of believers' baptism; and when I behold your contradictions and misrepresentations, I must be allowed to exclaim, with an unfeigned regret: Kirwan! Kirwan!! O Kirwan!!! How is the mighty fallen."—"I feel sorry that your earlier Romish education, and your later Presbyterian training, allow you to fall into a strain of half-sarcastical and half-jeering expressions, when speaking of the mode of an ordinance established by Him, whose minister and servant you profess to be. I would like to find words strong enough to show you the undignified manner with which you treat so lightly, what so large a number of your Presbyterian brethren confess to be the original mode of administering baptism. What a powerful arm you have thus lent to Bishop Hughes, in your letters to whom you profess to have so much reverence for all the doctrines taught in the Holy Bible. Solemnity and respectful language would have been preferable to scoffing and light words. Really, I feel abashed, that a Presbyterian brother could expose himself in the way you have done." We are not sure, after all, that the levity thus castigated by Dr. Cote, differs materially from the "great courtesy, urbanity, and sprightly humor," which have been placed to his credit in the controversy with bishop Hughes. But in this last case, the sport was with Romanism *only*, while in the other case, game is made of the whole Baptist denomination. Circumstances, of course, alter cases. So much for the history of this rather curious affair.

There is not the least doubt, we think, but that Dr. Cote and the Baptist Recorder are right, in claiming the argument of Kirwan as legitimately and fully on their side. On his own principles, and with his own style of warfare, he can never make head successfully against their attacks. If the Church be no more than he supposes; if the sacraments are of such purely outward significance; if all is to turn so mechanically on the letter of the

Bible, with so little room for the authority of Christianity as a living constitution; it were better to yield this whole question at once, and pass over in form to the Baptist ranks. The very style in which he talks about it, shows how little earnest value it has in his eyes. He stands, in truth, himself on baptistic ground; his theory of christianity is baptistic; his idea of the Church is baptistic; and it is only by *tradition*, accordingly, that infant baptism still keeps its place in his system. It is not a principle with him strictly, but as Dr. Cote styles it, retorting upon him his own term, a "hobby," which he holds against himself, in the way of concession to the Romanists. The concession is twofold. Infant baptism cannot be established, in the first place, by direct Bible proof; in the second place, it has no meaning aside from faith in a divine grace-bearing Church. Kirwan will have Bible proof, chapter and verse plump to the point, for every position; his motto is, the text, the whole text, and nothing *but* the text; and yet here we find him, in a most important case, insisting upon a doctrine and practice, for which he is able to urge no text whatever. If infant baptism be at all taught in the Bible, it is by the sense and spirit of it, and not by the letter of a single passage separately considered; and the sense and spirit of it, in such view, are made out for us by the presumptive practice of the Christian Church in the age of the Apostles, authenticated by the known practice of the same Church in the age following. But this is not all. Kirwan allows no sacramental grace in the old sense, no Church as an object of faith according to the Creed, no mystical objective power consequently in baptism under any view. His conception of the Church, is that of a purely mechanical organization added to the proper substance of christianity from without, and of no real force any farther than this substance is supposed to be already at hand, in the way of christian experience, under a different form.* Christianity is strictly for *believers*, and for such only; the entire world of infants accordingly

* Hear his own language:—"There is one other point to which I would direct your special attention, because it is one upon which you have been greatly deceived; I mean the Church. Every effort has been put forth by your priests to mystify this topic, and to deceive you in reference to it. All

is excluded from it, by original insurmountable disqualification. God may save infants that *die* such, if he see proper, in some other way (by the mere magical *fiat* of his own will); but not by any real comprehension of them, as a living component part of our redeemed humanity, in the new creation brought in by Jesus Christ. *This*, Kirwan makes to be throughout, for "believers," and for such only. His church has no room in it for infants, except *catachrestically*, by making itself into a mere "pedagogium" for educational purposes. Thus the *idea* of infant baptism, at once falls completely to the ground. If infants cannot be comprehended organically in Christ, in the new order of life, introduced by the mystery of his incarnation, in the true living compass of his mystical body, the Church; why in the name of all "common sense," we may well ask with the unsacramental Baptists, should we so trifle with a divine institution as to apply to them the holy *sign* of baptism? The sign in their case, has no significance; while it goes directly, for this very reason, to foster the Roman imagination of its being something *more* than a sign only. Infant baptism is truly part and parcel of the old catholic idea of the Church, and without this is of no force whatever.

Kirwan, of course, has no power to be true and fair, in his

who truly believe in Jesus Christ, and practice the precepts of his word, are reconciled to God. They are adopted into the family of God; they are the sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty. A connection of such with any branch of the visible church, does not interfere with their connection with the family of God. No good man is lost, and no bad man is saved, because of their connection with any church. As a man may be a true Papist, and be a Jesuit or a Jansenist, or a monk of La Trappe, or a shorn friar, so he may be a true Christian, and a member both of the visible and invisible church, and be a Protestant or a Papist, and a member of any of the sects into which they are both divided, which hold to the true atonement of Jesus Christ."—How very roomy and convenient! Why not add: Let such a good christian include in his canon of scripture, *all* the books of the Bible, or only half of them, or only two or three, or even none at all, *provided* he do but hold fast still to the atonement of Christ, and all will be well. Strange Presbyterianism, of a truth; much like that which Dr. Potts once undertook to *defend*, to the edification of all concerned, in his memorable duel with Wainright.

controversy with Romanism. With the utmost honesty of intention in his own mind, his whole position is such as to disqualify him for understanding correctly, or representing justly, the system he undertakes to expose. His own theory of christianity is one-sided and defective; he has no sympathy with catholic ideas; his notion of history is fantastic; the interior sense of Romanism lies for him away out of sight. Hence the force of what is true and good in his Letters, is greatly weakened by the way in which it is mixed up continually with what is false and bad.

Take one broad, and truly glaring, illustration of this defect. To prove Romanism false, all pains are taken to make it out the systematic enemy of liberty and knowledge—a favorite topic, as we all know, with ordinary haranguers on this subject. As the foe of civil liberty, it has required nations and kings to hold its stirrup; as the tyrant of the mental world, it has not allowed men to suit the Bible to their own sense. And then what has been the effect of popery upon human *knowledge*? Kirwan answers: “When Christianity, like a new sun, rose upon the world, there was much that might be called education in the Roman Empire. The obvious effect of Christianity was to extend it. After the lapse of some ages, popery by gradual stages crept, serpent like, to the high places of power. How soon afterwards the lights of learning go out; how soon the dark ages commence and roll on as if they were never to end! And those centuries of darkness form the golden age of your Church. And what spirit did it manifest on the revival of learning in England, after the sacking of Constantinople, and at the Reformation? Leo X. prohibited every book translated from the Greek and Hebrew, &c.” Again: “When the Reformation occurred, the retrograde movement of the world towards ignorance and barbarism and idolatry, had almost been completed. Had it not occurred, a radiance might continue to gild the high places of earth after the gospel sun had set—a twilight might be protracted for a few ages, in which a few might grope their way to heaven, but each age would have come wrapped in a deeper, and yet deeper gloom, until impenetrable darkness had fallen on the world.”

When one reads such stuff, and hears it echoed on all sides as

the shout that laid flat the walls of Jericho, he may be excused for calling to mind, at least, the indignant blunt remark of Johnson: "Let me tell you, Sir, no Church in the world has ever been so slandered as the Church of Rome!"

Could there well be a more gross insult put upon Christianity, than to make its triumph lead to the downfall of the old Roman culture and civilization? Even Gibbon has ventured on no assertion so bold as that. It does not help the case at all, to say: Christianity was indeed at first favorable to learning, but Popery came in stealthily under its name, and accomplished this great ruin. The Christianity, under whose presence the old Roman life fell, call it by what name we please, was the same substantially that conquered the empire in the fourth century, and that gave birth to the brilliant theology of the following period. It was, besides, the only Christianity in the world, the legitimate succession of all that had gone before, the whole Church as it then stood. And are we to be told, that this was the power which extinguished the lights of science for the ancient world, and thus made room for the dark night of ignorance that was to follow? Kirwan seems never to have heard of the universal revolution wrought in the Roman empire at this time, by the barbarous population poured in upon it from the North. Must we tell him and those who are forever harping on the same key, that the old civilization was overturned by Paganism, and not by Christianity; that the foundations of society were completely broken up, in the awful process; that universal chaos took possession of Europe; that a wild, tumultuating, savage life, prevailed on all sides; that a new course of culture was to be commenced; and that the Church was the ark, in whose bosom mainly was preserved all that was still left of value for this purpose, from the wreck of that great time which had gone before. Then follow the *incunabula* of modern society; the nations of Europe in swaddling clothes; the vast and mighty elements of a new civilization, wrestling not without terror towards the accomplishment of their great problem. Such a process of new creation, was never before seen. Still it goes forward. And in the whole of it the Church takes the lead. The world is again outwardly conquered, in the name of Christ, with a victory fairly equal to

that which won the throne of the Caesars in the beginning. Dark ages indeed are to be gone through; a long night, comparatively speaking, of ignorance and superstition, violence and wrong; for nations are not born in a day, and the great problems of history ask centuries for their solution. But what then? Is the Church to be held responsible for this necessity? So Kirwan would seem to think. Because she was not able to compress the work of ages into as many hours; because barbarous nations did not at once become wise, and learned, and politically free, under her magic hand; because her own constitution was shaped and moulded, more or less, by the power of the rude life with which she was called to deal; because, in one word, the light and liberty, and institutions generally, of the nineteenth century were not anticipated, under her auspices, in the ninth; she is held up to reproach, as the very *mother* of all the darkness and sin, through which the course of her history lay. What is bad, is laid unsparingly to her charge; while all good is regarded as going forward by some other force, and in spite both of her power and will. Nay, we are told that no such onward movement can be allowed, in truth, to have taken place. It was all one grand "retrograde" march, from the days of Alfred the Great and Charlemagne, down to the sixteenth century; at which time fortunately the Reformation occurred, to arrest the downward tendency; just in season, apparently, to save the world from universal barbarism, and a total extinction of the blessed light of Christianity. So this precious theory runs!

It never entered Kirwan's head probably, seriously to compare the actual civilization of Europe in the fifteenth century, with what the same Europe was in the ninth and tenth centuries. Had he done so, he would have found the rate of difference quite as striking, in the way of advance, as any which has been created by the progress of society since. The life of Europe, in all that time, was neither stationary nor retrograde, but powerfully onward.

The entrance of the Middle Ages, as they are called, was in the midst of universal chaos. With their going out, we behold the presence of a new world; Europe reclaimed from barbarism; forests cleared; lands cultivated; nations tamed and brought

under law ; art, science, politics, trade, all actively awake ; life as a whole, we may say, in universal motion. Academies and schools had multiplied on all sides. Of universities alone, as many as sixty-six were established before the year 1517, the date of the Reformation. Some of these were almost incredibly large. That of Paris formed a sort of commonwealth or state, within its own limits. Students and teachers were congregated there from all nations. Thought had acquired prodigious force, and stood ripe for the most brilliant exploits in literature and science. To talk of the revival of classic letters, the art of printing, the discovery of America, and other such agencies, as *originating* the scientific spirit of modern Europe, is infantile simplicity. Such powers were themselves possible only through the action of mind already awake, and only for such mind could they have been of any account. It required some culture, to welcome the learning of ancient Greece and Rome, when it was again brought to light. Men on the verge of barbarism take no pleasure in reading Plato ; the songs of Pindar have no particular music for their ear ; neither the strength of Thucydides, nor the grace of Herodotus, are apt to engage their taste. No importation of letters from Constantinople or anywhere else, would raise into enthusiasm the torpid mind of Mexico or China. "The very fact of the Reformation itself," as a distinguished Roman Catholic ecclesiastic has said, "presupposes a time, whose leading representatives occupied a very high grade of intellectual life ; a period less awake, and possessed of only small furniture in the way of knowledge, could neither have produced it nor met it with proper support. Let any one compare with the Protestant Reformation the later dissensions of the Greek Church, and he must almost loathe their insignificance and want of character. The separation which took place from the Latin Church in the sixteenth century, on the contrary, both in the objects it sought, and in the principles from which it sprang, reveals something grand and full of meaning, reflecting thus a brilliant light, against its own will, on the Church it left behind, and in its very blame covering her with praise. Who can survey, without admiration, the polemic powers brought into action on both sides ? Indeed the writings of Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Chemnitz

and Beza, on the one side, and the works of an Eck, Catharinus, Cochlaeus, Albert Pighius, Sadolet, Fisher, Thomas More, Reginald Pole, Vega, Andrada, and Bellarmine, on the other, in point of keen intelligence, eloquence and learning, afford a rare treat, which were it not embittered by other considerations, might be counted perfect. We know moreover, that the Reformers did not drop at once from heaven, when they first undertook to set the world right. It is no secret, where Luther went to school, whose instructions were enjoyed by Melancthon, who it was that put Calvin, still a little boy, into the use of a benefice, that the talent he saw in him might not go without means for its proper cultivation. The papal legate too is not unknown, to whom Zuingli was indebted, at the close of his academical studies, for a yearly pension, enabling him to enlarge his library.”*

This way of looking at the subject, as it is infinitely more rational, seems to us also, we confess, to be vastly more complimentary to the Reformation itself, than the view we have just seen taken of it by Kirwan. The Reformation would be a very small affair, if it had sprung up like the mushroom of a night, from such a compost of pure ignorance and corruption, as his theory supposes the whole Church to have been before. The true glory of it, and its only sure vindication in the end, are found just in this, that it did *not* fall from the clouds, nor creep forth from a corner (the valleys of Piedmont for instance); but that it was the product of the old Catholic Church itself, and the very channel in which was carried forward the central stream of its history, the true significance of its life. The notion that all was dark before the sixteenth century, and that then all suddenly became light, however generally current at one time, is now fairly exploded. It is a fiction worthy only of the nursery, which, in truth, kills itself, and must sooner or later be hissed out of the world.

So far is it from being true that the Roman Church stood opposed systematically to learning, her zeal for it was urged against her at times, as implying a want of true interest in religion. Her

* Mæhler's *Schriften und Aufsätze*. Vol. II. pp. 12, 13. Considerations on the state of the Church in the fifteenth century and first part of the sixteenth.

theology was held to be too scholastic. Even Melancthon himself, at one time complained of the attention given to Plato in christian schools. It is generally made the reproach of Leo X. and his cardinals, that their taste for the classics spoiled all their relish for the Bible. The pope, at all events, ranked first among the patrons of polite learning. He it was, the scholar of Politian and Chalcondylas, the friend of Picus and Marsilius, who sent the Greek, John Lascaris, back to his own country, to purchase up manuscripts of the classics and of the Greek church fathers; who invited young men of talent, in large numbers, from Greece into Italy, to give instruction there in their native tongue; who made it his business to encourage so many deserving men, by pensions and in other ways, to devote their lives to the cause of science. The revival of letters was not a consequence strictly of the Reformation; just as little as we can say that our modern civilization in general, starts from it as its ultimate cause. It contributed powerfully, no doubt, to the whole course of mind since, and may be taken, indeed, as the indispensable condition of its universal progress; but the necessity for such progress lay far back of this particular revolution itself, in the previous state of the christian world. Europe could not wake into full life, without the Reformation; but the waking itself, was something more broad and deep, which simply came to its most signal expression in this great fact.

"A *reformation* in the higher sense of the word," it has been finely remarked by Ullmann, "is always a vast historical result; the outlet of a spiritual process that has extended through centuries; a deep all-constraining necessity, brought to pass indeed by the free action of great men as its chosen organs, which yet in its essential character rests on a comprehensive mass mind, that cannot be produced at will, but gradually forms itself with irresistible force out of the inmost wants of life. In such a continuous spiritual formation process, however, there must be before all things, an actuating positive soul or centre; for what is merely negative, doubt, rejection, the denial of what is at hand, is not sufficient by itself alone, to unite the minds of men in this massive way, and to hold them thus in tension through centuries, moving in a fixed direction. Neither in the physical world, nor

in the moral, can any organic and enduring creation ever take place, except from the ground of a living fruitful germ, which holds in itself previously in the way of real power, all that is actually unfolded from its life; and this germ is always something positive, which first asserts its own existence, and only *then*, in order to win room for free growth, opposes and thrusts aside what is foreign and obstructive to its own nature. This general law we perceive also in every movement, that can at all lay claim to the dignity of a reformation in the sphere of religion. Reformation is a forming over again, a restoration of life. But in the conception of such a religious life-restoration, three things are essentially involved. *First*, it is a going back to something already given, and original; for a reformation, as distinguished from the first founding of a religion or ecclesiastical constitution, seeks not to make something entirely new, but only to renew what is already made; it moves always, accordingly, in a fixed historical sphere or tract, and loses its character when this tract is forsaken. *Secondly*, it is not a mere going back, a passive acknowledgment of the original, or a desire towards it, but above all an active *bringing* back of its power, a real renovation of that old faith in the form of life; this particularly constitutes its practical positive nature; it is a great historical fact, but one that rests on a given ground, clearly understood and acknowledged in the general consciousness, and which, for this very reason, forms itself again the foundation for farther development, new spiritual superstructure. *Lastly*, however, it lies also in the nature of a reformation, that it contends against what is false and sets aside what is out of date, that its "position" takes the form also of "opposition;" for the idea of renewing an original, implies that this original has in the course of time undergone distortion and falsification, that corruptions cleave to it which need to be removed; and to have free room for the new growth, what has run its course requires to be pruned away. Still a reformation, of the right sort, is never mere destruction as such, but always *creation*, involving destruction only as its unavoidable accident and condition." All these requirements meet, according to Ullmann, in the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. It was no accident, but an act which proceeded from the inmost

and deepest life of the world, and formed the grand turning point of its universal modern history. Such an act is not rationally conceivable, without vast presuppositions. "A world-historical epoch of this sort requires, like a gigantic oak, deep, far reaching roots, and firm solid ground, out of which to have grown. It betrays a poor sense of history, to seek the explanation of all here in single personalities or transient interests. These elements, indeed, must not be overlooked; but the truly great, the general, the enduring in history, springs from other and deeper grounds. Individuals make it not; they serve it rather, and become great just by this, that they do so with clear conscious conviction and full resolution, and the greater and more powerful always, in proportion as that is the case." The grandeur, and glory, and world-wide significance of the Reformation, stand precisely in this, that the forces which finally brought it to pass, had been maturing their strength and struggling in the same direction, for centuries before; so that the sense of ages might be said to become complete in the end by its presence.

In conclusion, with all becoming respect for the worthy author of these Letters, and the fullest confidence in the integrity of christian purpose with which they have been written, we are bound to say that we think them suited to do harm rather than good. We like not their anti-catholic temper and tone, disguised under the show of opposition merely to Popery and Rome; the rationalistic, nay, even radical, affinities and tendencies, that to our mind at least, make themselves painfully prominent in their whole character. We deprecate the spread of such views and feelings, in the holy name of Protestantism. We must say, in all solemn earnestness, we wish no such atmosphere of thought ever to reach the education of our own children. We would train them rather to faith in the idea of the Church, and sympathy with the articles of the ancient Creed. "Would to God that you could see things as *I* see them," Kirwan exclaims in one place, not without feeling, to Bishop Hughes. The bishop would say with equal earnestness, no doubt: "Would that *you* could see them as they appear to *me*." It is very certain, that they move in different worlds, with little power on the part of either to understand truly the position of the other. The bishop

sees Protestantism in a false light; dwelling only on its abuses and errors; having no eye for the vast world of truth which it reveals, no sense by which to appreciate properly its inward significance and power. But it is no less clear, that Kirwan is full as much in the dark, as it regards the opposite side. The fundamental meaning of the Roman Catholic Church, is hid from his view. There is a whole region of Christianity there, which he has never yet been brought to explore or comprehend. He confounds Catholicism perpetually, as we have seen, with the abuses heaped upon it by Popery. However valuable his own form of piety may be, (and we wish not to dispute its worth,) there is another style of piety altogether, forming a complete *terra incognita* to his experience and beyond the horizon of his thinking, which we are yet bound to acknowledge as of high and necessary account also to the complete conception of the christian faith. The most comprehensive and significant designation for this order of religion, is found in the term *Catholic*; as we may employ the term *Puritan*, on the other hand, to express what we mean by religion under the opposite type. We use both terms in an honorable sense, and simply to express in brief the general distinction now noticed. Catholicism stands in the sense of the outward and objective in Christianity, as a supernatural constitution actually at hand in the world under a historical form; the idea of the Church, as the bearer of heavenly powers; submission to authority; resignation of individual judgment and will to the apprehension of a divine rule, embodied and made concrete in the Church as a whole; sympathy with the symbolical, mystical, sacramental interest in religion. It will not do to treat all this as an obsolete fiction. It has too much countenance from the Bible; it finds too much to appeal to in the inmost depths of our religious nature. Any scheme of piety, however excellent it may be in other respects, which breaks in full with the faith and devotional life of the entire early Church, eviscerates the Creed of its true force, and makes it impossible for us to feel ourselves at home in the society of such men as Ignatius and Polycarp, Irenaeus and Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, Anselm, Fenelon, and the ten thousand others whose saintliness had been more or less like theirs from the beginning; any scheme

of piety that goes thus virtually, by its pretensions, to sap the very foundations of the Church itself, must be in its own nature defective and insecure. Puritanism must learn to do justice to Catholicism, before it can do full justice to itself. Its proper mission will be complete, only when the two forms of thinking are brought in some way to flow together, excluding on both sides all that is found to be incompatible with the idea of such a marriage.

We know full well, and have not forgotten for one moment, in all this review, that there is a Charybdis here as well as a Scylla, which we are bound on vast peril to shun and avoid. These Letters of Kirwan lie all on one side, covering at no great depth the treacherous *rock* we have now tried to expose; at some future time, if God permit, we shall take notice of the *whirlpool*, in an article, not on Bishop Hughes, but on "Brownson's Quarterly Review."

J. W. N.

ART. XVI.—ZUINGLI NO RADICAL.

THE following extract is translated from Professor Ebrard's great work, on the History of the Doctrine of the Lord's Supper. It forms part of a somewhat extended vindication of the general character of the Swiss Reformer, against certain injurious views which have been entertained of it, in Germany particularly, and in the bosom of the Lutheran Church. He has been held up to reproach, as a man whose zeal for the Reformation was more bent on pulling down than on building up; and who was ruled by the cold mechanical abstractions of the understanding, more a great deal than by proper power of the christian faith. It has been the fashion widely to associate with his name, the idea of a somewhat rationalistic and revolutionary tendency in religion; which is supposed also by the high Lutheran school, to have communicated itself, as a reigning permanent distinction, to the entire Reformed Church. This whole supposition Dr. Ebrard meets, as being in the case of Zuingli, no

better than a pure fiction of fancy, or theological prejudice. He insists upon it, that his theology was characterized throughout by a regard to the inward positive life of christianity, in its supernatural mystical form; and that even his sacramental doctrine itself, was based all along on the assumption of a real participation in the *very life* of Christ, as the necessary result of faith—something far deeper, of course, than the rationalistic conception of a mere moral union with him, which now so often affects to take shelter under the respectable authority of Zuingli's name. As for the notion of his being a fanatical radical, in his reformatory action, it is treated as wholly destitute of foundation. The extract here given, is intended to show, and it must be allowed indeed to do so very triumphantly, that this father of the Helvetic Reformation was, to say the least, full as conservative in his spirit as Luther, or any of the leaders of the same movement in Germany:

If to some of our readers the quotations now presented may perhaps seem too large and long for the end immediately in hand, we would remind them that they all go not merely to meet particular complaints against our reformer, which have no direct connection with the doctrine of the sacraments, but also at the same time to give us an insight into the fundamental character of his theology, *which is of the utmost consequence for the right understanding of his view of the Lord's supper*. We see at once, that Zuingli does not sunder faith scholastically from sanctification, but on the ground of his historical and biblical education apprehends both in their living organic union. Everywhere he opposes the *totality of what Christ does*, to the totality of what man can do without Christ, the decree of redemption through Christ to all humanly devised ways of salvation, deliverance from guilt by Christ's death to satisfaction by good works, sanctification by Christ's Spirit to the power of legal obedience. The vicarious action of Christ appears thus in the most intimate association with the vicarious passion of Christ. He makes good our shortcomings, not simply by suffering punishment in our stead, but also by *bringing to pass in us works* which we could not bring to pass of ourselves. Sanctification is taken here not as a subjective act growing out of faith, but as the immediate operation of *Christ living in us*; and the oneness which holds between the working of the *Holy Ghost* in us, and the life of

Christ himself in us, is thus apprehended in its deepest depth. With Zuingli accordingly, faith is not distinguished from sanctification, good works, the communion of the Holy Ghost, and the *mystical union*, but is regarded as the *totality of the new life*, which of itself involves all these from the start.

This will be very important for us hereafter. For the present we remark only how far Zuingli had entered into the true idea of Christian freedom. We see, that his opposition towards particular abuses proceeded not at all from the mere legal application of certain legally construed passages of Scripture, but from the most free and inward principle of faith. Allowing, however, the *ground* of this opposition to have been good, it is still asked whether the *manner* of it is not to be blamed as radical. Did he not mercilessly sweep away all that was old, even where it was free from harm?

Before we enter here upon the actual state of facts, it seems necessary first of all to clear out a whole Augean stable of prejudices and fables which busy *mythology* has contrived to throw around this part of the reformer's labors. To the Lutheran theologians, rather than to the Roman, belongs the credit of having vented their spleen upon him in the way of these ingenious imaginations; what one relates as dreadful, is made still a little worse in the hands of the next; and so the tattle runs through the polemical tradition, till it gains at last the show of well accredited history. What, did not Zuingli abolish everything! Not simply altars and images, but church music also, organs, ringing of bells, nay, the bells themselves, possibly even the steeples along? Is not the stale ory still in circulation, that he presented a petition to the Council for the suppression of church music, singing it himself, as he did so, to show practically the absurdity of using song in prayer—is not this flat story in circulation, we say, even in books and quite respectable theological journals, some of which we could easily name? Is it not the general impression that, while Luther retained all the old forms, and removed only what was doctrinally offensive, Zuingli made a cleansweep of the whole, and, then, constructed a poor scheme of his own in its place?

Against all this, at the outset, speaks the entire spirit of the good city, which Schiller has styled, not without reason, "the

old Zurich." What is new in Zurich springs from 1830, or, at farthest, from 1790. It is questionable, if any German imperial city (Nuremberg even scarcely excepted) has retained its ancient manners, institutions, and usages, with so little change, for any like time, as Zurich. The small, narrow streets, whose hurdle-work still shows plainly, by towers, citadels, and remains of walls and trenches, the three several enlargements the city has gone through in the course of history, threw open the outermost ring of their gates and barricades, only a few years since, for free intercourse with the country. The old democratic usages prevailed universally down to 1830; and are still, at least, half in force. Even since the old corporations have lost their importance politically, they still continue to stand, as social fraternities, proud of their old guild houses, which, under different names, are familiar to every child. In a city, whose spirit has cleaved for centuries with such attachment throughout to what is old, it is not so easy a matter to make any such clean sweep as is here supposed. If now, however, we compare the Zuinglian changes with those of Luther and Calvin, we reach the surprising result, that, so far as *the principle and spirit* of the changes are concerned, Zuingli stands throughout on the side of Luther against Calvin. Calvin created entirely new forms; Zuingli, like Luther, retained all the old, and set aside only what gave offence. Only in *result*, not in principle, does he differ from Luther; in this namely that the images as such seemed to him doctrinal stumbling-blocks, while Luther made a more nice distinction between their edifying use as works of art, and their misuse as objects of idolatry.

It is regarded as an essential difference, that Luther retained the existing church organization; provosts, chapters, and archdeacons, parish priests, and deacons, all remained in their place; while Calvin proclaimed all ministers equal, and brought in with violent novelty the presbyterial and synodical system. We inquire not here which is best; we say simply, that Zuingli took the course of Luther. The cathedral chapter of Zurich, with its canons or prebendaries, stood till within a few years past, and the number of the members has not even yet died out; while the distinction between priest and deacon continues to this day in all its old legal force. The archdeacon too, or "chief

helper," has not become strange to the Reformed church of the Zuinglian type.—Another small, but characteristic, difference, is, that Luther retained in the Lord's prayer the old and more hard form: "*Vater unser*," which the Calvinistic Reformed church of German tongue changed, (after Luther's own translation of the Bible however,) into "*Unser Vater*." Zuingli allowed, as Luther, the old *Vater unser* to keep its place, and it remained there in the Zurich church service till near the close of the last century.—Calvin set aside baptismal fonts; Luther and Zuingli allowed them to stand, and in Zurich, where all the children are baptized in public service, they are still in use every week.—Calvin abolished private baptism in extreme cases by midwives; Zuingli, and Luther, did not; the Zuinglian Reformed church, moreover, was more consistent with it, than the Lutheran, as not permitting the baptism to be repeated in case the child lived.—Another small but significant difference between the Calvinistic Reformed church and the Lutheran, is shown in regard to the renting of church sittings, a practice set aside by the first, while it is retained by the last; here again Zuingli stands on Luther's side. The Calvinistic church eschews crosses in grave yards, which with the Lutheran and Zuinglian are in general use. In observing christening-days as family festivals, instead of birth-days, the Zuinglian church is even nearer to the Roman than the Lutheran itself.—Let us look now, in full, to the Liturgy! Calvin constructed a new liturgy, on a new plan, the greatness of which, with all its simplicity, we have no wish to dispute. Zuingli, in his work *De canone Missae*, has followed the mass service, part for part, word for word, leaving out merely, or changing, all passages referring to the sacrifice of the mass and the worship of saints, so as to form a sacramental liturgy that was afterwards subjected, indeed, to various contractions on account of its undue length, but which still rests throughout on the old foundation, and breathes the spirit of antiquity; and which continues in use to this day. While the eucharistic liturgies of Calvinistic type consist of a simple didactic address, which is followed by a common extended prayer, and then by the distribution of the elements, the Zuinglian form, or the contrary, is made up of a number of smaller parts. It commences with the

ancient *introitus*, the translated *Dignum et justum est* &c.; then 1 Cor. 11, is read; after which the minister says (with the whole congregation originally), "*Glory be to God!*" Next follows a long responsory, now generally repeated by two ministers alternately. Then the familiar response between pastor and people: "*The Lord be with you—'and with thy spirit;'*" then a lesson from the sixth chapter of John; after another brief responsory, the Creed; then a short exhortation; the Lord's prayer; a prayer taken from the old mass service; the reading of the words of institution; the distribution of the elements; the 117th psalm, a closing prayer, and the benediction. In the same way, Zuingli retained the old baptismal service, with proper pruning. We find mention made of the chrisom cloth, on even to near the end of the 16th century.

But he put away the bells? These still swing in their places, and Zurich possesses verily a magnificent chime.—But they were not used for years; Zuingli would not suffer them to ring? Not for storms, true; otherwise bell ringing, in all its ancient classification, from the sound made at the beginning *and close* of divine service, on through eleven o'clock, noon and vesper chimes, down to the "coffee bell" at three o'clock in the afternoon, has been religiously observed, in defiance of the Nurembergers, through all centuries. Strange stories, indeed, are told of the love of the Zurichers for bells. On one occasion, (if we mistake not, 1712,) they are said to have brought off from a war with St. Gall, as *spolia opima*, a huge bell, transporting it in triumph to Zurich, with a team of forty-six horses!—But the clerical garments were abolished by Zuingli? The chasuble, (mass dress,) true. In other respects, the ministers until within a few years since, never appeared at regular church service, or at funerals even, and in family visitation, otherwise than in gown and cap, and with the large white ruff.—Has not Zurich, however, a synodical government? The Church, as of old, is divided into deanries, which have their deans and camerarii, and stand under the direction of the consistory or church senate, with the antistes at its head. Once a year, the clergy in general, convene in a synod, over which the same antistes presides, and which corresponds in its character more with the medieval councils than with

the Calvinistic synods. By the antistes, besides, an episcopal element has place in the system.—But the church psalmody? the church psalmody? why did Zuingli abolish the church psalmody? *What* church psalmody, we ask. The chorals, perhaps? Nothing of this sort was abolished by Zuingli, nor could be indeed—since the Zurichers, as well as the Nurembergers, “hang no one till he is first caught.” The chanted offices of the convents and the Latin sing-song of the mass, Zuingli did set aside. Luther, it is known, did the same thing; even the pope wished this reform, and would have actually accomplished it, had not Palestrina appeared with his new school.* The light in which the psalmody of that time was regarded, is briefly and aptly represented by the Tetrapolitan Confession, (cap. 21,) as follows: (*Cantiones et preces*) *a prima patrum consuetudine usque degenerasse abunde constat.* An endless ringing of Latin psalms to trivial melodies, street ballads often, suited not the purposes of christian worship. Not long since we read, where we would not have expected it, that Zuingli threw overboard the glorious creations of medieval art. It was forgotten here, that the music, as well as painting, which we admire as old, springs not from the middle ages, but is of the age of the Reformation or later. Palestrina, Durante, Orlando Lasso, Lotti, composed their immortal hymns after Zuingli’s time. So with the painters; Raphael (†1520) was Zuingli’s contemporary, Durer his friend and secret adherent; Corregio, (†1534,) Kranach, (†1553,) Holbein, (†1554,) Michael Angelo, (†1564,) Titian, (†1576,) Rubens, (†1640,) Murillo, (†1685,) all belong, with their main labors at least, to the person after his death. So the Nuremberg proverb, that no one is hanged before being caught, may be applied also to the hanging of Raphael’s and Durer’s pictures, and with slight alteration also to the church psalmody. The true state of the case is, that Zuingli abolished nothing save what Luther would also have abolished, the Latin singing, namely, of the clergy; but that Luther was able, sooner than Zuingli, to substitute something new in place of the old which was set aside, namely, the choral singing of the congregation. In this, the last

* See Thibaut’s work on the Purity of Music.

is indeed very clear of fault. Luther was a poet; Zuingli made some verses also, it is true, but poet he was not. Thus Saxony acquired a church psalmody *sooner* than Switzerland. This "sooner," however, is all that can be made of the matter. As soon as such psalmody made its way into Switzerland, it was laid hold of with earnest, we might say even voracious desire. As early as 12 Aug. 1526, Oecolampadius informed his friend Zuingli with enthusiasm, how his congregation had of their own accord begun to sing German psalms in the church.* We see how far the Swiss reformers were from any opposition to congregational singing as such. In a short time it became universal throughout Reformed Switzerland; and so it continues, in the highest style of choral psalmody, to this day.

The only case then which remains at last, is that of the *images*. Here, too, we boldly undertake our Zuingli's vindication.

Professor Ebrard then goes into a historical review of the way, in which the reformation in Zurich was carried forward in regard to this subject. The question, whether pictures, as works of Christian art, might not be used, for exciting devotional feeling, in public worship, was not one, he says, upon which any decision was called for in Switzerland at this time. The whole concern was in regard to images only, which had been previously the *object of superstitious veneration*. What Zuingli says in opposition to images, is said against them always in such view. Luther contended against image abolitionists, who made a sin of images legalistically as such, and thought that everything was done, when they were outwardly demolished; the great matter he saw, was to have them expelled from the heart; the idol and the work of art must be properly distinguished. Zuingli, on the other hand, contended with such as defended, not only the images, but image worship itself; in a situation too, where the images had already become a shibboleth between Popery and the Reformation. Here it was necessary to insist upon it as a part of *Christian freedom*, that the Church has a right to remove images. In such spirit, the opposition to them went forward in Zurich. It was neither rash nor radical, but considerate and sober throughout; showing all due regard to the prejudices of the weak; advancing not a step outwardly, for which full room was not made previously in the way of inward preparation. About the end of Sept. 1523, a certain *Nicholas*

* Without doubt Luther's "*Psalmlieder*" as published by Wolff Koepphel, in Strassburg, 1526.

Hottinger took it upon himself to break down a crucifix, in one of the suburbs of Zurich; for which he was thrown into the prison, with Zuingli's approbation. A woman in Luzerne had set up an image, in fulfilment of a vow, which soon became a resort for many pilgrims; on her conversion to the Protestant faith, she burned it with her own hand; whereupon she was fined, and required to restore it again to its place. In this judgment Myconius directed her to acquiesce as just, she had no right to destroy thus what was no longer her own. The anti-image spirit was excited, not by Zuingli, but by *Ludwig Hetzer's* tract: "The Judgment of God, our Spouse: how to treat all idols and images, as drawn from the holy scriptures;" a work, of which three editions, in the year 1523, were at once sold. Great commotion followed. A commission was appointed to investigate the question. A second conference took place, Oct. 26, 27, and 28, 1523, in the presence of 350 ministers and 450 laymen; the result of which was a resolution, that no change should be made at that time, in regard either to images or the mass. Zuingli was directed to write on the subject, for the instruction of the people. This was done, and with good effect. The next year, a *third* disputation was held. Still no action was taken against the images; they were allowed to keep their place a whole year longer, in accommodation to the prejudices of such as were still unprepared for their removal.

Finally, on Easter, 12. April, 1525, the Christian Lord's supper was celebrated in room of the mass—a solemnity of which *Gerdesius* has left us an impressive account; and as a preparatory step, the images were removed. The three city ministers, with certain members of the council and the necessary workmen, went from church to church, and with closed doors took them all down, and brought them away to the Water church. The clear trash among them was afterwards burnt; the better pictures are preserved to this day in the Water church, (now the city library). There is to be seen a coronation of Mary; there are the patron saints, Felix, and Regula, all stiff productions belonging to the transition period from the Byzantine over to the old German school; there again are some naked figures of martyrs, tortured with thorns, shocking to look upon; above all, however, there is that wonderful saint, the smith Erhardt or Eligius, who cut off the legs of the horses, he was called to shoe, and having shod them in such style, restored them sound to their place, (a miracle, to which the coat of Treves is nothing!)—articles all, that must tend much, in truth, to the edification of Evangelical

worshippers! We may understand from this, why it came so little in Zuingli's way to take his estimate of images, from the side of their artistic worth, their adaptation to produce feeling. If these pictures have any importance, it is only for the study of the history of art; and for this a library is altogether the most suitable place.

I must ask the indulgence of my readers, who have been carried along with me in this digression. It is not, however, my fault. So long as Zuingli remains as good as unknown, so long as he is absolutely misknown, so long as a caricature, a fanatical enthusiast and a man of mere dry understanding withal, is made to pass for him in the brain of the German theological public, so long also must it be a pure impossibility to apprehend the sacramental controversy between Luther and Zuingli in its true meaning and significance. It would be hard, indeed, to find the apprehension of a doctrine more intimately blended with the entire man, and his whole sense of Christianity, than just here in the case of Zuingli.

ART. XVII.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

The "Person of Christ," according to the Older Theologians of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. By Heinrich Schmid. Translated from the German and Latin by Chas. P. Krauth, Pastor of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Winchester, Va.

[The title of the entire work from which this chapter is translated, is, "Die Dogmatik der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche. Erlangen. 1843." It is designed to present the doctrines of the Lutheran Church as they were held when her faith was purest. Under each head, there is a summary statement of the doctrine of the church, by the author, and in the notes ample citations are made from the standards and standard authors of the church,

to confirm and illustrate his general view. The arguments for the various doctrines can, therefore, only come in incidentally—the grand object being a display of the doctrines themselves. To those who have not access to the great sources from which these rich treasures are drawn, a work like this will be of very great value. To those familiar with the great teachers of the Lutheran Church, the work of Schmid would still form a valuable remembrancer and arranger, and to those who have a longing to drink at these wells of undefiled theology, this work, which is ably executed, would form the guide they need; for as old Quenstedt, to whom he would often find himself introduced, has well said, in the Preface to his great system of Didactic and Polemic Theology: “Scire, ubi aliquid possis invenire, magna pars est eruditionis.” *Tr.*]

CHAP. II.—*Of the Fraternal Redemption of Christ as another Element of Salvation.*

§. 31.

THE redemption determined of God from eternity, was in time consummated⁽¹⁾ by his only begotten Son Jesus Christ, and of

(1) Holl.* “The Redeemer of the human race is Jesus Christ. The Redeemer is called Jesus, that is, Saviour, because he is to save his people from their sins. Matt. i. 21.—He is called Christ, that is, anointed, because he has been anointed by the holy Spirit as our king, priest, and prophet. John iii. 41.—The DD. declare farther that Jesus Christ is the ‘true Messiah, in whom all the prophecies of the O. T. concerning the Messiah are fulfilled to the minutest particular.’” Holl. “Proof 1) whosoever is God, and man, is the true Messiah. But Jesus &c. The major is evident from 2 Sam. vii. 12, 13. Ps. cx. 1. Mich. v. 1. Jer. xxiii. 5, . . 2) Whosoever is born of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, of the family of King David, and of a virgin undefiled, is the true Messiah. Major from Gen. xxii. 18. xlix. 10 2 Sam. vii. 12. Is. vii. 14. Minor from Luke ii. 23. 3.) Whatsoever ruler of Israel, as God, begotten from Eternity, as man, in the fullness of time, has been born at Bethlehem, ‘is the true Messiah.’ Major from Mich. v. 1.

* NOTE BY TRANSLATOR.—The following abbreviations are used in citing authorities:

Br.—J. G. Baier, *Compendium Theologiæ Positivæ*. Jena. 1686.

Chem.—Chemnitz, *De Duabis Naturis in Christo*. 1590.

DD.—Dogmatick Theologians.

Form. Con.—Formula Concordiæ. (I. Epitome. II. Solida Deebratio.) 1580.

Grh.—Gerhard. *Loci Theologici*. Jena. 1610—1625.

Hfrffr.—Matt. Hafenrefferi *Loci Theologici*. Holmiæ 1612.

Holl.—Hollazius. *Examen, &c.* Holmiæ. 1707.

Quen.—J. A. Quenstedt. *Theologia didactico-polemica, &c.* 1685.

this we here propose to treat. This doctrine involves a consideration I. of the person of the Redeemer; II. of the work, by which he has secured that redemption; III. of the different states involved in his incarnation.

A. Of the Person of Christ.

§. 32. *Union—personal union.*

In Christ we observe a duality of natures and a unity of persons, in accordance with the expression: “in Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, are two natures, the divine nature of the Logos, and the human nature, so united that Christ might become one person.” (Chemn.) If we regard this point with reference to its distinct parts, we would speak

I. Of the two natures in Christ;

II. Of the Person of Christ.

I. When we say of Christ, He is God and man, it is but another way of expressing the idea, that he exists in two natures, the divine and human.⁽¹⁾ Yet we must regard each of these na-

Minor from Matt. ii. 6. . . 4.) Whosoever at his coming hath his way prepared by a forerunner sent of God, he is the true Messiah. Major from Is. lx. 3. Mal. iii. 1. Minor from Mar. i. 23. 5.) Whosoever king of Zion enters Jerusalem poor and lowly, riding upon an ass, he is the true Messiah. Zach. ix. 9. . . 6.) Whosoever is Goel, or Redeemer, by right of consanguinity Job. xix. 25, a prophet like unto Moses Deut. xviii. 15, a king universal Zach. ix. 9. Ps. lxxii. 8, a priest according to the order of Melchizedek Ps. cx. 4, a priest interceding for sinners Is. liii. 12, to endure the last extremities Ps. xxii. Is. liii., to die Dan. ix. 26, to be buried Is. liii. 9, to be free from corruption, to descend into hell, and to rise again Ps. xvi. 10, to ascend to heaven Ps. lxviii. 18, to sit at the right hand of God the Father Ps. cx. 1, he is the promised Messiah. All which things the New Testament asserts of Jesus of Nazareth.

(1) Hfrffr. “By the nature two principles, or parts (so to speak), are to be understood, of which the person of Christ is constituted, to wit: ‘the divine and human nature.’ Of *person* the remark is made—The person of our Redeemer is here considered not as *αἰσχρο* or such as it was before the incarnation from eternity; but as *ἐνσάρχο* or such as it began to be in the fullness of time by the assumption of our human nature into its own divine hypostasis.” (Holl.)

General Definition of “*nature*” and “*person*”: Chemn. “Essence, or substance, or nature, is that, which of itself is common to many

tures in its complete verity and full integrity,⁽²⁾ for Christ is true

individuals of the same species, and which embraces the whole essential perfection of each of them."

"Person, or Individual, is something singular, which has indeed an entire and perfect substance of the same species: but determined or limited by some characteristic and personal property, and thus being distinguished and separated, not in essence, but in number, from the remaining individuals of the same species, subsists by itself. For a person is an individual intelligent substance, incommunicable, which is neither part of another, nor is sustained by another, nor has dependence on another. Thus, therefore, θεότης, ανθρωπότης, deity, humanity, divine nature, human nature, divine essence, human substance, are names of essence or of natures. God, man, are appellations of person."

On the distinction of meaning, when the word nature, or essence, is applied to God, and men. Comp. on the Trinity. Not. 11. Quen. "(Of the divine nature of Christ): The divine nature otherwise, signifies the divine essence one in number, common to all the three persons and entire in each, but in the article of the person of Christ it is not absolutely considered, in as far as it is common to the three persons of deity, but relatively, in as far as it subsists in the person of the Son of God, and is limited *πρόσω ὑπαρξεν* in the second person of the Trinity. Whence the whole divine essence is united to human nature, but in one of its hypostasis to wit the second."

(2) Holl. "Counc. of Chalcedon: We confess (him to be) true God, and true man, the latter consisting of a rational soul and a body, co-essential with the Father according to his divinity and co-essential with us according to his humanity, in all things like to us, sin excepted."

Quen. "With reference to his human nature is to be considered 1.) its verity; 2.) entirety; 3.) *ὑμουνσία*. The first denies it to be a phantasm, the second that it is partial, the third *ἑτεροουσίαν*."

Gerh. "In Christ is a true and perfect divine nature, and thence also Christ is true, natural and eternal God. We say not only that divine gifts, but that also a true and perfect divine nature, is in Christ, nor do we simply say, that he is, and is called God, but that he is true, natural and eternal God, that, in this way, we may more clearly separate our confession from the blasphemies of the Pholians, and of all *θεομάχων*."

Gerh. "In Christ is a true, entire and perfect human nature, and thence, also, is true, perfect and natural man—By the *verity* of his human nature is understood, that the Logos did not assume a phantasm, or mere external appearance of human nature, but in very deed has become man. By *entireness* of human nature is understood, that he assumed all essential parts of human nature into unity of his person, not only a body, but also a rational soul, so that

God and true man.⁽³⁾ As true man he partakes in all the natural infirmities to which human nature is subject, not, however, in consequence of a natural necessity, but in consequence of his free will, in order to the promotion of his mediatorial commission; for, inasmuch as he truly was born of man, of the Virgin Mary, but was not begotten of a human father, his human nature has also received nothing of all that which was the first consequence of Adam's sin.⁽⁴⁾ This does not prevent us from predi-

his flesh became animated flesh. Nor do we say alone, that he was man, but that he still is, for what he has once assumed he never has nor ever will lay down."

(3) Holl. I. "His true and eternal divinity is proved by the most solid arguments, taken *a*) from the divine names (arg. ὀνομαστικοῖς); *b*) from attributes proper to the true God alone (arg. ἰδιωματικοῖς); *c*) from the personal and essential acts of God (arg. ἐνεργητικοῖς); *d*) from religious worship due to God alone (arg. λατρευτικοῖς); compare on the Trinit. n. 34."

II. "That Christ was true man is demonstrated *a*) from human names, John viii. 40 1 Tim ii. 5; *b*) from the essential portions of man, John ii. 21. Heb ii. 14. Luke xxiv. 39. John x. 15. Math. xxvi. 38. Luke ii. 52 John v. 21. Math. xxvi. 39; *c*) from attributes proper to true man, Math. iv. 2 John xix. 28. Math. xxv. 37 Luke xix. 41. Joh. xi. 33; *d*) from human operations, Luke ii. 46. 48 Math. iv. 1. xxvi. 55.; *e*) from the genealogy of Christ as man (as to the ascending line Luke iii. 23, as to the descending line Math. i. 1)."

We must then distinguish a "double generation," an "eternal generation, through which he is Son of God", and a "temporal generation, through which he is man, or son of man, Gal. iv. 4." (Br.)

(4) Chemn. "Christ being conceived of the H. Spirit, assumed human nature without sin, incorrupt. Those infirmities therefore, which, as penalties, attend sin, would not have been a necessary condition in the flesh of Christ, but he could have kept his body free from, and unexposed to, those infirmities. For a flesh of sin was not necessary to his being true man, as Adam, before his fall without those penal infirmities, was true man. But, on account of us and for our salvation, Christ incarnate, that he might commend his love unto us, voluntarily assumed those infirmities, . . . that so he might bear the penalty transferred from us to himself and might free us from it" Hence Holl.: "Christ assumed *natural infirmities* common to all men placed in the natural state; but he did not take on him *personal infirmities*, arising from particular causes, far less those implying moral evil."—"Natural common infirmities of men are, those found in all men after the fall, as to hunger, thirst, suffer

cating of Christ a true and complete humanity, like unto us, as the same may also be predicated of Adam, since the original sin which comes upon us in consequence of the sin of Adam, has not converted the nature of man into another; but it may well be a consequence of the special circumstances which by the birth of Christ had their being, and from the special relation which the divine λόγος has to this human nature, that special properties may be predicated of the human nature of Christ, in which it has advantages over that of other men. These are 1.) the ἀνθρωπότητα; 2.) the ἀναμαρτία; 3.) the “singular excellence of soul and body.”(5) The first is consequent on the special relation

fatigue, to be cold, hot, sorrowful, angry, agitated, to weep; which, since they are blameless, the holy Scripture attests, were assumed by Christ, not of force, but freely, not for his own sake, but for ours (Quen: that he might perform the functions of the mediatorial office, and become a sacrifice for our sins), not for ever, but for a time, to wit, in the state of exinanition, but not retaining them in a state of exaltation. Personal infirmities are, those which originate in particular causes, and have their source in a defect δυνάμειος πλασεικῇ, or of efformative power in the parent, as consumption, gout, or from a particular fault, as for example from gluttony or other excesses, as fever, dropsy, &c, or from a particular providence, or divine judgment, as disease in a family (2 Sam. iii 20) These were very far removed from the most sacred humanity of Christ, as to have assumed them was not expedient to the human race and would have derogated from human dignity.”

(5) Holl. “Certain individual properties meet in the human nature of Christ, in which, as if ὑπεροχαῖς, or in certain prerogatives, he surpasses other men; of this kind are: a) ἀνθρωπότητιδ wanting proper subsistence, compensated by the divine hypostasis of the Son of God as far more eminent.—If the human nature of Christ had retained its proper subsistence, there would have been two persons and consequently two mediators in Christ, contrary to 1 Tim ii 5. The reason is: because a person by subsistence to the highest degree complete, is formally constituted, in its own being, and consequently from unity of subsistence unity of person, is to be estimated. It follows therefore, that one or other nature of those, which coalesce into one person, must be devoid of its proper subsistence: and since the divine nature, which is really the same with its subsistence, cannot be devoid of it, it is evident that to the human nature is to be attributed the want of a proper subsistence. From ἀνθρωπότητα we must distinguish the ἐνθρωπότητα: : Quen. ἀνθρωποστατον is, that which does not subsist by itself according to a proper

into which the divine λόγος has entered with the human nature ; this, to wit : is at no time to be regarded as subsisting for itself and forming a person for itself, for the λόγος has assumed no human person, but only a human nature. The ἀνυπόστασία is, therefore negatively predicated of the human nature, in so far as this human nature attains no proper personality, positively the ἐνυπόστασία in so far as another hypostasis, that of the divine nature, participates in this human nature.

The ἀναμάρτησία is expressly taught in many places of sacred

personality : ἐνυπόστατον however, that which subsists in another and has been made partaker in the hypostasis of another. When, therefore, the human nature of Christ is called ἀνυπόστατος, nothing else is meant than that it does not subsist by itself, and according to its own self in proper personality : but it is called ἐνυπόστατος, because it has been made partaker of another hypostasis, and subsists in the Logos."

Holl. notices the following objection : "You say, if the human nature is devoid of proper subsistence, it will be more imperfect than our nature ἀνυπόστατος, or subsisting by itself? Answ. : The perfection of a thing is to be estimated by its essence, not by its subsistence." —And there is weight in the observation of Gerh. : "That impersonality of flesh, which some assign as the *terminus a quo* of incarnation, which distinguishes between a subsistence, by which that mass from which the body of Christ was formed, subsisted as a part of the virgin, not by the proper and very subsistence of the virgin, and between a subsistence, by which the human nature from the sanctified mass, formed by the operation of the holy Spirit, began in the first moment of incarnation to subsist by the very subsistence of the Logos communicated to it, that is not to be received in a sense that implies that, at any time whatever, the flesh of Christ was completely impersonal ; but that, in our thought, the impersonality of such flesh, before its reception into subsistence of the Logos, is assigned, not in previous order of time, but of nature. That flesh and soul were not previously united into one person, but there were simultaneously a formation of flesh from the mass which had been separated and sanctified by the holy Spirit, the animation of that flesh thus formed, the assumption of the formed and animated flesh into subsistence of the Logos, the conception of the flesh formed, animated and subsisting in the womb of the Virgin."

b) *Sinlessness* (ἀναμάρτησία). Chemn. " 'Therefore,' said Gabriel to Mary, 'the holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee, that what shall be born of thee, shall be holy.' By the operation of the holy Spirit therefore, it was effected that the Virgin Mary, without the seed of man, con-

scripture, (2 Cor. v. 21, Heb. vii. 26, Is. liii. 9, Dan. ix. 24, Luke i. 35, 1 Pet. i. 19, ii. 22,) and follows also from the supernatural birth of Christ. The "*singular excellence of soul and body* from his sinlessness.

II. The person of the Redeemer was formed by the union of the λόγος, the second Person of the Godhead, the Son of God, with human nature so closely and intimately, that the two united natures form only one person, that of the Redeemer, the God-man.⁽⁶⁾ The act itself, by which this was accomplished, is called "*personal union*." Holl. "*A divine action, by which the Son of God took human nature into unity of his own per-*

ceived and became pregnant. And that mass, which the Son of God in that conception assumed from the flesh and blood of Mary, the holy Spirit so sanctified and purified from all taint of sin, that, what was born of Mary, was holy. Is. liii. 9. Dan. ix. 24. Luke i. 35. 2 Cor. v. 21. Heb. vii. 26. 1 Pet. i. 19. ii. 22. (Quen. I call the sinlessness inhesive, not imputative; for our sins have been truly imputed to him, and he has been made sin for us. 2 Cor. v. 21)."

c) "*Singular excellence of soul and body*. Quen: Threefold perfection of soul, of intellect, will, and desire; (Holl.: the soul of Christ holds the elements of wisdom, Luke ii. 46. John vii. 46. . . of holiness). Perfection of body: α. the highest εὐχρησία, a good and equable bodily temperament; β. ἀθανασία, or immortality (Holl.: which belongs to him, as well on account of the integrity of a sinless nature, Rom. vi. 23. as on account of the indissoluble chain of the personal union. Christ, therefore, by reason of an intrinsic principle, is immortal, and the fact that he died, arises from an extrinsic principle, and according to a voluntary οικονομία, John x. 17—18. In that death, however, which he freely underwent, the body of Christ remained ἀφθαρτον, or free from corruption, Ps. xvi. 10. Acts ii. 31.); γ. the highest elegance and beauty of form, Ps. xlv. 3. (Holl.: The beauty of Christ's body is judged by the excellence of the soul that dwelt in it, and from the direct action of the Holy Ghost, by whose ἐπελεύσει the most glorious shrine of the body of Christ was formed. Quen: That he is said to be despised and rejected of men (vulg. most abject of men) Is. liii. 3. relates to the disfigurement consequent on the wounds of his passion)."

(6) Holl. "The divine and human natures existing in the one person συνδετῶ of the Son of God, have one and the same hypostasis, diverse, however, in the way in which it is had. For the divine nature has it primarily, of itself, and independently; but the human nature secondarily, on account of the personal union, and therefore by participation."

son, in the womb of the Virgin Mary.(7) This act has been willed and determined by the entire holy Trinity; by them has the mass been prepared, of which the human nature consists, and by them has it been united with the divine nature; but this act has been consummated by the second person of the Godhead, who alone has become man.(8) This second Person of the Godhead, the Logos, is so related in the act of union to the

(7) Br. "The union of the human nature with the divine consists in this: that those natures are so conjoined, that they become one person. Synonymous expressions are: σάρκωσις, ἐνσάρκωσις, σαρκογενεσία, incarnation, inhumanation, and incorporation (ἐνωδρώπησις καὶ ἐνσωμάτωσις), assumption (πρόσληψις).

Quen. "The basis of this mystery: John i. 14. Gal. iv. 4. 1 Tim. iii. 16. Hebr. ii. 14. 16. Rom. xi. 5."

Definition: Holl. "Incarnation is a divine act, by which the Son of God, in the womb of his mother, the Virgin Mary, assumed into unity of his own person, a human nature, consubstantial with us, but without sin, devoid of proper subsistence, and communicated to the same alike his divine hypostasis and nature, so that now the θεάνθρωπος Christ subsists perpetually in the two natures, divine and human, most closely united."

(8) Gerh. "The work of incarnation is said to be common to the whole Trinity, as to the act; but proper to the Son, as to the terminus of the flesh assumed, which is λόγον ἐπόσεσις; the work is called *ad extra*, and essential, or common, to the whole Trinity, as to the effect or production; but *ad intra*, and personal or proper to the Son, as to the termination, or relation. The act of assumption proceeds from the divine power common to the three persons, the terminus of assumption is a ἐπόσεσις proper to the Son.—The Father sent the Son into the world. The holy Spirit supervening sanctified those drops of blood, and purified them from sin, from which the body of Christ was formed, so that what should be born of Mary, might be holy, and by divine power it might be wrought in the blessed virgin that, apart from the order of nature, she might conceive a fœtus, without virile seed. The Son descended from heaven overshadowed the virgin, came in the flesh, being made flesh, by partaking of the same, manifesting himself in it, assuming it into unity of his person." (In Luke i. 35, by "power of the highest" is generally understood the Son.) Holl. "Overshadowing denotes a secret, and wonderful filling of the temple of the body reared by the holy Spirit. To wit: the Son of God overshadowed the Virgin Mary, whilst, in an unsearchable mode, he descended into the womb of the virgin and, by a peculiar approximation, filled and united to himself that virgin mass of blood excited by the holy

human nature, that he, the Logos, forms the person⁽⁹⁾ as in general he is the efficient, through which the union is brought about; for it is he who has an active relation to human nature, who

Spirit, so that *σωματικῶς* he might dwell in it as his proper temple. — The conception *Σεαυθρώπου* is appropriated to the holy Spirit Luke i. 35. *a*) because the whole work of fecundation is ascribed to him, Gen. i. 2; *b*) that the purity of that mass of blood, from which the flesh of Christ grew, might be more evident; *c*) that so there might be the same cause for the generation of Christ as man, and our regeneration, to wit, the Holy Spirit. The material principle, and that entire, of the conception and production of Christ the man, is Mary, a spotless virgin (Is. vii. 14.) of the royal stem of David, and, therefore, sprung from the tribe of Judah (Luke iii. Acts. ii. 30). The material principle, partial and proximate, is the animated seed of the Virgin Mary (Hebr. ii. 14. 16)."

(9) Chemn. "The human nature did not assume the divine, nor did man assume God, nor did a divine person assume a human person: but the divine nature of the Logos, or God the Logos, or person of the Son of God, subsisting from eternity in the divine nature, assumed, in the fullness of time, a certain mass of human nature, so that there would be in Christ the nature assuming, to wit, the divine, and the nature assumed, to wit, the human. But, in other cases, a human nature is always the nature of some particular individual, whose property it is to subsist in some certain hypostasis, which, by some characteristic peculiarity, is distinguished from all other hypostases of the same nature. So each man has his proper body and his proper soul. In Christ incarnate, however, a certain divine nature, before this union, subsisted by itself, and that, indeed, from eternity. But not thus did that mass of the nature assumed subsist, before this union, by itself, so that, before this union, it was the proper body of some particular and distinct individual, and a proper soul, i. e. a person peculiar and subsisting in itself, which afterwards the Son of God assumed. But, in that conception, the Son of God assumed that mass of human nature into unity of his own person, so that he subsists and is sustained in it; and, by assuming, made it proper to himself, so that the body is not the body of another individual, or of another person, but the proper body of the Son of God himself, and the soul is the proper soul of the Son of God himself. — The 'Communication of hypostases, or of subsistence,' proceeds also from the Logos: Holl. 'Communication of hypostases is, that the Son of God truly and really brought his divine *ὑπόστασιν* to communion and participation of the human nature destitute of proper personality which he assumed, so that the same reaches a terminus, is complete in subsisting, and is constituted in the ultimate hypostatic *esse*.'"

assumes it, whilst the human nature stands to him in a passive relation.⁽¹⁰⁾ This close union then, of the divine and human nature, regarded as a state, is called "*the personal or hypostatic union.*" Holl. "*The personal union is the conjunction of the two natures, the divine and human, subsisting in one hypostasis of the Son of God, implying a mutual and indissoluble communion of each nature.*"⁽¹¹⁾ To wit: it is a result of this efficiency of the Logos, that the hypostasis of the divine nature has now also become a hypostasis of the human nature; i. e., the two natures have now one hypostasis, that of the Logos, and

(10) Quen. "But of these two extremes (of divine and human nature) one has regard to the agent, or to one who perfects, the other to the passive and perfectable. The former is the Son of God, or, simple person of the Logos, or, what is the same, the divine nature, determined by the hypostasis of the Logos; the latter is the human nature The former extreme is the active principle of the περιχωρήσεως, which acts and perfects, the latter is the passive principle of the same περιχωρήσεως, which is perfected, or receives perfections. Kg. 'Περιχώρησις, immixtion, is that active permixtion, by which the divine nature of the Logos, perfecting within and completely around, pervades the human nature and communicates to the whole of it its entire self, to wit, in entirety and perfection of essence. Col. ii. 9.' Their operation is however this, that the fullness of divinity dwells within the human nature, and the two natures are 'to one another present by the closest presence.'"

(11) Gerh. "The state of union is properly and specifically called union, ένωσις ύποστατική, and is a most strict περιχώρησις of two distinct natures in one person, most near in mutual presence, an impermixt and unconfused immixtion, on account of which one nature is not without the other, nor can be without the distinction of unity of person. The distinction between a state and an act of union is regarded as this: that the act is transient, but the state is permanent, and that the act is simply of one person, i. e. of the Logos, who, before his incarnation, was a simple person, on a nature, to wit, the human; but a state is between two natures, the divine and human, in ύποστάσει σύνδέτω, that the act consists in the assumption of humanity, made in the first moment of incarnation; but the state in that most close and ever enduring junction of natures."

Quen. "Formula of this personal union: *a*) participation, or communion, of one and the same hypostasis, 1 Tim. ii. 5; *b*) personal intimate, and perpetual presence, of the natures to one another mutually. John i. 14. Col. ii. 9."

form together one person, that of the Saviour, the God-man :⁽¹²⁾ in consequence then of this, the union of the two natures is so complete and inseparable, that the one can no longer be thought of without or apart from the other, but both at all times entirely with one another,⁽¹³⁾ yet in such a way, that both natures retain their own essence and properties entirely unmingled with the

(12) Form. Conc. viii. 6: "Although the Son of God is of himself an entire and distinct person of the eternal Godhead, and, therefore, was true, substantial, perfect God with the Father and H. Spirit from eternity—yet, in assuming human nature into unity of his own person, there were not two persons in Christ, or two Christs, but Christ Jesus, now in one person, is at once true eternal God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and true man." . . .

Chemn. "To the specific difference of the hypostatic union it belongs, that those two natures are coupled and united to constitute one *ὑποστάμενον* in Christ incarnate, i. e., by that union the nature inseparably assumed was so made proper to the person of 'the Word' who assumed it, that, although the two natures are and remain in Christ without confusion or change, the difference, both of natures and of essential properties, being preserved, there are not two Christs, but one.

Christ, therefore, since the personal union, is called a person *σύνδετος*. Gerh. "The hypostasis is called *σύνδετος*, not, because it was composed by suffering, in itself, and of itself, any alteration or loss of its own simplicity, but because, after the incarnation, there is a hypostasis of two natures, when, before, there was a hypostasis of the divine nature alone. The person of the Logos, before the incarnation, was an *αὐτοτελεστάτη*, and simple *ὑπόστασις*, subsisting in the divine nature only; by the incarnation was made *ὑπόστασις σύνδετος*, a constant nature at once divine and human, and so to the integrity of the person of Christ, now incarnate, belongs not only his divine, but also his assumed human nature:—Because the hypostasis of the Logos has been made the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the *ὑπόστασις λόγου* has been communicated to the flesh (from whence follows the '*ἐνυπόστασις* of the human nature')."

(13) Gerh. "For it is not a part united to a part, but the whole Logos to the whole flesh, and the whole flesh to the whole Logos; therefore, on account of the *ὑποστάσεως ταυτότητα καὶ τῶν φύσεων εἰς ἀλλήλα περιχώρησιν*, the Logos is so present to the flesh, and the flesh to the Logos, that the Logos can neither be without the flesh, nor the flesh without the Logos: but wherever the Logos is, there it has the flesh most closely present with it, to wit, which it has assumed into unity of person; and wherever the flesh is, there it has the Logos most closely present with it, to wit, into whose hypostasis it

other.(14) A perfectly exact conception, however, of the mode and way in which these two natures are united in the one person, cannot possibly be obtained, since the holy Scriptures, which certainly teach the union itself, say nothing of the *How?* of that union. We must, therefore, be satisfied with the ability to avoid false conceptions of this union.(15) Consequently we may say, that this union is *not* 1.) *essential*, by which two natures would coalesce into one essence (in opposition to Eutychianism); 2.) *not natural*, such as that of the soul and body in man; 3.) *not accidental*, such as is: *a*) between two or more separable accidents coupled in one subject, (so whiteness and sweetness are united in milk); *b*) between accident and substance (such as we have in a learned man); *c*) between two substances but accidentally united (as between the sticks in a bundle); 4) not merely

has been assumed. As the Logos is not without his deity, of which he is a hypostasis: so also is he not without his flesh, finite indeed in essence; yet personally subsisting in the Logos. For as his own deity is proper to the Logos by eternal generation from the Father: so to the same Logos the flesh has been made proper by the personal union. Form. Conc. viii. 11."

(14) Form. Conc. viii. 7. "We believe that, now, in that one undivided person of Christ, there are two distinct natures, to wit, the divine, which is from eternity, and the human, which in time has been assumed into unity of the person of the Son of God. And these two natures, in the person of Christ, shall never be either separated or confused, nor shall the one be changed into the other; but each in its own nature and substance, or essence, in the person of Christ, shall remain to all eternity. We believe . . . that each nature also shall remain unconfused in its own nature and essence, nor ever shall be taken away; so also each nature shall retain its own natural essential properties, nor to all eternity shall lay them aside."

(15) Gerh. "The mode of this union is wonderfully singular and singularly wonderful, transcending the capacity not only of all men, but of all angels, whence it is called *ὁμολογουμένως μέγα μυστήριον*. There are various and diverse modes of union, which are to be regarded as different from the mode of personal union. For, as the pious fathers say, that we can better know and say, what God is not, than what he is: so also of that divine and supernatural union of two natures in Christ we can, in truth, assert, that it is more easy to say, what is not its mode, than what is."

From holy Scripture Gerh. vindicates the dogmatic conception

verbal, arising either from a title with no corresponding fact (as when a man is called counsellor of the prince, who in fact never gave him counsel,) or from an expression not literal, (as when Herod is called a fox); 5) not *habitual* or *respective*, which can subsist, although the extremes of this union are in fact separate and distant. (For there is respective union of various kinds, as moral between friends, domestic between married persons, political between fellow-citizens, ecclesiastical between members of a church.) On the other hand we may assert positively of this union, that it is 1.) *true* and *real*, because it exists between extremes truly cohering, the idea of separation or of distance being excluded; 2.) *personal* (but not of *persons*) and perichoristic; 3.) perpetually enduring. (Comp. notes 6—8.)

in the following: "The more important passages of Scripture, which speak of the union of the two natures in Christ, are these: John i. 14. Col. ii. 9. 1 Tim. iii. 16. Hebr. ii. 14—16. Since all these are parallel, they should be constantly united in the explanation of the union. John says, 'the Word was made flesh;' but, lest it might be thought, that the Word was made flesh, as water was made wine, Paul says, 'that God,' i. e. the Son of God, 'was manifest in the flesh, and that *μετεσώτηρε* (he became partaker) of flesh and blood'. But a *κοινωνία* involves at least a distinction of two, otherwise there would be *μεταβολή και συμφυσίς*. God, is said by the Apostle, to have been manifest in the flesh; but, lest it might be supposed that there was such a *φάνερωσις*, as there was under the O. T. when either God himself, or angels, appeared in external forms, John says, that the Logos was made flesh, i. e., that he so assumed flesh into his own hypostasis, that he will never, in all time to come, lay it aside. The Son of God is said to have taken on him the seed of Abraham; but, lest it might be supposed, that it was such an assumption, as that of the angels who temporarily assumed corporeal figures, it is added that, forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise partook of the same. But it is evident, that the children partake in such way of flesh and blood, that flesh and blood, or human nature, is imparted to them by being born of their parents. The union is described by the Apostle, as a *κατοίκησις λόγον* in the flesh assumed; but, lest it might be thought that the Son of God dwells in the flesh assumed, in the same way that God dwells by grace in the hearts of believers, it is expressly added: that *παν πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος* dwells in the flesh assumed, and that indeed bodily, corporeally, as if a dwelling were denoted, or, personally, that the mode of union may be expressed."—The "negative properties" are very differently recounted by the theologians.

§. 33. *Communion of natures—personal propositions—communication of properties.*

When now by the personal union the hypostasis of the divine nature has at the same time also become that of the human nature, and so no longer a divine nature alone, but a human and divine one is to be predicated of the person of the Redeemer, so there has been constituted at the same time also, an efficient association of the two natures between one another, in consequence of which the two natures are not related to each other in a barely external way: for since the hypostasis of the divine nature is not essentially distinct from that nature itself, but this hypostasis has communicated itself to the human nature, it follows therefrom, that a real and efficient communion and association between the divine and human nature is established.⁽¹⁾ The first operation of "the personal union" is also the "communion (also 'communication') of natures." Quen. "Comm. of nat. is that most close and intimate *κοινωνία* and *συνδύσις* of the divine nature of

Besides that furnished in the text, the following are of principal importance: "The union has been formed *a)* *ἀσυχνῶς*, without confusion; *b)* *ἀτρέπτως*, in a way allowing no change; *c)* *ἀδιαίρετως*, indivisibly; *d)* *ἀχωρίστως*, inseparably; *e)* *ἀαλλοιῶτως*, immutably; *f)* *ἀδιαλύτως*, indissolubly; *g)* *ἀδιαστάτως*, without distance. Ox: 'not *τοπιῶς*, as formerly in the temple at Jerusalem; not *ἐνεργητικῶς*, as in creatures, not *χαρίεντως*, as in the saints, not *δοξαστικῶς*, as in the blessed in heaven, and the angels.'

(1) Quen. "If the hypostasis of the Logos has been truly and really communicated to the flesh assumed, there is absolutely a true and real communication between the divine and the human nature, which has been assumed, since the hypostasis of the Logos and the divine nature of the Logos do not really differ. But that exists, therefore also this does." Form. Conc. viii. 14.: "But we are not to think of this hypostatic union, as though those two natures, the divine and human, are united in the way, in which two pieces of wood are fastened together, so that really, or in very deed and truly, they have no communication whatever, between them: For this is the error, and heresy, of Nestorius and Paul of Samosata, heretics, who supposed, and taught, that the two natures are separate or distinct, and, in every respect, are by alternation or between themselves incommunicable. By this false doctrine, the natures are separated and two Christs are supposed, of whom one is Christ, the other God, the Logos, who dwells in Christ."

the Logos and of the humanity assumed, by which the Logos permeates* the human nature personally united to him by a most intimate and most profound *περιχώρησις*, perfects, dwells in, appropriates to himself, so that from each mutually communicating is made one incommunicable, to wit: one person.”(2) But as in the act of union the divine nature is considered as the active one, and the divine Logos as that which has assumed the human nature, so is also the association of the two natures between one another to define it more closely, that between the two natures the active relation proceeds immediately from the divine nature, and this it is, which permeates the human. To obtain an adequate conception of it, would present the same difficulties as in the personal union, and we must be satisfied with analogies, which at least approximately give us a conception of it. Such we find in the binding together and association of soul and body, in the relation in which the three persons of the Godhead stand to one another or in the relation, which exists in red-hot iron between fire and iron. As soul and body bear to each other not merely an external relation, as for example, a man does to the

(2) Holl. “The communion of natures in the person of Christ is a mutual participation of the divine and human nature of Christ, by which the divine nature of the Logos having become partaker of human nature, permeates, perfects, inhabits, and appropriates it to itself; but the human, having become partaker of the divine nature, is permeated, perfected, and inhabited by it.”

Br. “From the personal union flows the communion of natures, by which it comes to pass, that the human nature becomes a nature of the Son of God, and the divine nature a nature of the son of man. To designate this the word *περιχώρησις*, which, in its native meaning, denotes penetration, or the existence of one thing in another, began to be used: so, indeed, that the divine nature, is said, actively to penetrate, the human nature passively to be penetrated.—But in this we are to understand that all imperfections are removed. For

* “Permeates.” So Cudworth uses this word: “They (the three persons) are physically (if we may so speak) one also, and have a mutual inexistence, and permeation of one another.”—*Intel. System.* p. 559.

“That subtile substance which permeates the whole world,”—*Do.* p. 456.

“God was conceived to permeate and pervade all things.”—*Do.* p. 503.—

TRANSLATOR.

clothing which he has put on, or an angel to the body in which he appears, but as the binding together of soul and body is an operative, intimate and perfect one, so also is the binding together and association of the two natures. As soul and body are inseparably united with one another and constitute the one man, so is also the human and divine nature united most inseparably. As the soul co-operates with the body and is bound together with it, so that no commingling however, of the two is introduced, on the contrary, the soul always remains soul, and the body always remains body. So must we also contemplate the association of the two natures that each remains in its own integrity. As finally the soul is never without the body, so also the Logos is always to be thought of as in the flesh, and never without the same.⁽³⁾ As such a communion of natures actually exists, it follows therefrom :

I. That the two natures can also be reciprocally predicated of one another, that we can with the same propriety say : " the man (Jesus Christ) is God," as : " God is man," which expressions have not naturally the sense, that God, in becoming man, had

the divine nature does not so penetrate the human, that successively it occupies one part of it after another, and by extension diffuses itself through it; but because it is spiritual and indivisible, the whole of it, at once, acts on and perfects every part of the human nature and the entire nature, and is and remains entire in the entire human nature, and entire in every part soever of it. Here comes in the passage Col. ii. 15."

Holl. "Περίχωρησις is not indeed a Biblical term; it is, however, an ecclesiastical one, and began to be especially employed, when Nestorius denied the communion of natures. But they did not mean a *περίχωρησις*, which implied locality, or quantity, as a bucket is said, to contain (*χωρεῖν*) water, but they employed it illocally and metaphorically. . . In addition : *περίχωρησις* notes : 1.) that the personal union is intimate, and most perfect; 2.) that the communion of natures is mutual; 3.) that the personal union and communion of natures in Christ is *ἀχώριστον*, inseparable; 4) that the communion of natures is *ἀνύχυστον*, *μικτον*, *καὶ ἀτρεπτον*, that is, implies no confusion, mixing, or transmutation."

(3) Form. Conc. viii. 19. "And indeed learned antiquity, to some extent, set forth the hypostatic union, and the communication of natures, under the similitude of the soul and body, likewise of

ceased to be God, but on the contrary, that the very Christ, who is God, is at the same time also man. (Holl. "The Son of God personally is the same, who is son of man, and the son of man personally is the same who is the Son of God.") So that the predicate man belongs as much to the subject God, as the predicate God to the subject man :⁽⁴⁾ for if we deny this, we must at once discover, that, instead of two natures in Christ, we are thinking of two persons, of which each remains what it originally was, which would be Nestorian. From the "communion of natures," follow also the "personal propositions, that is, ex-

glowing iron. For the soul and body, (as also fire and iron,) not only as a phrase, or mode of speech, or verbally, but really, and truly, have a communication between themselves : nor, however, is there in this way introduced a confusion, or equalizing, of natures, such as takes place, when mead is made of honey and water, for such a drink is neither mere water, or mere honey, but a certain drink mingled of each. Far otherwise, assuredly, is it in that union of the divine and human nature (in the person of Christ) : for far more sublime and clearly ineffable is the communication and union of the divine and human nature in the person of Christ" . . .

(4) Gerh. "The origin and foundation of the personal propositions consists alone and entirely in the personal union and communication of natures, from which entirely and immediately they take their rise, from which entirely also they are to be estimated and explained. For since the divine and human natures in Christ are personally united, since to these two natures personally united, an intimate *περιχώρησις* comes in, so that the divine nature of the Logos does not subsist out of the human nature assumed, nor the assumed human nature subsist out of the divine, thence and therefore God is man, and man is God. Since the hypostasis of the Logos is not only the hypostasis of its own divine nature, but also of the human : therefore God is, and is called man. Since the human nature assumed subsists in that hypostasis of the Logos, therefore man is and is called God."

Biblical examples : Jer. xxiii. 6. xxxiii. 16. Math. xxii. 42—45. Luke xx. 44. Ps. cx. 1. 2 Sam. vii. 19*. Is. ix. 6. Math. i. 21. 22. xvi. 13. 16. Luke i. 35. ii. 11. 1 Cor. xv. 47.

* There is no force in this quotation in the English version. But Luther has rendered the latter part of the verse thus : "That is the way of a man, who is God the Lord," "that is : Thou speakest to me of an everlasting kingdom, of which no one can be king, unless he be God and man, for he is to be my Son, and yet shall be a king forever, which can relate to God alone."—Tr.

pressions in which the concrete of the one nature (the one united) is predicated of the concrete of the other nature, that is, those two truly distinct essences are enunciated of each other in the concrete truly and really, but in a way altogether peculiar and extraordinary, to express the personal union.”(5) To prevent false conceptions about these personal propositions, they may be designated more nearly, as : 1.) not “merely verbal,” i. e., they are not so to be understood, as if the name, but not the nature, expressed by it, were affirmed of the subject, as Nestorius did, when he said of the Son of Mary, He is the Son of God, in which he attributes, as it were to the subject only a title, but will by no means concede, that the very same, who is the Son of

(5) *a.* The expression “concrete” was used, when a personal designation was sought for Christ, as one in whom are two natures. If the personal designation was taken from one of his two natures, it was called a ‘concrete of nature’; and, also, since Christ is in two natures, a ‘concrete of the divine nature,’ when the designation was taken from the divine nature; ‘concrete of the human nature,’ when taken from the human nature. To the first class belong the designations—God, Son of God, &c.; to the other these—man, son of man, son of Mary. Holl.: ‘Concrete of nature is a word, by which is signified nature with a connotation of hypostasis.’ Br.: ‘By concrete is understood a word, which signifies the suppositive in its direct sense, the nature in its indirect sense. So God denotes a suppositive, having a divine nature: man denotes a suppositive, having a human nature.’ From the ‘concrete of nature’ is to be distinguished, however, the ‘concrete of person,’ which expression is used, when the personal designation is taken not so much from one of the two natures, as it serves, on the contrary, to designate this distinct person, in whom the two natures are united as in one person, by an expression derived elsewhere. Br.: ‘Concrete of person is a word, or name, of such kind, that it signifies, formally, a person, consisting of each nature, for example Christ, Messiah, Immanuel, which names signify, in a direct sense, the suppositive; in an indirect sense, neither nature alone, but rather both.’—In the present case only the ‘concrete of nature’ comes into use, for it is employed only in the cases, in which the communion of natures is to be expressed in their personal designations. To the ‘personal propositions,’ in a proper sense, those ‘propositions’ do not belong, in which a ‘concrete of nature’ is predicated of the ‘concrete of person,’ as is the case in such expressions as: Christ is God, is man, is God-man. Gerh.: ‘Because these propositions express precisely, and formally, not so much

Mary, is actually the Son of God ; 2.) not "identical," as though the predicate which is affirmed of the subject were identical with it, and only embraced an affirmation of the subject, as would be the case if the truth : the Son of God is the Son of Mary, had been thus expressed : the man, who is united with the Son of God, is the Son of Mary ; 3.) not "figurative or tropical," as would be the case in the predicate, which would express in regard to the subject, not the properties of its own actual nature, but would attribute only certain properties of this predicate to the subject, so that in a figurative sense it might be said, God is man, in the same sense that we say of a picture, that is a man, or a woman ; 4.) not "essential and univocal," as if the subject were

unity of person, as duality of natures in Christ : for thence and therefore Christ is, and is called, man, since in him is human nature ; thence and therefore he is, and is called, θεάνθρωπος, because in him is not only a human, but also a divine nature.'

It is farther understood, in regard to this, that these 'propositions' can only be employed on the presupposition of the personal union, and are not in general available, hence Holl. : "If the divine and human natures are regarded apart from the personal union, either God or man, there is a disparity ; nor can the one be affirmed of the other. For as I cannot say : a lion is a horse,—so neither can I say : God is man. But if a union between God and man comes in, and a certain real union, such as in Christ, comes in between the divine and human nature, they can properly be mutually predicated in the concrete. The reason is, because by union the two natures constitute one person ; the concrete of nature, whichever it is, signifies that very person. Since therefore the man Christ is the same, as he who is God, or this person who is God, is that very person who is man, it may be said, with propriety : Man is God, and God is man."

b. Finally also, in regard to the 'abstracts of nature,'—('an abstract is that, in which, indeed, there is a nature, but considered, not with respect to union, but in its own self, and abstracted from union or concretion, not in very deed however, but only in the mind :' Hrffr.) the parity does not hold, as in regard to the 'concretes of nature', nor could we say : 'Deity is humanity, humanity is Deity.' Quen. : 'The reason is, because the union is not made to one nature, but to one person *ὁν θετον* ; the difference of nature being secured, therefore the one nature is not predicated in the abstract of the other, but the concrete of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other nature.'

according to its essence, that which the thing predicated affirms of it (God is man, would mean then: the essence of God is this, that it is the essence of man). The "personal propositions" rather are: 1.) "real," i. e., what is predicated of the subjects actually and in truth appertains to them; 2.) "unusual and singular," for as the "personal union" has no farther example, so also the personal propositions have none.

But from "the communion of natures" follows—

II. That a mutual operation is established between the natures towards themselves, and between the natures and the person.⁽⁶⁾ This is expressed in the doctrine of the "communication of properties. Br. Communic. of prop. is that by which it comes to pass that those things, which, the two natures being compared between themselves, relate per se and formally to one of them, are also truly proper to the other nature, either in respect of concretes or in order to the nature itself looked at in the abstract."⁽⁷⁾ In accordance with this doctrine also, a property can neither be

(6) Gerh. "Whatever in the assumption of human nature comes under the union, comes also under the communication. And, in fact, the properties now come under the union, because no nature is destitute of its own properties; since a nature without properties, would also be without existence, and two natures are united in Christ, not bare, or stripped of their properties, but entire without defect, having endured no lapse of what was proper to them. Therefore also the properties come under the *communication*."

Holl. "No union can be perfect and permeant (*perichoristica*) without a communication of properties, as the examples of animated body prove. A seeming union of two pieces of wood may be made without a communication of properties, we readily admit, because that degree of union is very low and imperfect. But, as Scripture has defined it, the personal union of the two natures in Christ, is most absolute, perfect, and permeant (*perichoristica*): therefore, it cannot exist without a communication of properties." So also can evidence be drawn from the communion of natures, which involves the communication of properties as a necessary consequence.

(7) Holl. "Communication of properties is a true and real participation of the properties of a divine and human nature, resulting from a personal union, in Christ, the God-man, denominated from either or both natures."

Explanation of the single ideas of communication and property:

a) Gerh. "Communication is the distribution of one, which is

affirmed of one of the two natures, which is not a property of the whole person, nor can an operation or action be affirmed of one of the two natures, in which the other nature does not also participate, naturally, but not in the same way, as when with the properties or the operation proceeding therefrom at the same time, also the essence which constitutes their basis, passes over to the other nature. (8) "A communic. of prop." is accordingly es-

common to many, into those many, which have it in common."

Quen.: 'Not that *ιδιώματα κοινά*, become common, but that they become *κοινωνητά*, by, and on account of, the personal union.' *b)* 'Ιδίωμα,

in Latin, *proprium*: Quen. 'By *ιδιώματα* are understood those pro-

perties and differences of natures, by which, as marks and characteristics, two natures (in verity of person) are mutually distinguished and separated from each other. But the word *ιδιωμάτων* is taken

either strictly for those natural properties themselves, or, in a wider sense, it comprehends also those operations themselves, by which

the properties, properly so called, exhibit themselves; *in this place*, properties, or *idiomata*, are taken in the wider signification, so that,

on account of the properties strictly so called, they embrace also in their compass, actions, and passions, *ἐνεργήματα καὶ ἀποτελέσματα*,

since by *ἐνεργείας* and *ἀποτελέσματα*, the *idiomata* exhibit themselves.' Gerh. 'Notice: the notion of divine *idiomata* is one thing, that of

human another. The *idiomata* of the divine nature are the very essence *τοῦ λόγου*, and are not really distinguished from it. The

properties of human nature are not the constitutives but the consecutives of essence.' As regards the justification for the establishment

of this doctrine Holl.: 'This phrase, communication of properties, is not found *ἀπολύξει* (in so many words) in the sacred Scriptures,

but the thing itself has most clearly a Scriptural basis. For as often as the Scripture assigns to the flesh of Christ the actions

and works of omnipotence, so often, by consequence, omnipotence is attributed to him as an *actus primus* (immediate act), from whom

the divine *ἐνέργεια* flows as an *actus secundus* (mediate act). But although the '*communicatio idiomatum*' was first used by the scho-

lastics: yet orthodox antiquity in the controversies with Nestorius, and Eutychius, employed equivalent modes of expression.' The

first complete development of this doctrine was made by Chemnitz in his book '*De Duabus Naturis in Christo*,' 1590.

(8) Hence the idea of the 'communication' is farther guarded, by saying, that it is not a 'communication *κατὰ μέθεξιν*, or essential,

by which one passes over into the essence, and definite character, of the other'; but a 'communication, *κατὰ συνδύασιν*, i. e. such a

communication of the two natures, by which one of those united is so connected with the other, that, the divine essence remaining, the

tablished between the natures and the person, and between the natures towards one another.⁽⁹⁾ Thence the communication of properties is divided into distinct kinds, of which we enumerate three, (for the Holy Scripture makes distinct mention of this number,⁽¹⁰⁾) the "genus idiomaticum, majesticum and apotelesmaticum."—The more particular consideration of these three genera is as follows:

I. *Genus*.—Since the two natures are actually united to one person, it follows that every property which immediately appertains to one of the two natures, may be predicated of *the whole person*; in general the properties of the divine nature as well as those of the human nature, must pertain to the person of the

one truly receives and assumes the property of the other, its power and efficacy by and because of a communion made, without any confusion whatsoever.' (Quen.) So there might be given yet farther designations, as in the case of the 'personal union'. Gerh.: 'As the union is not essential, nor verbal merely, nor by *σύγχυσις*, or *αλλοίωσις*, or *μίξις*, or *παράστασις*, nor is *προσωπική*, or sacramental; so also the communication is not such.'

(9) Gerh. "Communication of properties is of nature to person, or of nature to nature."

Hfrfir. "Communication of properties is a true and real participation of divine and human properties, by which, on account of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, not only the personal properties of the joint nature, (which is at the same time God and man,) but also the things proper to one or other nature, are attributed to the other: that is, to the Logos human attributes, and to the humanity assumed divine. And, on account of the same *κοινωνίαν*, each nature operates with a communication of the other: the natures however, and the properties, being preserved uninjured."

(10) Quen. "Certain and distinct grades of the communication of properties are given: because, however the question concerning the number of grades, or *genera*, of the communication of properties relates not to faith, or its establishment, but to the *τρόπον παιδείας* and method of teaching, some constitute two, others three, others four kinds of properties. A threefold arrangement pleases most of our theologians, inasmuch as, in accordance with a threefold mode of expression, it is observed in the Bible. It proposes, we say, three distinct kinds, though it does not number them." Some DD. receive "four kinds of communication of properties," inasmuch as they distinguish the "expressions, in which things proper to the human nature are attributed to the Son of God," from the "expressions, in which the properties of either nature are enunciated of the

Saviour. Since also the birth or the suffering is a property of the human nature, it can as well be said : " Christ, the God-man, was born, has suffered," as it could be said of him : " by him were all things created," although creation is a property of the divine nature.⁽¹¹⁾ For if we are unwilling to speak thus, but maintain that a property of the human nature may only be predicated of the concrete of the human nature, and a property of the divine nature only of the concrete of the divine nature, so that it should be expressed : " the man Jesus Christ has been born," " through Christ, who is God, all things have been created," the personal union would be destroyed, and it would seem as though not two natures, but two persons were supposed ;⁽¹²⁾

whole person of Christ ;" and also regard the proposition : " Christ suffered," as belonging to a different class, from the proposition : " God suffered." But most DD. declare themselves against this division.—But the order, also, in which these three *genera* are introduced, is not the same in all DD. Quen. : " Some follow the *order of doctrine*, others the *order of nature*. The former (Form. Conc.—Chemn.) place the communication of official actions, as it is more easy, and less controverted, before the communication of majesty, which is chiefly controverted, and is to be more largely explained. The latter follow the order of nature, and place the communication of majesty before the communication of official actions, because that in nature precedes this."

(11) Gerh. "The basis of this communication of properties is the unity of person. For, since after the incarnation, the one person of Christ subsists in two, and of two natures, of which each is invested as it were, with its own properties, thence the things proper to each nature, whether the divine or human are predicated of the one synthetic (συνθετικῆς) person of Christ." Form. Conc. viii. 36. "Since in Christ there are two distinct natures, which, in their essences and properties, are neither changed, nor confounded ; but of the joint nature there is but one person : those things, which are proper only to one nature, are attributed not to the other person in itself, as if separated, but to the whole person, (which is, at the same time, God and man,) whether it be named God, or man."

(12) Chemn. "Nestorius, however, supposed such a communication, that divine properties might be attributed to Christ, the God, but to the man Christ only human, that the man, for instance, not the God, was born of Mary, was crucified, &c. Likewise, that the God, but not the man, had healed the sick, raised the dead ; but thus there would be one person of Christ as God, and another of Christ as man, and two persons, and two Christs, would be formed."

but the personal union directly displays itself as a positive thing, in this, that all properties which pertain to one or the other nature, are also equally properties of the person. Since farther in virtue of the communion of natures and of the personal propositions following therefrom, it is all the same, whether we name Christ with reference to his two natures, or with reference to one of them, so can a property of one of the two natures be predicated equally well of the concrete of the one or of the other nature, it can be said with as much propriety: "God has died," as that: the man Jesus Christ is almighty.⁽¹³⁾

Nevertheless, though the properties of the two natures may be assigned to the concrete of the two natures, (Christ, the God-man,) or the concrete of one to the two natures, (God—to the man Jesus Christ,) yet does it not follow therefrom in any way, that the properties of the one nature become the properties of the other, for the two natures are not changed by the personal union as regards their substance, and each of the two natures retains its essential and natural properties. In addition, it is *only of the person* that we can, without farther distinction, predicate alike the properties of the one or the other nature, but by no means can this be done of the natures in themselves in such a sense,

(13) Chemn. "To show this very close unity of person, those things, which are proper either to the divine, or to the human, or to the joint nature, are attributed to that one hypostasis, or are designated by a concrete, or taken from the divine, or the human, or the joint nature. Likewise: Because the union of natures, is made in the hypostasis of the Word, so that the person of each nature is now one and the same, subsisting, at the same time, in each nature: the concrete words, taken from the divine nature, as God the Logos, Son of God, when they are predicated of the incarnate Christ, although the denomination is taken from the divine nature, it yet signifies not the divine nature only, but a person subsisting now in two natures, to wit, the divine and human. And the concrete words, taken from the human nature, as man, son of man, when they are predicated of the incarnate Christ, designate not the bare or mere human nature: but a hypostasis, subsisting both in the divine and human nature, and to which each nature bears a relation. And hence it comes, that to the concrete words, signifying the person of Christ, whether taking their denomination from both natures, or one only, are rightly attributed all the properties, whether they are those of the divine or human nature."

as if each of the two natures singly no longer retained its essential properties.⁽¹⁴⁾ In order to avoid a misapprehension of this character, it is usual to employ expressions by which is particularly marked from which nature the Person derives the properties attributed.⁽¹⁵⁾

(14) Chemn. "True belief does not, however, with Eutyches and the Monotholites, confound that communication between the natures, with a conversion and confusion both of natures and properties, so that humanity is said to be divinity, or the essential property of one nature becomes the essential property of another nature in the abstract, or apart from the union, or in itself or of itself, in the union itself of the nature under consideration. But the property agreeable to one nature is communicated or attributed to the person in the concrete." Hence Holl. 1.) "The subject is not abstract, but is a concrete of nature or of person." (We cannot say: 'Deity was crucified.') 2.) "The Predicate" (that to wit, which is affirmed of the subject, i. e. of the person *ἑσχατος συνθετος*) "does not designate the very substance, whether divine or human, but a property of either nature."

(15) Form. Conc. viii. 37: "But in this kind of expressions, it does not follow that those things which are attributed to the whole person, are at the same time properties of each nature: but it is distinctly to be declared, according to which nature anything is to be ascribed to the person."

Chemn. "Lest, however, it might be thought that the natures are confused, it is usual to add to the example from Scripture a declaration, to which nature the property belongs, which is attributed to the person, or according to which nature it is attributed to the person. For the existence of the properties of one nature, does not prevent the presence of another nature with its own properties. Nor does it prevent the properties of the one nature from being attributed to a person subsisting in each nature. Nor is it necessary that those things which in this way are predicated of the person, should be agreeable to each nature. But it is enough, if according to one or other, whether the divine or human, they are agreeable to the person." Quen. "Such particles are, *ἐν, ἐξ, διὰ, κατὰ*, 1 Pet. ii. 24, iii. 18, iv. 1; Rom. i. 3, ix. 5; Acts xx. 28." By this additional closer designation is then expressed, how the predicate is attributed to the subject, since it also relates, because of the union of persons, to both natures, yet primarily belongs properly only to one of the two natures. Hence, "the *modus prædicandi*" (the way and method, in which a predicate is made of the subject) is thus described: (Holl.) "It is a true and real thing, by which divine or human attributes are enunciated of the whole human-divine (*θεοανθρωπινον*) person, (for what are the properties of the humanity in themselves, those

General Definition : (Quen.) "The first genus of the communication of properties is, when things proper to the divine or

are truly and properly predicated of the Son of God, on account of the personal union, and *vice versa*,) in such a way, however, that by the discrepative particles they are claimed for that nature to which they are strictly proper, whilst they are appropriated to that nature to which they belong, not formally, but on account of the personal union." The "*modus prædicandi*" is illustrated in the following examples : (Holl.) "The Son of God was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, Rom. i. 3. The *subject* of this idiomatic proposition, is the Son of God, by which is denoted the entire person of Christ, assuming a title from the divine nature. The predicate is being born of the seed of David, which is a human property. This is predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, to which of itself it does not belong, but on account of the union of the divine-human (*θεοανθρώπινον*) person. Hence by the limiting particle *κατὰ*, according to the flesh, the human property is claimed for the human nature, to which a temporal nativity properly belongs ; but yet the divine nature is not excluded or separated from a participation in the nativity, inasmuch as to it the being born of the seed of David relates by appropriation." The proposition : "God has suffered," is thus illustrated : "The Son of God has suffered according to the human nature subsisting in the divine personality. As, therefore, when a wound is inflicted on Peter's flesh, it is not merely said that Peter's flesh is wounded, but that Peter, or the person of Peter, was really wounded, although his soul could not be wounded : so when the Son of God suffers according to the flesh, not his flesh alone suffers, or his human nature, but the Son of God, or the person of the Son of God, truly suffers, although the divine nature be impassive (*ἀπαθής*)." The statement : God has suffered, dare not be resolved with Zuingli into this : the man Jesus Christ, who at the same time is God, has suffered, in which case the "*modus prædicationis*" would be nothing "real or appropriate." Form. Conc. viii. 39.* Zuingli calls this *allocosis*, when something is affirmed of the divinity of Christ, which is however proper to the humanity and the contrary. For the sake of example : when it is said in Scripture : ought not Christ to have suffered these things, &c., there Zuingli trifles, by remarking that the word Christ in this place is to be understood of the human nature. Beware, beware, I say, of that *allocosis*. . . For if I could persuade myself to believe "that the human nature alone suffered for me : surely Christ would not be to me a Saviour of great value, but would himself in the end need a Saviour. . ."

* These words are quoted in the Formula from Luther's Greater Confession on the Lord's Supper.—Tr.

human nature are truly and really attributed to the whole person of Christ, denominated from one or the other nature, or from both.”(16)

This genus the later DD. divide into three species, according as the different properties are predicated of the concrete of the divine nature or of the concrete of the human nature, or of the concrete of both natures. These species are: *a*) *ιδιοποιήσεις*, or *οιχείωσεις*, appropriation, when human properties are attributed to the concrete of the divine nature. Acts iii. 15, xx. 28, 1 Cor. ii. 8. Gal. i. 20; *b*) *κοινωνία τῶν θείων*, when to the person of the incarnate word assuming a title from the human nature, divine properties are attributed on account of the personal union. John vi. 62; viii. 58. 1 Cor. xv. 47; *c*) *ἀντίδοσις* or *συναμφοτέρημα*, alternation or reciprocation, by which divine as well as human properties are predicated of the concrete person or of Christ denominated from each nature. Heb. xiii. 8, Rom. ix. 5, 2 Cor. xiii. 4, 1 Pet. iii. 18.

II. *Genus*.—Since the divine Logos has taken upon him the human nature, so that through the personal union the hypostasis of the divine nature has also become that of the human nature, it is a farther and natural consequence therefrom that the human nature has also therewith become partaker in the properties of the divine nature,(17) for through the personal union not alone

(16) As appellations of this first genus, the following have been introduced, whose origin has been referred to the old Church Fathers: “*ἀντίδοσις*, alternation, *τροπος ἀμτιδόσεως* (Damascenus), *ἐναλλαγή καὶ κοινωνία ὀνομάτων*, permutation and communication of names (Theodoret), *ιδιοποιὰ καὶ ιδιοποίησι*, appropriation (Cyrill), *αλλοιώσεις*” (but in a sense different from that in which Zuingli uses it), “*οἰκείωσις, συναμφοτέρημα*.”—Examples from Holy Scripture: Heb. xiii. 8. 1 Cor. ii. 8, Acts vii. 2, Ps. xxiv. 7, 8, Acts iii. 15, John viii. 58.

(17) Quen. “The basis of this communication is the communication of the hypostasis and of the divine nature of the Logos. For since the human nature, assumed in the union, has also by the union been made partaker of the hypostasis and divine nature of the Logos, therefore also it has been made partaker truly and really of the divine properties; for these do not differ from the divine essence.”

Chemn. “If the indwelling of God in the saints by grace, confers many gratuitous divine gifts more than and beyond natural

the person, but, since person and nature cannot be separated, the divine nature also has entered into communion with the human nature, and indeed the communication of the divine attributes to the human nature follows in that very moment in which the divine Logos has united itself with the human nature.⁽¹⁸⁾ But here no mutual operation takes place, for the human nature can readily become participant of the properties of the divine, and can thus have an increase of its essential properties, but not convertibly, for the divine nature according to its essence is unchangeable, and can sustain no increase.⁽¹⁹⁾ The attributes,

endowments, and works many wonderful things in them, what impiety would it be, to be willing to believe that in that mass of human nature, in which the whole fullness of the God-head dwells bodily, only physical endowments are to be acknowledged, and nothing of that which surpasses and exceeds the natural conditions of human nature when it is looked at in itself or by itself apart from the hypostatic union."

(18) Quen. "For in the very moment in which the personal union is made, the communication of majesty is also made. For the divine nature of the Logos with its entire fullness has united and communicated itself to the flesh assumed, from the very beginning of the incarnation."

(19) Quen. "The *subjectum quo* is the nature, to which the communication has been made. But that is not the divine, since to it, in accordance with entire immutability, nothing can be added; but the human taken into the hypostasis of the Logos." John vi. 53, i. 2. Matt. xxvi. 28. Acts xx. 28. John v. 27. Phil. ii. 9. (Form. Conc. viii. 49, 51.) "That it is not the divine but is the human nature which is the *subjectum quo*, is proved by the condition of the divine nature, which as most rich cannot be enriched, as most good it is impossible *βελτιωθῆναι*, as most high cannot be exalted as most perfect cannot be perfected, as most glorious cannot receive an augmentation of glory."—The ground, on which the human nature partakes of the *idiomata* of the divine, whilst the converse is not true, arises from the mode of the "union." Br. "It amounts to this, that like as on the part of the natures, although the divine is personally united to the human and the human to the divine, this distinction yet intervenes, that the divine nature intimately penetrates and perfects the human, whilst the human does not in turn penetrate and perfect the divine, but is penetrated and perfected by it; so in the communication of properties, this distinction on the part of the natures intervenes, that the divine nature penetrating the human, makes in its own mode the same also, abstractly con-

finally, which in virtue of the personal union and of the communion of natures have been imparted to the human nature, are truly divine, but are also to be distinguished from the peculiar human prerogatives, which the human nature, assumed by the Logos, has beyond other human natures.⁽²⁰⁾

sidered, partaker of its own divine attributes: but not so in turn the human nature, which neither permeates nor perfects the divine nature, and does not and cannot equally make it, abstractly considered, partaker of its own properties."

(20) Gerh. "We do not deny that besides the essential properties of human nature certain habitual endowments inhere in Christ the man, subjectively, which, although they are most excellent and far surpass the endowments of all men and angels, yet are and remain finite: yet we add besides these habitual and finite endowments, there have been communicated to Christ the man, endowments truly infinite and immense by the personal union and exaltation to the right hand of the Father." Holl. "By and on account of the personal union, endowments truly divine, increate, infinite and immense are given to Christ according to the human nature." And it may be in general affirmed: "all the divine attributes are communicated to the flesh of Christ," yet we are to distinguish: "attributes ἀνεργητα and ἐνεργητικά."

Quen. "The attributes which are ἐνεργητικά admit a secondary act or proceed by ἐνεργήματα and operations *ad extra*. Such are goodness, omnipotence, pity, omnipresence, &c., (and which do not involve anything which is entirely inconsistent with human nature. Br.)" "The attributes ἀνεργητα are those, which apart from the divine essence remain quiescent, and do not outwardly, by operations upon creatures, exert or present themselves to our cognition, as eternity, infinity, spirituality, immensity, &c. (involving something inconsistent with human nature. Br.)" Of both it is said: "they are communicated to the flesh of Christ, which they inhabit and possess," but only of the first: "they are communicated so as *to be actually employed* and to be *immediately predicable*." Of the "attributes ἐνεργητ" it is affirmed that they are participated, "immediately," of the "attributes ἀνεργ," that they are participated "mediately or by the medium of an operative attribute." The DD. make special mention of "omnipotence," of "omniscience" (which, however, "he employed in his state of exinanition not always and everywhere, but freely, when and where he willed," of omnipresence, (Form. conc. viii. 28. Br. which words, *solid. decl.*, manifestly describe that omnipresence, not as absolute, for a nude indistant nearness to all creatures, and without efficacious operation, but as it were modified or conjoined with an efficacious operation, and adapted to the exigency of that universal dominion which Christ exer-

Definition: (Holl.) The second genus of the communication of properties is that by which the Son of God truly and really communicates, on account of a personal union, the properties of his divine nature to the human nature assumed, so that there is a common possession, employment and denomination.⁽²¹⁾

cises according to each nature," of "worship by religious adoration (that the flesh of Christ the mediator, is to be worshipped and adored in the same adoration with the divine nature of the Logos)." In regard to "omnipresence," Quen. farther remarks: "The human presence of the body does not here come into controversy, whether resulting from the proper character either of a natural (*ψυχικός*) or of a glorified body. We grant that the body of Christ by act of nature was through exterior circumscription in a physical locality, from the first conception on to the resurrection, to wit, as long as it was a natural (*ψυχικός*) body. We grant also, that after the resurrection and ascension into heaven, that very body as it is glorified, by act of nature is not everywhere, but determinately in its own celestial *ποιῶν*, not indeed by circumscription, but definitively, as in their own *ποιῶν*. But here the only inquiry is, whether the human nature of Christ, now raised to the right hand of God the Father, is in this glorious state of exaltation at the right hand of the divine majesty, omnipresent to all creatures in the universe. And, therefore, it is not in question, whether this divine presence is proper to Christ, in as far as he is man, from the proper character of human nature, for this we also deny; but whether it is to be attributed to him, through and on account of the personal union, even as this is inseparably connected with the exaltation of the humanity to the right hand of God the Father. The former modes of presence are, therefore, so to be set forth, that the infinite presence in the flesh assumed, shall not be denied."

Of the communication of these "divine attributes," to the human nature, it may in fine be observed: Br. "This communion is not made 1.) by an essential or natural effusion of the properties of the divine nature into human nature; as if the humanity of Christ could have them in themselves and separated from the divine essence, or (2) as if by that communication the human nature in Christ had at all laid aside its own natural properties, or (3) had been converted into the divine nature, or (4) in itself and by itself had been rendered equal to the divine nature, by its properties communicated; or (5) that the natural and essential properties and operations of both natures had become the same, or at least equal. But those words and phrases (real communication, really communicated) are employed in opposition to a merely verbal communication."

(21) Quen. "The second genus of communication of properties

III. *Genus*.—The whole aim of the incarnation of Christ is no other than the completion of the work of redemption by Christ in unity of the human nature. From the association of the two natures, which has been introduced through the personal union, it follows, that all operations, which proceed from Christ, cannot be referred exclusively to one of the two natures.⁽²²⁾ The operation proceeds it is true from one of the two

is that, in which the Logos with its own divine nature communicates its own proper glory and excellence to the humanity hypostatically united to it, on account of this very hypostatic union truly and really, and without any commixture or confusion of natures and properties so as to be possessed, employed and denominated in common.”—Scripture evidence: “To the human nature majesty is communicated: Matt. xi. 27. Luke i. 33. John iii. 13; vi. 62. Phil. ii. 5. Heb. ii. 6. The man Christ seated at the right hand of majesty: Matt. xxvi. 64. Mark xiv. 62. Luke xxii. 69. Rom. viii. 34. Eph. i. 20. Hebr. vii. 26; viii. 1. Omnipotence: Matt. xxviii. 18. Phil. iii. 21. Omniscience: Col. i. 19; ii. 3, 9. Omnipresence: Matt. xviii. 20. xxviii. 20, Eph. i. 22; iv. 10. Power of vivifying: John vi. 51. 1 Cor. xv. 21, 45. Power of Judgment: Matt. xvi. 27. John v. 27. Acts xvii. 31.” Appellations: “Communication of majesty—genus majestatical, βελτίωσις, προσθήκη μεγάλη, ἐπερνώσεις, μετάδοσις, δόξαις, μετάληψις θείας ἁξίας, μετοχή θείας δυνάμεως, δέωσις, ἀποθεοσία, θεοποίησις. In sacred Scriptures: unction, viz., Ps. xlv. 8. John iii. 34. Acts x. 38.

(22) Form. Conc. viii. 46. “As to the functions of office, the person does not act or operate in or together with one or through one nature only, but rather in, with and according to and through both natures, or as the Council of Chalcedon expresses it, one nature does or effects, with the communication of the other, that which is properly its own. Christ, therefore, is our mediator, redeemer, king, &c. not according to one nature only, whether divine or human, but according to both natures.” Gerh. “The Son of God thence and therefore assumed human nature, that in it, with it and by it he might carry on the work of redemption and the parts of his mediatorial office. 1 John iii. 8, &c. Hence, in the works of his office, he does not act as God only, nor as man only, but as θεάνθρωπος, and what is the same, the two natures in Christ do not in official acts operate dividedly, but unitedly. From unity of person flows unity ἀποτελέσματος (of effect).” Holl. “The remote foundation of this communication is the united person and intimate conjunction of the divine nature in Christ. The proximate foundation is the communication of properties of the first and second genus.” Holl. “If the divine incarnate nature of the Logos (on

natures, and each of the two natures completes its own distinctive operation, but in such sense, that, during the manifestation of such an operation on the part of one nature, the other nature is at the same time not idle, but active; that also, whilst the human nature suffers, the divine, which of course cannot suffer, yet assists the human, imparts power and strengthens it for the endurance of the burden laid upon it; (23) that the human nature, then, is not to be contemplated simply as active through its essential attributes, but, in addition to these, through its essential attributes in virtue of the second genus of the communication of properties which its participated divine attributes enter into, with which it operates. (24) For the divine nature cannot in itself

account of the communication of properties of the first and second degree) truly appropriates to itself those things which belong to the human nature, and communicates to it its own properties (omnipotence, &c.) to possess and employ them, it inevitably follows, that the divine nature appropriates to itself what the human nature performs in the mediatorial office, and the latter operates not only by a natural, but also by a communicated divine *ἐνεργεία*."

(23) Chemn. "When one nature in Christ does that which is proper to it, or when Christ does anything in accordance with the proper character of one nature, in that action or suffering the other nature is not idle, so that it either is doing nothing or is engaged in something else, but that which is properly of one nature, is and is done in Christ with the communion of the other nature, that difference being observed which is proper to each, so that when Christ in his human nature suffers and dies, this also comes to pass with the communion of the other nature, not that the divine nature also in itself suffers or dies, for this is proper to the human nature, but because the divine nature of Christ is present personally with the suffering nature, and wills that suffering of his human nature, does not avert it, but permits his humanity to suffer and die, strengthens and sustains it, so that it can bear the infinite burden of the sin of the world and of the entire wrath of God, and renders those sufferings precious before God and the source of salvation to the world."

(24) Chemn. "Because the offices and blessings of Christ our Saviour, are of such a character, that in many or in most of them, the human nature in Christ cannot co-operate by its natural or essential properties or operations alone, therefore beside and beyond the natural properties, there are numberless hyperphysical and paraphysical imparted and communicated to the human nature by hypostatic union with divinity."

alone give a ransom for the propitiation of the world, it must, in order to this, be united with the human nature, which, consisting of body and soul, can be given up for the redemption of men, and, on the other hand, there was much which the human nature could not accomplish, (miracles, &c.,) had not its properties obtained an accretion by the accession of the divine.⁽²⁵⁾

Holl. "The mode of union and of mutual confluence consists in this, that the divine nature of the Logos not only performs divine works, but also truly and really appropriates to itself the actions of the flesh assumed; but the human nature, not only according to its natural powers, but also according to that divine virtue, which has been communicated to it by the personal union, sustains the office of Mediator." Quen.: We say by *means of the hypostasis*, (mediante ὑποστάσει,) it appropriates to itself the actions and sufferings of the humanity, for we do not say: the *divine nature* bled, suffered, died, as it is said: the human nature gives life, works miracles, governs all things, but *God* bled, suffered, died."

(25) Chemn. "The evidence of Scripture clearly shows, that the personal union of the two natures in Christ, was made in order that the work of redemption, propitiation, salvation, &c., might be perfected in each, with each, and through each, nature of Christ. For if redemption, propitiation, &c., could have been effected either by deity alone, or by humanity alone, to no end would the Logos have descended from heaven and become man incarnate for us and our salvation." Gerh. "The human nature indeed could suffer, die, and bleed, but the cruel sufferings and bloody death of Christ would have had no saving effect, had not the divine nature added a price of infinite value to those sufferings and that death, which the Saviour endured for us." The work of redemption, as well as each transaction of Christ, is consequently considered as one in which both natures in Christ participated. The expression which designates this is ἀποτέλεσμα ("a common work, resulting from a communicative* and intimate conflux of natures, or in the production of which the operations of each nature concur.")—(Quen.) Since, however, each distinct act proceeds from one of the two natures, from that to wit, of whose original attributes it is derived, the term for it is ἐνέργεια ("an effect proper to one nature"). Thus the shed blood of Christ is an operation of the human nature, for only the human nature has bled, the inestimable value which this blood possesses, is an operation of the divine nature. The propitiation for our sins,

* "Communicative." "For the Father and Spirit do dwell in his human nature, as he is now become one of the persons; the man, God's fellow, in their communicative society together.—Goodwin's Works, vol. I. pt. iii, p. 35.—TRANSLATOR.

Definition: (Gerh.) "The third genus of communication of properties is that by which, in official acts, each nature performs that which is proper to it, with a communication of the other. 1 Cor. xv. 3. Gal. i. 4; iii. 17. Eph. v. 2."(26)

however, which could be accomplished by the shed blood alone, is the work (*ἀποτέλεσμα*) of both natures, since both natures contributed thereto their own parts, the human nature to shed, the divine nature to give to that blood an infinite worth. The "apotelesmata of Christ," Holl. farther designates as of "two kinds. Some things the divinity of the Logos could not bring to pass apart from the conjunction with the flesh, for example, the atoning sacrifice, the life-giving death; some things of free *εὐδοκία*, or good pleasure, it will not to produce without the flesh—as miracles, for example."

(26) Br. "The third genus of communication of properties consists in this, that operations belonging to the office of Christ, are not those of either nature alone, but common to both, inasmuch as each contributes to them its own part; and thus each acts with a communication of the other."

CLOSING NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR.

With the harmonious and glorious view of his Church on this great central idea of Christianity, the translator feels the profoundest sympathy. He believes that there is no consistent position between the essentials of this view and the dreary half-socinianism of Nestorius. The doctrine lives in the hearts of thousands of God's children, to whom it has never been imparted in the teachings of the theology to which they have been wont to listen. It is only the doctrine of a *true* incarnation which can lift us to the power of that adoring love which the Son of God, our Saviour, demands. It is this alone which can cause us to present, as the true homage of our souls, the prayer of the Church which found voice in that sweet hymn of Aquinas:

"Adoro te, devote latens Deitas:

— Jesu Domine

Me immundum munda tuo sanguine,

Cujus una stilla salvum facere

Totum mundum quit ab omni scelere."

ART. XVIII.—INNOCENCE.*

Well have I loved thee, little *Innocence*,
 And fain would love thee more, would love thee more.
 Sweet, sweet flower! image of our heavenly birth,
 And sole memento of our perished bliss!
 Amidst the ruins of Humanity,
 More grand and awful than the broken arch,
 Column and lofty architrave of that
 Proud temple of the Sun in desolate
 Palmyra, fresh thy lowly head appears.
 The human spirit, reared so high and pure
 That it did on its Father's bosom lean
 In felt communion as a holy child
 To drink the glory of his image in,
 Fallen and crushed, its beauty, holiness
 And grandeur gone, now sad in ruin lies:
 But yet in thee, the stream of heavenly life,
 From year to year and age to age flows on;
 And, constant as the Spring, in endless youth—
 In *innocence*, blooms on thy lovely brow.

Strange that the foul and tainting air of earth
 Hath ne'er seduced thee from thy rectitude;
 Bedimmed the lustre of thy heavenly eye;
 Rude rubbed the blush from off thy modest cheek;
 Hung down thy head in shame of conscious guilt;
 Then reared it up in bold effrontery,
 That blushes not to either God or man!
 O whence that strange, unutterable power
 That breathes so holy round thy lowly head!
 O whence that smile which steals into the heart,
 Startling that culprit into breathless awe?
 That still small voice which wakens in the soul
 A dim remembrance of a something lost,
 Whose name and image, faded from the breast,
 We toil in vain, with anguish and remorse,
 Long, long to summon into life again?

“Child of the dust, no more; my answer's short:

“When your high Nature fell and thundered down,
 It caused an earthquake such as ne'er had shook,
 And hath not shaken since, the world below;
 Nor yet like that, when once again its Lord

* *Houstonia carulia*.

Shall shake both it and heaven—to close the world.
Then I and all things staggered 'neath the shock,
As if the day of doom had crushed the world,
And sickening Death crept gasping through our veins.

“Then Innocence, as lovely angel, sad,
Her last walk through the bowers of Eden took.
Nor eye of man, of beast, nor yet of flower,
(As they were wont, in other, holy days,)
Kindling with joy, her form reflected back.
Indeed it was a mournful scene—and hard
Her tender heart was wrung, to see those forms,
So lofty once, in ruin prostrate now.
Where her own spirit, as in heaven at home,
Communed with beauty in its holiness,
An exile now and utterly alone,
In earth's aceldema herself she found.
Her voice, with power mysterious in its tones—
Whose like hath never since been heard on earth,
Save in the sacred land of Palestine,
When Justice drank the blood from Mercy's veins,
And sent her Voice to wander o'er the world,
And call the sons of men to life again—
Her voice, which led the Paradisiac choir,
Was silent now; for chokings of the heart
Stood armed to guard the pass from out her soul,
And exit there was none.

“She sought the gate.
As near it there and near the path I stood,
And life's last flutterings trembled on my cheek,
The blushing wonder caught her eye surprised,
And kindled up its sparkling joys again.
Upon me there she fixed its heavenly blue,
Called back my youth, restored my purity;
And gazed until the same celestial hue
Beamed and returned betwixt our mutual eyes.
She sealed that color with a fervent kiss;
And, as she spread her pinions to the sky,
With her last tear, baptized me—INNOCENCE.
A being strange, her living miniature,
Thus pencilled by her eye, she left me here,
That man may see, though with his outward eye,
What he has exiled from her home, his heart,
And from the world—till back recalled,
“*The Seed*” shall seat her in her throne again,
To rule in peace a ransomed, holy world.”

A. J. M. H.

ART. XIX.—PUBLICATIONS.

A Dictionary of the German and English Languages; indicating the accentuation of every German word, containing several hundred German synonyms, together with a classification and alphabetical list of the irregular verbs, and a dictionary of German abbreviations. Compiled from the works of *Hilpert, Flügel, Griel, Heyse*, and others. In two Parts: I. German and English. II. English and German. By *G. J. Adler, A. M., Professor of the German Language and Literature in the University of the City of New York*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1849.

We find this work favorably noticed on all sides; and so far as we can judge from a general examination of its plan and execution, it seems to be every way worthy of such distinction. Its outward appearance, in the first place, can hardly fail to create an impression in its favor, with all who have any sort of taste for good style in the manufacture of books. The paper, type, binding, are all of the best order; in its whole mechanical character, the work is such as to reflect honor on the publishers, and may be counted indeed an ornament to the American press. For one who has been accustomed to the dingy blurred aspect presented by our common German Dictionaries, it produces a feeling of relief and satisfaction only to look at the clean, clear page which is here offered to his eye. The whole has a bright, cheerful air about it, which carries with it also, in its way, an enlivening and pleasant influence for the mind. The main merit of the work, however, is something more a great deal than this goodly outward show. Its literary or scientific contents are in full keeping with the promise it thus holds out to the eye. Seldom, indeed, has a work been published that might be considered equally complete in its kind. It is all that could well be demanded as a German Dictionary, for popular use among an English people.

It has its general basis in the work published at London, under the name of Flügel, though in reality compiled by Heimann, Feiling and Oxenford. This is considered the most complete and judicious which has appeared in England. Still it is only the *basis* of this American publication. The German-English part in particular, which is here made to take the lead, as it

should, for English use, has been carefully revised, much of it re-written, and the whole augmented by an addition of at least thirty thousand new words and articles, making almost the half of it, indeed, to be entirely fresh matter. In these additions, the editor has availed himself, with independent and full learning, of the best lexicographical helps supplied by modern scholarship in Germany. One great advantage of the Dictionary is, the accentuation of the German words, which it gives according to the system of Heinsius and others. Another very valuable addition is found in the *synonyms*, which it presents in an abridged and not unfrequently somewhat modified form, from Hilpert. The vocabulary moreover of foreign words, as used in art, science, and more and more always in popular conversation, also, is far more full than in our common German Dictionaries.

It is encouraging to find such a work received with so much interest and favor. We have no blind enthusiasm for German learning; no sort of disposition to yield implicit trust to its authority; not the least faith, we may add, in the capacity of the German mind, as such, for bringing to proper practical solution the great questions of the present time. We are equally sure however, that this solution will never be reached by any system of thinking that allows itself to overlook or ignore the philosophy and learning of Germany, requiring the world to take in stead its own separate circle of notions as the consummation of all wisdom. The activity of the German mind, the power of German thought, enter largely into the general movement of the world's life as it now stands, and must be respected accordingly. This plainly is coming to be more and more felt and acknowledged on all sides. Above all may the German life, in this way, lay claim to favorable regard on the side of the English. The two nationalities are closely bound together, by original inward affinity. One may be taken as in some sense the explanation and complement of the other. So as regards mere language. No man can understand the English fully, who has not some knowledge of its analogies with the German. And so then too, of course, as regards mind; for language is ever but the outward form of thought. To be truly and thoroughly English, is to be in sympathy at least with what is truly and thoroughly German at the same time.

N.

GOD IN CHRIST.—Three discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover. With a Preliminary Dissertation on Language. By *Horace Bushnell*. Hartford: 1849.

We acknowledge thankfully a copy of this work, received from the respected author; to a mere general notice of which however we find ourselves confined by our present limits. The Discourses made some noise when they were preached; and now that they are put into book form, they seem to be in a fair way to make a good deal more. The misery of it is however, with our theology, that a little *noise* is generally the end of any agitation to which it is brought in this way. Our theological controversies are apt to go off in a volley of newspaper squibs, with a few declamatory review articles, which in the end discuss nothing and settle nothing scientifically, but simply lay the whole subject at last on the shelf, to make room for some new excitement equally superficial and equally ephemeral. What has ever come of the great question broached in Dr. Bushnell's tract on *Christian Nurture*, at all answerable to the vital character of the interests involved in it? So it will be probably with this new work. This we may well regret. For however wrong Dr. Bushnell may be in his views, it is not enough to dispose of him in this summary style. We believe him to be wrong. But we are very sure, at the same time, that he is struggling in his spirit towards great truth, and that the things he is warring with in the actual theology of New England, are no spectres simply of his own imagination, but very substantial realities at bottom, that greatly need in some way to be dragged into the light and properly exposed. For this reason, we honor his book, and hope that it may do good. Even the errors of an earnest wakeful mind, battling with the problems of life in a living way, it has been well remarked, may be more deserving of veneration, than the true notions of those in whom all such earnestness is wanting. We trust that Dr. Bushnell is thus honest; and we know, that his thoughts and inquiries lie in the direction of what must be regarded as the great central interest of the age, the constitution of Christ's person, and, as determined by this, the true idea also of the Christian Church. We would fain hope too, that his true sense and meaning are far more orthodox, than to many

his language as it now stands may seem to imply. He discards the article of the *Eternal Generation* of the Son. We are sorry for this; it seems to us to overthrow the true doctrine of the Trinity. But New England Orthodoxy has done as much before, without allowing the necessity of any such consequence. Altogether, however, we have no taste for his toleration towards *Unitarianism*, as though it were part and parcel still of the ruptured New England Church. His view of the *Atonement*, if we get hold of it at all, seems to us to turn it into a pure fiction, and we see not how his Christ can be considered along with it to have much more substance than a Gnostic phantasm. If an *æsthetic* salvation is all that we need, sin must resolve itself at last into something less than the vast *moral* evil it is always represented to be in the Scriptures. We know very well the general false conception which it is the object of Dr. Bushnell to exclude; but that may be done far more effectually, we think, in a different way. We dislike again his opposition to what he calls *Dogma* in christianity, which must include, if we understand him, all systematic or scientific theology. Christianity is indeed primarily life, not doctrine; but it is such a life as requires to take full possession, in the end, of our whole human being. This includes knowledge as well as action; and why then should not the contents of the new creation lay claim to our understanding full as much as to our Will? Just here Dr. Bushnell falls into contradiction with himself; his New England habit of thought gets the better of the right churchly tendency, that lies involved in another part of his system. It is just *because* Christianity is a new life, that it must work like leaven into our whole existence, generating a theology or theoretic religion in its own form, as well as a religion of mere feeling and practice; and just for this reason, too, it must be a process going forward from one age to another. All life is *historical*, not a dead outward tradition, but an inward continuously active movement. Dogma then, historically taken, forms an essential element in the constitution of the Church. Christianity starts in the Apostles' Creed, and can be true in any age only as it continues to grow forth from this as its root; but it is not bound by any means confessionally, through all time, to the limits of Creed; just as little as the man is required to take his measure from the child, out of which, notwithstanding, all his growth springs. Dr. Bushnell is not prepared to do justice to the historical objective character of Christianity, as it meets us in the Universal Church.

N.